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UNITED STATES (party
plaintiff in racial
discrimination action)

Cert to CAll (Fay, Anderson,
Gibso
[scj]) (per curiam)

_...-0~

v.

PARADISE~

Federal/Civil

(black
party pl~ffs in
action)

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

that the CAll's affirmance of the

DC's imposition of a temporary one-black-for-one-white promotion

-

~ uota ) was in error under Title VII and under the Equal Protection

Clause.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

In 1972, the NAACP brought

this class action suit against the Alabama Department of Public
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~lleging

Safety and the Alabama Personnel Department,
of the Equal Protection Clause and 42

u.s.c.

violations

§§1981 and 1983.

These allegations centered around the alleged systematic failure
-·-----------~

of the Department to hire blacks to serve on the Alabama state
trooper force.

Petr was made a party plaintiff, as were resps

(resp Paradise individually and on behalf of the similarly
situated class of black plaintiffs).

v-

~·~~~

The DC found that the

Department had engaged in a "blatant and

.
cont1nuous

pattern and

-;;:c.

~

practice of discrimination in hiring," noting that in the 37-year

--

history of the state patrol there had been no black troopers.
The DC concluded that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment had
been shown and entered comprehensive injunctive relief.
Specifically, the DC enjoined the Department from engaging in
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices and ordered it to
hire one black trooper for each white trooper until the
percentage of blacks on the force reached about 25%.
On appeal to the old CA5, the Department did not challenge
the finding of a constitutional violation but contended that the
quota hiring relief unconstitutionally discriminated against
whites.

The CA5 held that white applicants who had higher

eligibility than blacks were not denied equal protection because
the selection procedures had not been shown to be accurate
predictors of successful job performance.

The CAS also upheld

the temporary racial hiring quotas as the only rational means to
eliminate the current effects of past racial discrimination.
Having rejected the constitutional arguments, the CAS also held

-3that the DC had not abused its discretion because the violation
was so clear and the Department's record so dismal.
In 1974, the plaintiffs moved in DC for further relief,
alleging that the Department had restricted the size of the
trooper force so as to frustrate the 1972 hiring order and that a
disproportionate number of blacks hired under the order failed to
attain permanent trooper status.

In 1975, the DC found that the

Department had manipulated the size of the force to frustrate the
relief gained by the plaintiffs and that the high black attrition
rate was caused by the Department's failure to hire the bestqualified black applicants and official discrimination in various
forms against blacks on the force.

The DC enjoined the

Department from limiting the force size to frustrate the 25%
hiring goal.
In 1977, the plaintiffs moved in the DC for supplemental
relief.

After extensive discovery, the parties entered into a

consent decree in 1979.

This decree explicitly recognized the

continuing effect of the 1972 and 1975 orders.

In the decree,

the Department agreed not to engage in any discriminatory act or
practice and to develop a nondiscriminatory procedure for
promotions to corporal.

The Department obligated itself to

develop this procedure within one year from the decree.

Once the

corporal promotion procedure had been validated, the Department
was to start on the promotion procedures for higher offices.

The

decree also provided that the plaintiffs could apply to the DC
for orders enforcing its terms or for other appropriate relief.
A few days after the signing of the 1979 decree, the Department

-4moved for clarification of the 1972 order's hiring quota
requirement and supplemental relief.

The DC declined to modify

the quota requirement.
In 1981, more than two years after the 1979 decree was
entered, the Department requested the DC to approve a new
examination to be used for promotions to corporal.

All the

plaintiffs, including petr, objected to such approval,
maintaining that the examination had not been validated and that
its use would not be justified if it had an adverse impact on
blacks.

Before a hearing on this issue could be held, however,

the parties entered into another consent decree.

In this 1981

decree, the parties agreed that the Department would use a
promotion procedure that had no adverse effects on blacks.

To

avoid unnecessary litigation, the Department would administer its
proposed test (for corporal) and then review it to see if it had
a prohibited adverse impact.

If it had no such adverse impact,

promotions would be made according to the ranking resulting from
the test.

If it did, however, promotions were to be made in

another, nondiscriminatory manner.

If the parties could not

agree, the matter was to be submitted to the DC.
In accordance with the 1981 decree, the Department
administered its written corporal exam.

This resulted in a rank-

ordering that would have had an adverse impact on black
applicants for promotion.

Petr suggested that the Department

abide by the 1981 decree and formulate a nondiscriminatory
promotion scheme.

The Department had indicated that it needed to

promote 16-20 persons to corporal, and petr objected to these

-5promotions being made in rank order from the list resulting from
the test.
In 1983, resps moved in DC for an order enforcing the 1979
and 1981 decrees.

They sought an order requiring the Department

to promote blacks and whites to corporal at the same rate until
such time as the Department implemented a valid and
nondiscriminatory promotion procedure.

Resps noted that even

though blacks had been employed in the Department for 11 years,
only four had advanced beyond the lowest rank.

According to

resps, the relief requested was necessary to enforce the promises
made in the earlier decrees.
Petr opposed the imposition of the 1-for-1 promotional
quota, contending that such relief was inconsistent with the 1981
decree, exceeded the DC's remedial authority under
was unconstitutional.

~itle

VII, and

Petr did agree, however, that some

nondiscriminatory promotions should be ordered so as to enforce
the earlier decrees.
The Department agreed with petr that imposition of a
promotion quota was unconstitutional but argued that it should be
given the chance to show that its proposed promotion procedure
was valid and did not adversely affect blacks.

The Department

was joined by four white applicants for promotion to corporal
(representing those white applicants who ranked above the
highest-ranked black applicant) who intervened, claiming that the
decrees were illegal and unconstitutional.
The DC allowed the white applicants to intervene-prospectively only.

The DC then determined that the Department's

-6proposed promotion procedure adversely affected blacks.
the DC enjoined use of that procedure.

Thus,

The DC also ordered the

Department to submit a plan to promote 15 persons to corporal
that would not have a discriminatory effect.
A few weeks later, the Department submitted to the DC a
proposal to promote 15 troopers to corporal--4 of whom would be
black.

(This percentage reflected the percentage of those taking

the corporal's test who were black.)

The Department also

requested a period of time to submit a non-discriminatory
corporal promotion plan to submit for prior court approval.
Resps opposed this plan, noting that it failed to account
for their injury due to the Department's delay in implementing
the 1979 decree's nondiscriminatory promotion requirements.

This

delay had not only disadvantaged blacks trying to be promoted to
corporal but those seeking to be promoted from corporal to higher
ranks as well.

Resps again requested a 1-for-1 promotion plan

until such time as a valid procedure was put in place.

Petr, on

the other hand, did not oppose the Department's 15 and 4
promotion plan.

Petr did oppose the suggestion that a test be

approved by the court before its use on the ground that this
would violate the 1981 decree's requirement that a plan be
administered to see if it adversely affected blacks.

The white

interventors opposed any quota and contended that the promotions
should be by rank order from the 1981 corporal promotion exam.
The DC granted resps motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981
decrees, noted the striking lingering effects of the Department's
past discrimination in the absence of blacks in the higher ranks,

-7and agreed that a 1-for-1 promotion plan should be imposed for
promotions to all ranks until either (1) about 25% of the rank
was black or

(2) the Department formulated a nondiscriminatory

promotion procedure.

The DC also ordered the Department to

submit a schedule for development of nondiscriminatory promotion
procedures for all ranks.

The entry of quotas was appropriate,

the DC believed, because it was temporary, it did not require the
discharge of any white troopers, it did not require the promotion
of any unqualified black troopers, it did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white troopers, and it was specifically
tailored to redress the present effects of past discrimination.
The DC noted that the Department could end the quota at any time
simply by adopting acceptable promotion procedures.
In 1984, eight black troopers and eight white troopers were
promoted to corporal.

Following these promotions, the Department

developed and implemented a plan for promotions to corporal,
which the DC allowed the Department to use.

All parties but

resps appealed to the CAll from the 1-for-1 order.

Only the

white intervenors appealed from the second order of the DC
allowing the Department to use the new corporal promotion plan.
On appeal, the CAll first addressed the objections to the 1for-1 order.

The CAll turned first to the question whether the

DC's order was a proper enforcement of the earlier decrees or
whether it was an improper modification.

The CAll determined

that the order was proper enforcement of those decrees.

The 1979

decree specifically allowed the plaintiffs to move for
enforcement of the decree or for other appropriate relief.

-8Further, since the parties were unable to agree on whether the
examination adversely affected blacks, the DC was required, under
the 1981 decree, the resolve that issue.

The DC's remedial order

was specifically stated to be in accordance with the 1981
decree's provision that the DC fashion a remedy if the parties
could not agree.

The CAll, having held that the procedures were

in accord with the decrees, went on to hold that the substantive
relief was as well.

The decrees were aimed at eliminating

discrimination based on race and, although isolated provisions
could be taken as forbidding adverse effects because of race
generally, the clear motivating objective of these decrees was to
forbid adverse effects on blacks rather than on whites.

Thus,

the DC's order was authorized by the decrees and within their
;

scope.
The CAll then turned to the issue of the order's compliance
with Title VII.

The CAll rejected the argument that Firefighters

Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984), precluded
the award of relief to those who had never been found to be the
actual victims of discrimination.

(Here, there had never been a

finding of discrimination in promotions.)

Although agreeing that

"a superficial reading of Stotts" might support this position,
the CAll distinguished it on its facts.

First, it noted that the

issue there involved the DC's authority to override a bona fide
seniority system to require the layoff of more senior whites.
Here, the issue was promotions rather than layoffs, and §703(h)
of Title VII was thus not a controlling factor.

Second, the

defendant in Stotts never admitted to intentional discrimination.

-9Here, however, there were judicial findings of entrenched
intentional discrimination.
VII action.
Amendment.

Third, Stotts was primarily a Title

Here, the case was brought under the Fourteenth
And fourth,

(even assuming that this case could

properly be viewed as a Title VII case), Stotts did not involve
the enforcement of a voluntary consent decree.

There, the DC had

modified the decree over the objection of the parties.

Here,

however, the DC simply took appropriate action to enforce the
consent decrees.

The CAll noted further that this voluntary

action would be easier to justify than a similar order imposed by
the DC in its remedial capacity.
Finally, the CAll addressed the intervenors' equal
protection claim.

Noting the absence of a definitive ruling by

this Court on a ffirmative action programs, the CAll noted various
tests enunciated by various courts and finally concluded that the
order was not violative of equal protection.

First, there was a

long history of discrimination on the part of the Department.
And the quota was clearly designed to remedy the present effects
of this past discrimination.

The 25% goal was also appropriate

as it reflected the 25% hiring goal in the 1972 order, which was
affirmed on appeal.

Further, the 1975 order had made clear that

this goal applied to all ranks.

In addition, the

C~ll

found that

the quota was substantially related to the objective of
eradicating the present effects of past discrimination and that
it did not exceed what was necessary to remedy the longstanding
racial imbalance in the upper ranks of the Department.

The quota

was also temporary, within the power of the Department to

-10eliminate (by complying with the prior orders and decrees), did
not require that any white trooper be discharged, demoted, or
replaced, and provided that only qualified black troopers would
be promoted.
The CAll also concluded that the plan did not violate Title
VII, see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443

u.s.

193

(1979), and that the DC had had a sufficient factual record
before it to properly reach that conclusion.
In response to the intervenors' claim that the more recent
Department promotion program was improper, the CAll also affirmed
the DC's approval of that program.

(That ruling is not at issue

in this petition.)
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr first contends that the CAll erred in

concluding that the DC order here was simply an enforcement
order.

Rather, petr asserts that it was a modification of the

consent decrees.

This is so because the earlier decrees did not

provide for a 1-for-1 promotion quota.

In any case, if this is

not a modification, it presents the same issue as Local 93 v.
City of Cleveland, No. 84-1999, and should be held for that case.
(In Local 93, the issue is a racial preference incorporated in a
consent judgment.)

In any case, even if this was not a

modification, it presents issues similar to those in Local 28 v.
EEOC, No. 84-1656, and Wygant v. Jackson County Board of
Education, No. 84-1340.

In Local 28, the racial preference was

awarded by the court and is challenged under Title VII; in
Wygant, the racial preference was incorporated in a collective
bargaining agreement and is challenged under the Equal Protection

-11-

Clause.

The decisions in those three cases are likely to afford

substantial guidance in this case, and this case should be held
pending their disposition.
On the merits, petr adopts the arguments made in the SG's
briefs in those three cases (which I will not repeat here except
to note that petr is opposed to the use of racial quotas in the
affirmative action context).

Petr does, however, add a few

comments about this particular case.

First, the CAll incorrectly

distinguished this case from Stotts.

Stotts does not apply only

where seniority rights are abridged.

Further, Stotts cannot be

satisfactorily distinguished as not involving a consent decree.
In addition, that the DC predicated its order on findings of past
intentional discrimination is beside the point.

Further, the

fact that these quotas were premised on a constitutional
violation is incorrect (petr argues that they were based on Title
VII although the CAll said they weren't) and in any case these
quotas are no more acceptable because of that.

(Petr cites to

pertinent passages in its briefs on the merits of the various
cases in support of these summary arguments.)
Petr also questions the CAll's holding that the relief
awarded is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.

A federal

court is also subject to the constraints of the Equal Protection
Clause, and its action here violated those protections.
Resps review the factual history of this litigation in some
detail and then agree with petr that the Court should grant cert.
This case presents questions substantially similar to those
presented in Local 28 and Local 93, but it presents those

-12questions in a slightly different context: the enforcement of a
consent decree where intentional discrimination has been found.
The decisions in those cases will provide only "substantial
clarification" of the issues here, and thus this case should be
consolidated and heard with them.

Resps then argue that only

numerical race-conscious relief could remedy the discrimination
here.

In egregious cases such as this, only this type of relief

will remedy past discrimination.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The first issue, whether the DC's actions

were properly within the scope of the prior consent decrees or
constituted a modification of those decrees, seems clearly
factbound and not certworthy.

Further, as a preliminary question

that might affect the resolution of the underlying substantive
issues presented in this case, it might well render this entire
case inappropriate for review by this Court.

Nevertheless, petr

is correct that Local 28, Local 93, and Wygant should shed some
light on the issues presented by this case.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend a HOLD for Wygant, No. 84-

1340, Local 28, No. 84-1656, and Local 93, No. 84-1999.
There is a response.
January 28, 1986
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The procedural history of this

Paradise

c~

is somewhat com licaft:: .

The essential facts are as follows. ~ 19~, the NAACP broug t a
class action against the Alabama state trooper force alleging
that the force had engaged in discriminatory hiring and promotion
practices in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 u.s.c.
SS1981 and 1983. The United States was made a party plaintiff
p nd Mr. Paradise was permi~ed to intervene on behalf of a class
f) C- 1-v~ black plaintiffs. The "f> istr ict Court (then Chief Judge Frank
Q-1 .. ~-- Johnson) found that the trooper force had engaged in a blatant
f'~- ~ nd continuous
attern and ractice of discrimination in hiring.
He oun
a 1n the
years o
e n1s ory
e patrol that
~
there had never been a black _trooper. Pet. 3a. The court
concluded t ha t oefen~ ad vio l ated the Fourteenth Amendment
and enjoined them from engaging in discriminating on the basis of
race and ordered them, inter alia, to hire one_ black troog er for
eac~ hired until blacks C:o mpr fSe d 25 % o f t he force.
The defendants appealed and CAS affirmed.

In 1975, the District Court found that defendants had
artificially restricted the size of the trooper force in order to
frustrate the 1972 order. Based on this finding, the court
enjoined the defendants from artificially restricting the size of
the force for the purpose of delaying or frustrating achievement
of the goal of having blacks comprise 25% of the trooper force.
In 1977, plaintiffs returned to the District Court seeking
supplemental relief in the face of defendants' recalcitrance. In
1979, the parties entered into a partial consent decree in which
they explicitly recognized the continuing effect of the courts
1972 and 1975 orders. Pet. 9a. The defendants also agreed, with
respect to iDr~motion~ to develop within one year a promotion
procedure th'a wouia e fair to all applicants and that would
have little or no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to
corporal. Id.
In 1979, one year after the deadline contained in the
consent decree, defendants moved the District Court for approval

P

Gl!A

~f (_a_,;_ os:=~ pr; ;tio{ ~:_
W (J'"

1

~o-g4-/,~b

I

:

~s J a: : t

the United States objected to this proposed
unfair
to blacks. Before a hearin could be held n this issue, the
parties entered into another consent deere • In that decree, the
parties agreed that de en an s proposed examination would be
administered and scored. Thereafter, the promotion register
(rank listing of individuals who took the exam) would be reviewed
to determine whether it had an adverse impact on blacks. If the
procedure would have little or no adverse impact on blacks, it
would be implemented. If, however, the parties agreed or the
court found that the procedure did have an adverse impact,
promotions were to be made in a way that does not result in such
an impact. Specifically, defendants were to submit an
alternative proposal. If the parties then failed to agree on a
method for making proposals, the matter was to be submitted to
the court for resolution.
n.,_~
In accordance with the 1981 decree, ~ defendants administered
the exam. Upon reviewing the examination results, the United
States objected to the use of the procedure on that ground that
it would have a substantial adverse impact on black applicants
for promotion to corporal. Pet. 14a-15a.

~

~

Nothing more seems to have transpired until 1983, when the
plaintiffs moved the District Court for an order enforcing the
terms of the 1979 and 1982 decrees. They requested an order
requiring defendants to promote one black to corporal for each
white promoted until the defendants implement a valid promotional
procedure. The u.s. agreed that that the decrees should be
enforced by ordering some promotions but without ordering a onefor-one quota. Shortly after the motion to enforce was filed,
four white applicants intervened on behalf of a class of white

~~roopers.
--/

t"'l-

r

~ trf ~-?

The District Court ultimate! granted plaintiffs' motion to
enforce and- o r:stma 'the trooper f rce to ''promote'" one black for
ever* ~bite ~ t ~l 25% of the ra ~ k 's composed of blac k troopers
o r t e derenaants have developed and implemented a promotion plan
for the rank conforming with all the prior orders and decrees.
The court observed that almost 12 years had passed since the
inception of the litigation and E'fie eFfects of the prior
discriminatory hiring practice were still being felt. The court
noted that:

•of the 6 majors, there is still not one black.
Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black. Of
the 35 lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of
the 65 sergeants, there is still not one black. And of
the 66 corporals, only four are black. • • • Moreover,
the department is still without acceptable procedures
for advancement of black troopers into this structure,
and it does not appear that any procedures will be in

place within the near future."
original).

Pet. 20a (emphasis in

The trooper force, the United States, and the intervenors
all appealed the District Courts judgment to CAll. Three of the
issues before CAll are the issues raised by the Unite d States in
this petition for cert. They are:
1) Whether the District Court's order impermissibly modified
the consent decrees of 1979 and 1981.
2) Whether the District Court exceeded its remedial
authority under S706(g) in awarding relief that benefits
individuals who are not proven to have been the ' victims of past
discrimination.
,,
/1
3) Whether the one-for-one quota violates the Equal
Protection Clause.

cA 1t '{

CAll held first that the District Court's order merely
implemented rather than modified the consent decree, noting that
~
the parties expressly contemplated that in a situation where they
1~<
~
._
could not agree the District Court would formulate a promotion
~
plan. Second, the court observed that the instant suit was
~ ~-~
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, not Title VII, and that
~thus Stotts (and by extension S706(g)) had no relevance here.
~·
The court went on to state, though, that even assuming that this
~
case is properly v i ewed as a Title VII case, Stotts is
~
distinguishable and S706(g) does not limit the authority of
~
courts to enter consent decrees. Pet. 32a-33a. Finally, the
A~~~
court held that the District Court's order is substantially
~ '~:related to the objective of eradicating the present effects of
~/
past discrimination and extends no further than necessary to
v -~ . ~ remedy the egregious and longstanding discriminatory practices of
~~
defendants. The court noted t ~ t it is a temporary measure,
~~
which will cease to exist whe nJihe percentage f 1gure 1s met or
(~~~~when the~per rorce ~ aevelops a valid promotion procedure. The
L/7court also found significant the facts that the ~rder does not
require the discharge or demotion of whites or the replacement of
a wh 1 ~ r wifE a D!aaK one. The court concluded that ' ~ _ ,_
absent the order, the trooper force would not cease its
~J
discriminatory practices. Id., at 4la.

/P

vJ1

f

Only the United States has petitioned for certiorari,
rais i ng the issues listed above. Because the plaintiffs in this
case litigated it as a Fourteenth Amendment case, rather than as
a Title VII case, S706(g) and our decisions explicating S706(g)
in
1 93 and Local 28 are inapposite. I will therefore vote
to eny on questions 1 and 2. And, since the parties whose equal
p o
ion rights are implicated by the District Court's order,
t e class of white troopers who intervened below, have apparently
decided to live with the order and ~ petitioned for
certiorari, I believe that we shoul ~ n question 3 as well.
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UNITED STATES v. PARADISE(CAll)

MEMO TO BOB:
This is a brief memo to you, Bob,

as you mentioned

that this was your case and you found it difficult.
case has a 14-year hi story,
the

Alabama

Department)

State

This

from which it is clear that

Department

of

Public

Safety

(the

"egregiously discriminated" against Blacks in

both employment and promotion for many years.
complicated

by

the

prolonged

litigation,

The case is
including

particularly the entry by the DC of two "consent decrees"
that are complicated both as
the extent of violations.

to their meaning and as to

If I

understand the promotion

procedure included in the consent decree of 1981, when it
was followed by the Department
am not sure),
the

rank

of

(as I believe it was, but

no blacks would have been promoted even to
corporal.

In an order

entered October 28,

1983, the DC agreed that the 1981 promotion procedure was
unacceptable because it had an "adverse impact" on black
applicants.

On December 15, 1983, the case now before us,

the DC granted Paradise's motion to enforce the consent
decrees

(I

assume,

except with respect to the promotion

4[..

procedure that had failed to attain its purpose).

The DC

imposed a fixed quota requiring the Department:
"To promote from this day forward, for each
white trooper promoted to a higher rank, one
black trooper to the same rank, if there is a
black
trooper
objectively
qualified
to
be
promoted to that rank."
The

court

found

that

this

quota

was

"racial imbalances in the upper rank".

necessary

to

It is to be noted

that the earlier dissent decrees had been limited,
recall,

to promotions to corporal.

applies to promotions to all ranks.

cure

as I

The DC's latest order
The Court of Appeals

first rejected the contention that the DC, in ordering the
"one

black

for

one

white

promotion

quota"

had

"modified, rather than enforce, the 1979 and 1981 dissent
decrees.

The DC reached this conclusion by construing the

consent decrees to bar any "adverse impact" only against
blacks,

and

not

against

whites,

who

sought

promotion.

After agreeing that there was no improper modification of
the consent decrees,

CAll held

violated neither Title VII

that the promotion quota

(a question not before us on

this appeal), nor the Equal Protection Clause.

The Court

of

"the

Appeals

sustained

the

quota

because

of

history of discrimination in the Department,

long

and because

3.

the "relief was designed to remedy the present effects of
past

discrimination".

importance
concluded

at
that

unqualified
qualified

least
the

for

me,

quota

black

white

Moreover,
is

did

not

troopers,

troopers

and

did

"from

of

the

considerable

fact

require
not

that

CAll

promotion

absolutely

advancement

through

of
bar
the

ranks", and did not "require the discharge or demotion of
a white trooper or the replacement of a white trooper with
a black trooper."
As the SG argues in its well-written brief,
of

the

"less

courts

below

intrusive

or

considered
more

whether

narrowly

there

tailored

neither
were

any

means

of

enforcing the Department's compliance with its obligations
under

the

brief, P.

consent

decrees."

I

note here

that

the SG' s

13, n. 6, states that the one on one promotion

quota has been applied in actual practice only once, that
8

blacks

have

been promoted since

the DC' s

decree,

and

that the constitutionality now has "limited retrospective
importance

since

its

invalidation

could

demotion of the 8 blacks promoted under
the

quota

could

have

significant

should be strictly followed.

future

not

it."

lead

to

Of course

effects

if

it

The principle adverse effect

on whites would be that less well-qualified blacks would

't •

I would assume

be promoted over better-qualified whites.
this would have

an adverse effect on

the morale of the

white officers,

and also could have an adverse effect on

recruitment by the State Department.
As would be expected, petitioners - and particularly
the SG

rely on Justice 0' Connor's and my opinions

Wyga~ .

Respondents

understandably

prefer

to

in

rely

primarily on our decisions last Term in Local 93 and Local
28,
were

particularly the latter.
Title

VII

cases,

but

To be sure,
it

can

be

both of those

argued

that

the

rationale is relevant particularly in view here - as was
true

in

Local

28

of

a

decade

or

more

of

grossly

discrimatory conduct by the State.
I

have

spent relevantly

and certainly am not at rest.

little time on the briefs,
This is a more difficult

case for me than the three cases we decided last Term.

I

will adhere to the reasoning of my Wyga ~ opinion unless I
am persuaded to compromise to some extent on the facts of
this case by Justice O'Connor's views.
we will decide this case
did
Nor,

if we are together,

not understand Justice White's
of course,

do

I

My guess is that

reasoning

although I
last Term.

know how Justice Scalia may think

Jo

about the extremely perplexing questions that arise under
affirmative action programs.
I

therefore

will

welcome

particularly

your

views,

Bob, and please feel free to express them with candor.
add only

that

I

am sympathetic

I

to the grave problem of

blacks seeking upward mobility in competition with whites.
This

is

a

problem that

is experienced

in education and

particularly in the professional schools.
the

several

hundred

law

clerks

here

For example, in

since

I

became

a

Justice I can recall only three who were black and one of
these

was

sympathy,

from
I

one

think

of
it

the
is

African

essential

decision making.
LFP, JR.

countries.
to

have

Despite
principled

ral 10/25/86
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1$ ....

S_.u_ A~~
To:
From:

October 25, 1986

Justice Powell
Bob

No. 85-999, United States v. Paradise
Cert. to CAll (Fay, Anderson, Gibson) (per curiam)
Wednesday, November 12, 1986 (1st case)

Question Presented

orbid

Does the Equal
one-black-for-one-white

~ E/fJ c~- Td4 V7T

promotion

discrimination against blacks?

s

a

imposition
remedy

for

of ~ 'f~
past

2.

I.

BACKGROUND
The history of this litigation is a long, sad story.

class

action

Department

began

of

in

1972,

Public

when

Safety

against blacks in hiring.

the

NAACP

(Department)

~r.

In~Judge

District

the

v blatant

and

that

continuous

Alabama

discriminating

intervened on behalf of a

class of black plaintiffs.
held

for

the

The United States joined the action as

a plaintiff, and Phillip Paradise,

Judge,

sued

This

Frank Johnson, then a

Department

pattern

of

had

"engaged

discrimination

NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705

in

in

a

hiring."

(MD Ala.), J.A. 25.

Judge

Johnson based his holding on the "unexplained and unexplainable"
fact that "[i]n the thirty-seven year history of the patrol there
has

'-....-

~

~'

--

never

been

a

black

trooper."

Id.

____....______
,,

the

. Department to adopt a one-black-for-one-whit

~uch time as blacks
~~~-~ trooper fo / T\
,,

•t

In ~

ntil

made up approximately 25

the

DC

found

that

the

Department,

"for

the

purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the plaintiff
class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and
the number of new troopers hired."

J.A. 34.

The DC enjoined the

Department's conduct and ordered the Department to file progress
reports w6

- the DC.

In 197 ,
whether t
(i.e.,

the Department returned to the DC to determine

25 percent goal applied to the entire trooper force

sergeants,

troopers.

Because

lieutenants,
the

etc.)

Department

or

only

prori\otes

to

only

entry-level
from

its

own

ranks, the Department argued, blacks would make up 25 percent of
;

3.

the entire force only if they filled 37.5 percent of the entrylevel positions.

The DC, held that the 25 percent figure applies
9

Itt.:

-232---state

"[A]s of November 1, 1978," the DC noted,

to the entire force.
"out of

troopers

at

there still is not one black.
positions

would

be

to

the

.

ignore

rank of corporal or

,n....~

above,

To focus only on entry-level
that

past

discrimination

by

the

Department was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they
are manifest."

Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 {MD

Ala. 1979), J.A. 63.
Also in 1979, the parties entered
consent

objective •
and

"to

[a]

have

as
is

procedure when

used

or

no

utilize

a

agreed

to

"have

as

objective

fair

utilization

to all applicants

either

for

impact

37,

the

an

The

40.

blacks

is

promotion

further

agreed

"to

in conformity with

the
J.A.

of the EEOC, the Departments of Justice and Labor, and the Civil
Service Commission.)

The Department agreed to submit a procedure

for promoting entry-level

corporal

was

40, 45.

troopers

to corporal by February 16,

Once the procedure for making promotions to

approved,

the

Department

validate

procedures

for

sergeant,

lieutenant,

captain,

'·''

a,_

making

agreed

promotions

and major.

to

to

In the

develop
the

ranks

interim,

~y~

to

' •·

J.S.

-

promotion ~

ranking will have

seeking

Department

promotion procedure which

a

(The Uniform Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1607, are a joint product

1980.

~.. \

and which promotion ~~

screening or

upon

of

1978 Uniform Guidelines [on Employee] Selection Procedures,
40.

~

1/~

' -v-~

adverse
J.A.

corporal."

Department

the first of two

promotion system that is racially neutral "

an

procedure which

little

The

agreements.

in ~o

and
of
the

~

Ao

4.

parties agreed to use the state merit system to make promotions
to corporal.

1 f j'tJ :

In February, 1980, four blacks and six whites were

promoted to corporal un - er the interim agreement.

'I ::a-~

~~~

the Department

~l-ui.

submitted to the

procedure for promoting troopers to to the

~

rank of corporal.

The Department proposed to weigh four factors:

In April,

than

a

year

late,

a written examination (60 percent); a supervisor's evaluation (20
percent); length of service (10 percent); and service ratings (10
percent).
the

The United States and Paradise initially objected to

proposal

validated

as

Guidelines.
however,

because

the

written

job-related

in

examination

accordance

w

had
h-

The parties entered into

under

which

the

not

been

the---Un1f

consent

Department

tered

the

other ~

examination, evaluated the results in
three

factors,

and

ranked

the

applicants

for

corporal

on

a

1

t promotion register : \ The parties agreed that the procedure would
be considered to have an adverse impact if it failed the "fourfifths" test set out in the Uniform Guidelines (that is, if the
selection rate for black applicants was less than 80 percent of
the selection rate for white applicants).
have

an

adverse

impact,

alternative procedure.

the

Department

If the procedure did
agreed

to

propose an

If the parties were unable to agree on an

alternative procedure, the matter would be "submitted to the [DCl
for resolution."

J.A.

53.

No further

promotions

to corporal

were to be made until a satisfactory procedure was in place.
The

-------

promotion

register

compiled

on

the

basis

of

Id.
the

written examination and the other factors ranked 260 applicants,

5.

of whom 60 (23 percent) were black.
in the top half of the register;
ranked

~ightieth.

prom~tions

20

Only five blacks were listed
the highest-ranking black was

The Department proposed to make no more than

from

the

list.

Thus,

no blacks would have been

promoted to corporal under the Department 1 s proposed procedure.
The Department

submitted

promotions, for the f
In
consent

aradise

decrees
to

implement a

alternative proposal,

by

and

made

no

imposing

corporal

asked

the

DC

to

enforce

the

a one-black-to-one-white quota for

"until

such

time

as

the

defendants

valid promotional procedure." J .A.

62.

The UnitErl

States agreed that the DC should order promotion of some blacks,
but

opposed

Department 1 s

a

one-for-one

1981

The

quota.

procedures

would

have

DC
an

agreed
adverse

that

the

impact

on

blacks, and that the Department "needs additional corporals and •
.

• needs at least 15 of them as soon as possible."

Prescott,

580

F.

Supp.

171

(M.

D.

Ala.),

J.A.

Paradise v.
119.

The

DC

ordered the Department to submit, by November 10, 1983, a plan to
promote at least fifteen troopers to corporal that would not have
an adverse impact on blac
Ch November

~~~

10,

the

Department

submitted

promote 11 whites and 4 blacks to corporal.
the

four-fifths

test

because

would have been black,
were

black.

The

27

percent

of

a

proposal

to

This proposal met
the

new corporals

while only 23 percent of the applicants

Department

promised

to

develop

a

permanent

procedure for promotion to corporal "as soon as possible."
126.

/

lowing nine months.

April

promotions

no

J.A.

The United States did not oppose the proposal, but Paradise

U . ~.

6.

'$3

continued to insist on a one-to-one quota.

/

15, the

On

DC imposed a one-black-to-one-white promotion

above

the

entry

level

objectively

rank,

"if

there

is

a

black

trooper

o be promoted to the rank," "until either

approximately 25 percent of the rank is black or the [Department
has]

developed and implemented a

rank."

J.A.

128.

for

the

schedule
ranks"

within

Department

The DC ordered
development

promoted

8

of

J.A.

days.

35

corporal.

[valid]

the Department

promotion
In

129.

blacks

promotion plan for the

and

8

to submit "a

procedures
February,

whites

to

the

for

all

1984,

the

rank

of

) ttf

On June 19,

the Department submitted a new proposal for
/\

making promotions to corporal.

_____

On July 27, the DC suspended the

~

one-for-one
---_.______
promotion quota and ruled that the Department could

---promote

up

to

procedure.

DC

to

ordered

corporal

the

parties

under
to

its

proposed

proceed

with

the procedure could be validated under the

Uniform Guidelines.

Under the new procedure, ten white troopers

three

black

troopers

were

promoted

to

corporal.

The

Department has also proposed procedures for making promotions to

~ ~ ~

sergeant.

';:~

ranks

Because no blacks are yet eligible for promotion to \

above

>

sergeant,

the

one-to-one

quota

is

not

effect

for

those ranks either.

C \\
~d
~

The

troopers

determining whether

and

fX'

13

~l

consolidated the various appeals from the DC' s orders

affirmed

in all respects.

CAll rejected the argument that

the one-for-one quota was an improper modification of the 1979
and 1981 Consent Decrees.

Those decrees barred procedures having

w.-

7.

an adverse impact on blacks, but did not bar procedures having an
adverse

impact

on

whites.

CAll

held

that

the

one-for-one

promotion quota was constitutional in light of "the long history
of discrimination in the Department" and because the quota "was
designed to remedy the present effects of past discrimination."

II.

DISCUSSION
A. Standing.

~e

parties,

~~
~lthough the issue

is not raised by any of

some of the law clerks have questioned whether the

United

States

has

standing

to

litigate

the

equal

protection

claim.

You will recall that the United States, the only party to

petition for cert., asked the Court to consider whether the onefor-one quota violates Title VII.

The United States clearly has

standing to raise the Title VII question.

The Court'

however I

,a_ fe.•H d-e~

~k ~

~~~ ~.

7k.t.. u.~.
..

a

l

k~~
~ 'Tl.JL'

.
1 question.
.
.
grante d review
on 1 y on t h e consti.
tutiona

The government was a party below, and so was entitled to ~ · i'$J
petition for cert. under 28
Rule

19.6,

"[a]ll

"

respondents
are

"respondents

government

may

constitutional

not

u.s.c.

parties

§1254 (1).

other

than

supporting

that

constitutional standing

the

petitioner."

River

be

E/t1 .

Although

the

Associates,

-

Article III standing to litigate the
/,}.- )... ',R.A4f(
ttl~
troopers
the Department and the white

"'

the

In an identical situation,

presence

of

a

respondent

"assures that an admittedly

controversy is now before the Court."
North

shall

have

claim,

held

petitioners

~~~

Court ~ l.h"-

The Department and the white troopers thus

clearly do have Article III standing.
the ' Court

Under Supreme

459

u.s.

297,

with

justiciable

Director, OWCP v. Perini
305

(1983).

There

now

seems to be general agreement,
Perini disposes of the standing problem.
B. Mootness and Ripeness.
decision by
case.
and

this

Court will

It seems quite possible that a

have

no practical

shown

not

to

promoted
would

be

have

re-imposed

an

adverse

to corporal
not

the

effect on

while

demoted

be

unless

this

the quota was
if

even

5 79 n.

("Lower courts

( 1984)

actual

victims

does

The

eigh

in effec

were

At

oral

held

561,

extend

bumping

employees

The SG concedes that the Court's

--

ruling will have "limited retrospective importance."
5.

blacks

y held that relief

not

previously occupying jobs.")

n.

re

apparently

the

Memphis Firefighters

11

current procedures

blacks.

unconstitutional.

13

in

The one-for-one quota has been suspended as to all ranks,

will

for

effect

-

argument,

the

SG brf., at

~

Court

should

ask

the

to ~ -

SG

concede that a decision in this case will have no retrospective
effect,

in

or,

the

alternative,

to

specify

the

"limited"

retrospective effects that a decision will have.
The SG argues that the one-for-one promotion requirement
"has continuing prospective effects,"
re-imposed

for

promotions

selection procedures
effect

on

blacks,

higher

ranks

if

now
and

the

in

to

because the quota may be

corporal

use

because

are
the

Department

promotion criteria at those levels.

and

shown
quota

fails

to

have

will

be

to

Id.

sergeant

develop

if

the

an adverse
imposed

for

acceptable

The fact remains that ~tA-t..
] , . - - - - - ____::J

the

~-for-one

requirement may never be re-im

~-

views

the

one-for-one

requirement

as

an

sed.

The SG also

unconstitutional

"in

rt..L.

9.

terrorem" threat.
"threat"

by

SG brf. 24.
DC

a

to

I am far from certain that a mere

re-impose

the

quota

makes

the

The DC might,

constitutionality of the quota ripe for

review.

after all,

in response to changed

alter

Moreover,

circumstances.
Department

its order at any time

into

required--that

doing
is,

to

the DC is not trying to "coerce" the

anything

more

eliminate

the

than

is

constitutionally

continuing

effects of the

J

Department's past racial discrimination.
In short,

I am inclined to think that a challenge to the

promotion of the 8 blacks is moot, and that the challenge to the
continuing effects of the one-for-one quota is unripe.

/3oi~

The issue

is not well briefed, however, and discussion at oral argument may ~
alter my view.

c.

The Merits.

Although this is by no means an easy case,

your prior opinions establish a
.
call

ana lysi ~.

ramework for

"Racial

distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus
for

the most

exacting

judicial

examination."

u.s.

University of California v. Bakke, 438
POWELL, J.,

joined by WHITE, J.).

Regents

of

265, 291 (opinion of

"[T]he level of scrutiny does

not change merely because the challenged classification operates
against

a

group

governmental

that

historically

discrimination."

has

Wygant

Education, slip op. at 5 (May 19, 1986)
classification
examination.

based
______...,
~'

on

race
any

is

racial

not
v.

been

Jackson

u.s.

429, 432

to

Board

of

(plurality opinion).

subject

to

a

(1984).

Any

two-pronged

classification

justified by a compelling governmental interest.'"
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466

subject

'must

be

Id., quoting

"Second, the means

A 1-rr.<-1-/2 ~/..."7'4t

10.

chosen • . . to effectuate

[the]

purpose must must be 'narrowly

tailored to the achievement of that goal.'"
5, guoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
1.

Compelling

government

has

a

interest.
compelling

u.s.

The

Wygant, slip op. at
448, 480 (1980}.

parties

interest

agree

in

that

remedying

the
past

~

a..--t.-

~

discrimination by a public employer.

The DC found a pattern of 11--f:ii:l.t

racial

promotion,

discrimination

overwhelming

in

hiring

and

evj~~~pport those findings.

k

is

~~t

In this respect

~

and

there

~ the case i ,r;;;;-;ike ~lip op. at 8-10, a d sirnila to Local ~
~ 28 of the ~tal Workers' International Association v. EEOC
~

(July 2, 1986}.

In Sheet Metal Workers, you wrote:

The finding by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals that petitioners have engaged in egregious
violations of Title VII establishes, without doubt, a
compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify
the imposition of a racially classified remedy.
It
would be difficult to find defendants more determined
to
discriminate
against
minorities.
My
inquiry,
therefore, focuses on whether the District Court's
remedy
is
'narrowly
tailored. '
to
the
goal
of
eradicating
the
discrimination
engaged
in
by
petitioners"
Slip op.

at 3

(citation omitted}.

To be sure,

the 50 percent

quota is a court-ordered remedy rather than a voluntary program
of affirmative

action.

CAll,

however,

held

that

the quota

is

within the terms of the consent decrees, and the Court declined
to

grant

moreover,

cert.
the

on

this

issue.

Department's

As

appalling

in

Sheet

record

of

compliance with the judgments of federal courts."

Metal

Workers,

obstructionism ~..
Slip op. at 3.

I thus have no difficulty concluding that the order is supported

-----

by a compelling government interest.

c;~f

11.

Narrowly-tailored

2.

remedy.

In

evaluating

the

29

percent non-white membership goal goal in Sheet Metal Workers,
and the 10 percent minority business set-aside in Fullilove, you
considered

~he

five

factors tlt he efficacy of alternative

~f

planned

the

remedy~he

remedies:

relationship between the

percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage
of

"

minority

group

members

a:& e

met:

the

relevant

(!f)

the
I
availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be

.

in

population:

.

effect
of
......__.....,

the remedy upon innocent third parties •

~ the analysis that follows, it seemed most useful to break the
into
corporals: and

two parts:

(2)

( 1)

the one-time order

the "continuing" order to @

to hire 15

ne black for

white until acceptable promotion procedures are put in place.
a.

alternative

remedies.

to the E e-time ~ r § ,

As

the

Department concedes that it had an "immediate" need for at least
fifteen

new

The

corporals.

Department's

record

of

inactivity

strongly suggests that no remedy short of a direct order to make
some

promotions

'---

would

have

resolved

the

short-term

crisis.

Indeed, the United States agreed "that the consent decrees should
be enforced by ordering some promotions."
The

availability

of

alternative

term is somewhat more problematic.

As

SG brf. 9.
remedies

in

the

longer

in Sheet Metal Workers,

the DC had the parties before it for a considerable time, and was
in the best position to judge whether an alternative remedy, such
as

a

simple

injunction,

would

have

been

effective.

The

DC,

unlike the DC in Sheet Metal Workers, did not resort to contempt
sanctions.

In light of the Department's record of intransigence,
·-'

12.

however,

contempt sanctions may not have worked.

that the DC should

have appointed

a

trustee

The SG argues

to manage trooper

promotions, or awarded competitive seniority to blacks once they
were

promoted.

Department's

the

the

and

intrusive,

inclined

But

first

second

would

inexcusable delay,

to

think

____

would
not

have

have

been

highly

addressed

the root of the problem.
District

"the

that

-----------

remedy

Court

may

the
I

am
been

have

~--

powerless to provide an effective remedy" short of some form of
--.......__----

______--r

immediate
remain

response

to

effect

only

in

procedures

that

did

an

The one-time promotion order was an

- - - - -· --·-

immediate

until

not

have

the
an

crisis.

The quota was

Department
adverse

--...

adopted

in Sheet Metal Workers,

impact on blacks,

therefore,

to

promotion

until the percentage of corporals reached about 25 percent.
the goal

the quota

or
Like

was

of

limited duration.
c.

relationship to relevant population.

percent "incumbency" goal is based on

th~

the general

No one

population

goal is inappropriate.

in Alabama.

The ultimate 25

percentage of blacks in
suggests

whether

to
the

that

this

The debate is over the rate at which the

Department should approach the 25 percent goal.
difficult

consider

this
is

b-~

..,.,.~~-~r

.1.4Ju4 !Lc

k~

promotion goal.

b. planned duration.

~

question

"narrowly

within

tailored."

I have found it

the
My

framework
best

of

effort

follows.
It seems clear that extremely low or extremely high rates
of promotion would be unacceptable.

For example,

if fewer than

25 percent of the new corporals were black, the total percentage

13.

of black corporals never would reach 25 percent.
extreme,
25

At the other

requiring all new corporals to be black would reach the

percent

goal

quickly,

but

at

great

cost

to

innocent

white

(An even more extreme "remedy," of course, would be to

troopers.
demote

or

lay

off

black

troopers.)

some

white

Between

corporals

these

and

extremes,

replace
however,

them with
I

see

no

obvious criterion for determining whether a particular promotion

I~

ratio is constitutional.
The

SG

argues

that

the

DC

should

have

adopted

the

Department's plan to promote 11 whites and 4 blacks, rather than
requiring that half of the new corporals be blacks.

There is a

trade-off between the two plans:
the 11-4 plan takes longer to
~
remedy the harm, but causes more harm to whites, while the 8-8
plan

remedies

cost to whites.

the

harm

Under

to blacks

in less

time,

the Department's plan,

new corporals would have been black.
promoting blacks at this rate,

but at greater

26 percent of the

If the Department continued

it would not achieve the overall

25 percent goal until all the current corporals were promoted or

retired.
the

The Department's proposal thus is near the "low end" of

range

of

effective

,plans.

In

this

sense,

the

11-4

promotion order is more / "narrowly tailored" than an 8-8 promotion
order.

The SG seems to argue that the Constitution requires the

DC to choose the 11-4 plan for this reason.
reasoning proves too much.

I think this line of

Any affirmative action plan imposes

greater costs on whites than no affirmative action plan at all.
To be sure,

some blacks may not be able to escape the present

effects of past discrimination without some affirmative action on

J

14.

the part of government or private employers.
run,

most of

disappear.

in the long

the effects of past discrimination are likely to

The SG's argument,

constitutionality of

seemed

to

if accepted, would undermine the

all affirmative action plans.

The

better

is to balance the costs to whites of a

approach, it seems to me,

Cburt

Yet,

------~-~--------------------

approve

this

type

of

approach

in Sheet Metal

W)rkers, where the union had a 29.23 percent minority membership
goal but was voluntarily inducting new minority members at a 45
percent

rate.

unnecessary

(In

a

would

Metal

mandatory

case, however,
plan,

Sheet

Workers,

percent

50

the

CA

induction

set

taken

a

much

longer

time

In

quota.

the Department's only "voluntary" plan,

have

aside

as
this

the 11-4

to remedy the past

discrimination.)
flexibility.

d.

The

order

to

fill

the

15

immediate

·~~~~~~~~>-·~~--~~~
-

vacancies with at least 8 blacks is inflexible of necessity.

The

vacancies had to be filled at once, either with blacks or whites.
Thus, the distinction between a goal and a quota breaks down when
the

court

is

required

to

order

a

fixed

number

of

promotions

immediately.
The inflexibilit_y of the "continuing" order is a much more

...

~--

......

serious

The

problem.

promotion quota.

DC

Indeed,

did

not

provide

for

ap

not

completely

waiver

of

the

its choice of the word "quota" rather

than "goal" indicates an absence of flexibility.
is

inflexible.

First,

the

The DC's order

one-to-one

ratio

s only if "qualified" blacks are available for promotion.

Second,

the quota

remains

I~

~lZr·-.....,

in effect on y

until

the Department

~

15.

adopts acceptable promotion procedures, or until the percentage
of

troopers

Although

of

the

concluded,

a

particular

DC's

order

tentatively,

rank

thus

reaches

has

some

about

25

percent.

flexibility,

that it is not flexible enough.

I

have

If the

Department changes its ways, and undertakes good faith efforts to
adopt procedures that do not have an adverse effect on blacks, it
is still possible that the procedures will be found wanting.
this

situation

without

regard

should
to

occur,

the

reimposing

particular

the

If

one-for-one quota

circumstances would

be quite

inflexible.

e.

effect

on

innocent

third

parties.

or

Denial

~

deferral of a promotion generally causes less harm to innocent ~
J-1-(
~-----------------------~ employees than being laid off. At least the employee still has a ~·~job, and a chance of being promoted at a later date.

The DC' s

order does not require that any whites be demoted or laid off.

~

It also permits some whites to be promoted immediately.

~
d?,..,'P-~

On the

other hand, denial of a promotion probably causes more harm
~

J

otft''

to whites than not being hired in the first place.

~

In this case,

however, it is not obvious that any of the white applicants has a
reasonable

expectation

promotions

had

seniority,

so no one reaf?. onably counted on promotion simply on

never

of
been

promotion
made

the basis of years of service.

to

corporal.

exclusively

on

/Jt.J--

Apparently~~

the

basis

of ~f ~
~
~

Those who did well on the writte ~

examination knew that they would be entitled to a promotion only
if

the

procedure

did

not

have

an

adverse

effect

on

blacks.

~

would e
oncl
3 that the effects on innocent third ,.
~
parties are relatively small and diffuse.
«Therefore,

I

~"

16.

III.

CONCLUSION

Subject

to

additional

argument, I recommend that
mootness and ripeness.
recommend

enlightenment

yo~ispose

from

the

oral

of this case on grounds of

If it is necessary to reach the merits, I

~hat you~f~irm

the

on$ -time _eromotion

order,

~t

@ va~ the "continuing" promotion quota on the ground that it is

too

in~.

~ 10/31/86

/~w_

l .). ~ i t1 k. .. 5.
~.P~

MEMORANDUM
/

To:
From:

October 31, 1986

Justice Powell

··~

Leslie

No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Tr anspor tat ion Agency
You

asked

,1

for

a

supplemental

/'~~
...-~

memorandum

suggesting

a

standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause for the af-

----

----------~--~------~~

firmative action plan at issue that would be consistent with your
previous writings in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant.
In Wygant, you stated that the test for examining a racebased affirmative action plan has two prongs.
classification must
interest.

Second,

its purpose must
goal.

be

-----,

Fir

any racial

justified by a compel! ing governmental

~

be

C)•

chosen by the State to effectuate

narrowly

tailored

to achievement of that

page 2.
/

The first

\

volve~

th~

important point is that

not race, discrimination.

case at issue in-

In Wygant, you stated that

"the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the chal-

7

lenged classification operates against a group that historically
has not been subject to governmental discrimination," 106

s.

Ct.

at 1846, and you cited Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9 {1982).
for

The standard articulated in Hogan

sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause

is that "the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification."

458 U.S.

u.s.

461

455,

Feeney,

442

u.s.

at 724

{citing Kirchberg v.

{1981);

Personnel

256,

{1979)).

273

Feenstra,

Administrator

of

Mass.

450
v.

"The burden is met only by

showing at least that the classification serves

'important gov-

ernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed'
are

'substantially

related

to

u.s.

at 724

{citing Wengler

tives. '"

458

Ins.

446 U.S.

Co.,

sex-based
Bakke, 438

142,

classifications

150
is

the

achievement

{1980)).

v.

of

those

objec-

Druggists Mutual

This lesser scrutiny for

consistent

with

your

o inj on

in

--~---------------~----------~-

u.s.

sification as

at 303 {"[T]he Court has never viewed such clas-

inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or

ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis.").

(_

Admittedly,

applying

the standard that has been articu-

lated as to sex-based classifications to affirmative action plans
will have

the anomalous

result that a State will find

it more

vt.~r

~

~~-

J~

Uv tif.,:::."iu-J"

~

..

'

page 3.

difficult to justify a race-based affirmative action plan than _to
justify a sex-based plan.
tiny standard evolved

for

The anomaly is that the stricter scrurace because of the perception that

individuals suffered greater discrimination because of race than
because of sex.

It then might be argued that the State should

have greater latitude to remedy the greater past discrimination.
The anomaly is lessened, however,
-------~

fl._

if the standards of scrutiny
"\\--------------------

are viewed in terms of classifications.

This Court has articu-

lated a strong constitutional policy of achieving a society that
does not employ racial classifications.

The constitutional poli-

cy regarding sex-based classifications is less strong.
this way, it makes sense for the Court to treat all racial
sifications

and

all

sex-based

classifications

Viewed
clas~

consistently.

Moreover, it is unlikely in practice that the difference in semantics will lead to different evaluations of affirmative action
plans based on the type of classification.

The difference be-

tween "exceeding persuasive" and "compelling", and between "substantially related" and "narrowly tailored", does not appear substantial.
In sum, to justify a sex-based affirmative action plan, a
State must show that it has an "exceedingly persuasive" governmental objective, and that the means employed are "substantially
related" to the achievement of the objective.

Once the slightly

different standard of scrutiny is articulated, then the standards

(

in the race-based affirmative action cases are relevant to determine what constitutes a permissible governmental objective and
what means are permissible to achieve that objective.

page 4.

The governmental objective must be remedial and must be
directly at past discrimination by the governmental entity.
purpose to remedy the
is not sufficient.

u,.........._f:
6..

A ~M
------effects of general societal discrimination
~

The primary

enresol~d gu~

is what

typ~~
-~

of evidence a governmental entity must have to justify an affirmI

ative action plan.

Ypu stated in Bakke and Fullilove that find-

ings of past discrimination
are required.
I

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307

("We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense
of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative,

or

tions.");

administrative
Fullilove, 448

findings

of

constitutional

viola-

u.s. at 498 ("[T]he governmental body

must make findings that demonstrate the existence of illegal discrimination.").

It appears in Wygant that a determination by a

trial court that the state employer "had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" is
sufficient

to

meet

the

"findings"

requirement.

That

is,

the

state employer itself need not make explicit findings that it had
engaged

in

prior

illegal

discrimination.

Justices

Marshall,

Brennan, and Blackmun in dissent read this to be the meaning of
the Court opinion in Wygant, as does Justice O'Connor in her concurrence.

106 S. Ct.
,.

at 1853

(O'Connor, J., concurring)

("The

remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as

(

long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.").

7?

page 5.

(

Assuming tha ~ contemporaneous findings are not required,
the next question is

~at

type of evidence provides an employer

with a "strong basis in evidence" or a "firm basis for believing"
that remedial action is required.

Under Equal Protection princi-

ples, statistics should be sufficient if they can lead to an inference of prior discrimination.

Gross underrepresentation of a

particular class in the work force should be enough.

Other evi-

dence of prior exclusion from the work force could supper t
statistics where the statistics alone might not lead
ence of discrimination.

~ an

the

infe~

Any statistics should be "meaningf

in

~ ~

~

that they represent a correlation between the population in the
work force and the qualified working population of the relevant
(

area.
Once the "exceedingly persuasive" justification of prior
discrimination
whether

in

the work

the means are

objective.

force

found,

the next question is

"substantially related"

to the

remedial
~

In Wygant, you found that l~fs could never be con- l~

sidered narrowly tailored to meet a remedial objective.

Presum-

ably they also can never be "substantially related" to a remedial
objective.

In determining what other means can be "substantially

related" to as remedial objective, the standards articulated in
Fullilove

regarding

the

scope of

action plan are instructive.

a

race-conscious affirmative

The relevant considerations are:

(1) the efficacy of alternative remedies:

(

tion of the remedy:

(3)

(2)

the planned dura-

the relationship between the percentage

of minority workers to be benefited and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force:

and

MA-4-(

page 6.

(4)

the availability of waiver provisions

tives could not be met.

448 U.S. at 510.

if · the plan's objecA fifth consideration

articulated in Wygant is the relative burden on nonminority employees.

The last two considerations can incorporate the princi-

ple that "goals" are permissible because they allow for variance
to

ameliorate

the

potentially

harsh

impact

on

innocent

nonminorities in certain circumstances.
Applying the above considerations depends on the facts of
the case.

In this case,
------'

the affirmative action plan appears to

be justified by a persuasive remedial objective.

Its means also

appear substantially related to the objectives.
not appear to be alternatives that could meet the remedial need
in a reasonable time frame. ~ , the plan appears to be temporary and intended only to remedy past imbalances, not maintain

--------- the goals set appear reasonable in
a work force balance. L~'
light of the number of women in the work force and the popula-

~

tion.

the plan employs "goals" as opposed to "quotas."

Thus, all employees can compete for every available slot.

Final-

ly,

Promo-

the burden on nonminorities does not appear severe.

tion goals, at least where promotions are based on merit, appear
to be like hiring goals where their effect can be diffused among
a wide range of workers.
As

the above

standards

indicate,

the

inquiry under

the

Equal Protection -Clause is not that much different from the Title
VII standards for affirmative action plans articulated in Weber.
The only real difference appears to be in the "fit" required between the ends and the means.

I'

f·~

Under Title VII, Congress has ex-

page 7.

pressed a policy favoring voluntary employer action.

Consequent-

ly, the Court may accord employers greater latitude in choosing
the means to meet a remedial purpose whereas with public employers the Constitution requires rigorous scrutiny despite the stat<-------------~~--~·~--

utory preference.
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ral 11/13/86

To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob
No. 85-999, United States v. Paradise

The DC's order of December 15, 1983, imposes a one-blackfor-one-white promotion quota for each trooper rank above the
entry-level rank, "if there is a blaC'T<"tr oope t o bj ectively qualified to be promoted to the rank," until either "approximately 25
percent of the rank is black" or the Department has "developed
and implemented a promotion plan for the rank." J.A. 128.
I.
Did the DC's one-time order to promote at least 15 troopers
to corporal on a one-black-for-one-white basis violate the Equal
Protection Clause?
(Pursuant to this order, 8 blacks and 8 whites were promoted to t' f-'r8
corporal in February, 1984. These are the only actua l promot ions ~~
that have been made on a one-for-one basis.)
A.
The issue may be moot.
The 8 blacks promoted to corporal
will not be demoted.
Stotts, 467 u.s. 579 n. 11. The SG stated
at oral argument that the whites who otherwise would have been
promoted are seeking promotions, backpay, and seniority.
This
does not appear in the troopers' brief.
B.
There is a compelling government interest in remedying
egregious past discrimination. The DC made extensive findinss of
past discrimination. There is also a compelling "societ a l Int eres~ with the judgments of federal courts."
Sheet
Metal Workers (POWELL, J.).
C.

The one-time promotion order was "narrowly tailored."

1. No alternative remedy (e.g., fines, contempt sanctions,
etc.) would have met the ' immediate need ~ } or at least 15 new corporals. The Department's record of intransigence suggests that a
direct promotion order was necessary.
2.

The one-time order had a very brief duration.

3.
In one sense, the Department's proposal to promote 4
blacks (26 percent) and 11 whites was more closely related to the
pool of applicants for corporal (which was 23 percent black).
The ultimate goal, however, is a 25 percent black trooper force.
The question is how rapidly that goal should be achei ved.
The
11-4 proposal would approach the goal very slowly. The 8-8 order
approached the goal somewhat more rapidly.
I would reject the
SG' s suggestion that the Equal Protection Clause requires the ~
slowest possible remedy for proven discrimination.
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4.
A one-time promotion order necessarily is inflexible.
There is no distinct'on
w e
" oal" and a "quota," because
the order ta es Immediate and fu 1 e ect. ...._ _,
5. The effects on innocent white troopers were ~latively
diffuse.
The troopers still have jobs, and chances for =yater
----:'""
.
promotions.
Moreover, no trooper had a settled expectation of
promotions.
Promotions never were based soelly on seniority or
an "objective" measure of merit. Those troopers who scored highest on a written exam knew the exam results would be counted only
if they did not have an adverse effect on blacks.

/·*~1-

II. Does the DC' s "threat" to re-impose the one-for-one quota if
z-y {the Department does not adopt acceptable promotion procedures for
all ranks violate the Equal Protection Clause?
~
A.
The issue is not ripe.
First, the one-for-one quota may
never be re-imposed.
SecoHd, the DC has been willing to allow
the Department time to develop acceptable promotion procedures.
For example, the one-for-one
uota is not in effect right now,
even though the Departmen
has not yet succee ed in va ida ing
its procedures for ~rank. Therefore, the Court cannot predict
the exact circumstances in which the quota would be re-imposed.
The Department is not harmed by the "threat" that the order will
be re-imposed, because it is required to develop valid promotion
procedures in any event.
B.
There is a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination.
~I

C.

~

The continuing order is not a narrowly tailored remedy.

1. As circumstances change, less drastic alternatives may
be efficacious.
If the Department ends its obstructi /c)nism, for
example, a simple injunction may be enough.
2.
The order would not be lifted until 25 percent of each
rank was black, or until promotion procedures could be validated
for each rank. Apparently validation becomes increasingly difficult at the higher ranks, because there a fewer vacancies and
because the qualifications are more subjective.
3. The population of applicants for promotion usually will
be less than 30 percent black.
Sometimes it will be much less
than that, if only a few blacks have been promoted to the rank
below.
A 50 percent promotion quota is not closely related to
the relevant population.
(In terms of the analysis above, it
would approach the ultimate 25 percent goal too fast, at too
great a cost to innocent whites.)
4.
The order has some elements of flexibility:
It does
not apply unless the Department ai
a o
ptable promotion procedures.
It does not apply unless qualified blacks are

~-

~
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available for promotion.
One the quota is imposed, however, it
is quite inflexible.
If the Department is making good faith efforts to develop acceptable procedures, the DC should adjust its
order accordingly.
5. Because a continuing one-for-one promotion quota is too
"fast" a remedy in the long run, it will have too great an adverse effect on innocent whites.
For example, i
the quota were
impo e
on pro o 1ons to
ieutenant after the first few blacks
had been promoted to sergeant, almost every black sergeant would
be promoted to lieutenant, while a much smaller percentage of
white sergeants would be promoted. As the quota "worked its way
up" the ranks, a heavy burden might fall on a relatively small
number of whites.

~
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.JUSTICE

w.. . .J.

BRENNAN, .JR .

November 14, 1986

No. 85-999
United States v. Paradise

No. 85-1129
Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Dear Chief,
I' 11 try my hand at opinions
the Court in the above two cases.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

for

Clfo-urt o-f tltt ~b ~hdt•
,ruJrUtgto-u. ~. Clf. 2llbi'l$

~u:puuu

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 12, 1986

Re:

85-999 - United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill:
Unfortunately I will not be able to join your
circulating draft. I am particularly distressed by
the assumption that seems to pervade the entire draft
that standards developed in cases like Wygant should
be applied in reviewing a judicial decree entered in
response to a proven violation of law.
Voluntary race-conscious decisions by employers,
both public and private, are presumptively unlawful.
When an employer seeks to justify such decisions on
the ground that they are designed to remedy past
discrimination, the "Court has consistently held that
some elevated level of scrutiny is required" (see
your circulating draft at page 14). But no such
requirement has ever been imposed on federal judges
who are fashioning equitable remedies for proven
violations of the law. As I read it, your opinion
seems to assume that the employer "is entitled to
stand before the Court in the same position as one
who has never violated the law at all," International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 u.s. 392, 400 (1947).
In my opinion, the burden of demonstrating that
the relief granted by the district court is excessive
rests squarely on the law violator--not on the victim
of the wrongdoing. The basic question is whether the
relief granted by the federal court represents an
abuse of discretion or is punitive rather than
remedial in character. I cannot subscribe to an
opinion that assumes that the rules that limit raceconscious decision-making by presumptively innocent

,.
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employers apply equally to federal judges who have a
duty to remedy flagrant and persistent violations of
the law.
Respectfully,

1/L
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

~tqrrtutt ~lturl

ttf tlrt ~b ~Udts

'llhteJrhtgto~ ~. ~· 2ll.;i'!;t
CHAMI!IERS OP'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 12, 1986

Re:

No. 85-999-United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

December 13, 1986

85-999 United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill:
1 have just completed carefully reading the first
draft of your opinion in this case. It has been a pleasant
Saturday morning exercise for me. Your opinion in thorough
and persuasively written.
Subject to relatively minor changes in textual language, and my concern about subpart 111-0, 1 will be happy
to join your entire opinion. With respect to the language
changes, 1 am having my clerk mark up a copy of your draft
that 1 will send with this note. 1 do not think any of
these will create a problem in view of the basic similarity
of our views.
My concern about subpart 111-0 is substantive.
This subpart - except for the quote from CAS - consists of
only three paragraphs. The important purpose of the paragraphs is to show that the burden on innocent third parties
is not substantial. 1 agree with this, and differ only as to
your reliance on the argument that because some whites have
been benefited from the Department's discrimination, the
burden on individual white troopers .!lQl!.. is not particularly
significant under equal protection analysis.
1 do not think it is necessary for us to say this.
1 also have considerable doubt as to whether it would be
wise to do so. We are talking only about innocent employees, many of whom may have shared the views expressed on
behalf of the City of Birmingham (see amicus brief) that the
Department's discriminatory policy was shameful. Also, it
is probable that some of these employees may have prepared
themselves for promotion by extra study or special diligence
as troopers. This could be true of troopers who had children to educate and who needed an increase in income.
1 could join a briefer subpart 111-0 that makes the
argument in the first paragraph in your present draft. Un-
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like layoffs - that I would never tolerate - the potential
burden with respect to promotions is problematic as to any
particular trooper. The burden is not as "diffused" as it
is where job applicants - rather than present employees are implicated.
But it is diffused both in time and as to
whom it may affect adversely. Moreover - and I do not believe your draft emphasizes this sufficiently - the basic
limitation of being "qualified" remains. Thus qualified
whites simply have to compete with qualified blacks. To be
sure, as long as the "mathematical" requirements exist,
there will be some advantage to blacks.
But again, as you
properly emphasize this should be temporary and is subject
to amelioration by action of the Department itself.
If you prefer to leave III-D substantially as it is
written, I will join all of your opinion except that part.
If you make revisions along the lines I suggest, I will
gladly join your entire opinion.
I probably would write a
very brief concurring opinion, but this would be supportive
of your basic views.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

lfp/ss 12/15/86

PARADISE2 SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Bob

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

December 15, 1986

85-999 Paradise
In line with our discussion at lunch on Saturday,
unless you have a Court opinion to write I suggest that you
consider what anticipatory writing you can undertake.
I will, of course, be interested in Justice Brennan's reaction to our proposed changes.
him, call me at the Kahler Hotel.

When you hear from

As I probably will be

having tests throughout the day, the best time to call would
be between 5:30 and 7:30 Washington time.

The Clinic closes

up at 6:00p.m., Washington time {5:00p.m., out there), and
so I am likely to be in my room until Jo and I go out for
dinner.
As we have discussed, I will probably want to write
a brief opinion that summarizes my view in my own language.
I would emphasize, perhaps more explicitly than Justice
Brennan has the similarity between Paradise and the case
last Term that I think of as Local 28 {from New York).

In

Paradise, as in that case, there was a flagrant and long
time disregard of court orders.
When you call, I will, of course, want to know
which cases have been assigned to us and which of you will
prepare initial drafts for me.

As you now know, if we are
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going to circulate all of our assigned opinions before the
January assignments are made (probably January 24 or 26} , I
will need the clerks' drafts by the first of the year whenever this is feasible.

We will have a long Conference on

January 9, with a long discuss list.
paring for the January arguments.

I

Also, I will be prewould appreciate your

sharing these thoughts as to a time schedule with your coclerks.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 12/15/86

PARAD1SE2 SALLY-POW
M.EMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Sob

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

December 15, 1986

85-999 Parad .i se
In line with our discussion at lunch on Saturday,
unless you have a Court opinion to write 1 suggest that you
consider what anticipatory writing you can undertake.
1 will, of course, be interested in Justice Bren-

nan's reaction to our proposed changes.
him, call me at the Kahler Hotel.

A~

When you hear from

1 probably will be

havinq tests throughout the day, the best time to call would
be between 5:30 and 7:30 Washington time.

The Clinic closes

up at 6:00p.m., washington time (5:00p.m., out there), and
so 1 am likely to be in my room until Jo and 1 go out for
dinner.
As we have discussed, 1 will probably want to write
a brief opinion that summarizes my view in my own language.
1 woul1

emph~size,

perhaps more explicitly than Justice

Brennan has the similarity between Paradise and the case
last Term that 1 think of as Local 28 (from New York).

In

Paradise, as in that case, there was a flagrant and long
time

~isregard

of court orders.

When you call, 1 will, of

cour~e,

want to know

which cases have been assigned to us and which of you will
prepare initial drafts for me.

As you now know, if we are

2.

going to circulate all of our assigned opinions before the
January assignments are made (probably January 24 or 26), 1
will need the clerks' drafts by the first of the year whenever this is feasible.

We will have a long Conference on

January 9, with a lonq discuss list.
paring for the January arguments.

Also, 1 will be pre-

1 would appreciate vour

sharing these thoughts as to a time schedule with your coclerks.

L • .F.P., Jr.

ss
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Jtu~fington. ~.

Of.
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CHAMBERS OF"

December 16, 1986

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

85-999 - United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill,
I shall await the dissent.
Sincerely yours·, ·

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

_itqtrtm.t ~ouri !tf

t4t 'Jttittb .itatt.tr

Jluftingtou. ~ . ~. 2ll~'l~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 17, 1986

No. 85-999

United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill,
As soon as I can get around to it, I will
circulate a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,
.... .

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

.l'U¥rtmt <qgut of tift )htitt~ .l\talts

"ul{ington. J). <q.
CHAMBERS

2Llp,.~

0~

December 18, 1986

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

Re:

No. 85-999 - United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill,
I will await the dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

December 18, 1986

85-999 United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill:
Please join me

~n

your opinion tor the Court.

1 may write a brief concurring opinion, and may not
get to this before we go to Richmond for Christmas.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

December 19, 1986

85-999 United States v. Paradise

Dear Bill:
You will receive with this note, a copy of my
•Join• note that should give you the first Court decision in
which five of us have agreed in an affirmative action case.
1 send congratulations, and also my warm thanks for
making the changes that I thought were necessary.
1 may write a few pages in a concurring opinion.
lt will not in any way detract from your excellent opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

January 6, 1987

85-99'L.!lni.te-1

St~t--s

v.

P~tradise

Dear Bi11:

ijere
in thi.a case.

i~

a 1st draft of a br1ef

con~urr•n~

opl~to~

1 tntnk tt fg entirelv co~~fgtent in ev~rv respect
wttn ynu fine optnion for the Court. Unless you have 8uggegtions, 1 will circulate this .

Sincerely,

Justi.ce
lfPISCJ

,t.'

Bnmn~n

~mtt

<tromt of tift ~nittb .jfattg

'JfzuJrington. ~.

ar.

21l~-"'~

December 29, 1986

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/

Re: No. 85-999, United States v. Paradise
Dear Bill:
I am pleased to join your recirculation of December 17•
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

C!fouri of t4t ~b ;\\tzdts
'cJfasJringhm. ~.Of. 2n~_,.~

ilnprnnt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 29, 1987

Re:

85-999 - United States v. Paradise

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

December 31, 1986

85-999 United States v. Paradise
Dear Bill:
Thank you for your note of December 31.
your mistakes in Bakke!

I had forgotten

Of course, the point is hardly one of vast importance.
Also, a good deal has been written since Bakke by both of us,
and now we seem to be fully in accord as to the applicable
principles - at least in cases similar to Johnson and Paradise.
I am writing a brief concurring opinion in this case, and
will be glad for you to take a look .at it before it is circulated.
My little opinion is not necessary, but as I have written in
each of our previous affirmative action cases I want to keep my
record intact.
I will add a brief note simply .to the effect that the
"school cases", though broadly relevant, are different from the
subsequent affirmative action cases cited in your opinion. No
one has been denied the right to go to school. Apart from the
possible inconvenience of being bused, the children suffered no
detriment. But busing had prevailed in many if not most school
districts for decades prior to Swann •
. Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

,ju.prmu Q}tturi ttf tlft~b ~hdtg
..-ulrbt¢~ ~. Q}. 2ll&i,.~
C H A M BERS OF

.JUST I CE W M. ..J . B R E NNA N, .J R .

December 31, 1986

United States v. Paradise, No. 85-999

Dear Lewis,
I have run into a difficulty.
In light of the following
from my opinion in Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 366 n. 41 (1978), don't
you think I had better let well enough alone?
"Our cases cannot be distinguished by
suggesting as our Brother POWELL does, that
in none of them was anyone deprived of 'the
relevant benefit.' Ante, at 304. Our school
cases have deprived whites of the
neighborhood school of their choice; our
Title VII cases have deprived
nondiscriminating employees of their settled
seniority expectations; and UJO deprived the
Hassidim of bloc-voting strength. Each of
these injuries was constitutionally
cognizable as is respondent's here."
Sincerely,

~u

v

Justice Powell

<ijourl &tf tlft ~ittb •talts
._ulfinghm. J). cq. 2llt?'l'

•11p'rtUtt

CHAMBERS Or

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

February 19, 1987

Re:

85-999 - United States v. Philip Paradise

Dear Sandra:
I would be pleased to join your dissent in the above case.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

...

85-999 United States v. Paradise (Bob)
WJB for the Court 11/17/86
1st draft 12/11/86
2nd draft 12/17/86
jrd draft 1/30/87
4th araft 2/2/87
5th draft 2/6/87
Joined by TM 12/12/86
LFP 12/18/86
HAB 12/19/86
JPS concurring in the judgment
1st draft 12/29/86
2nd draft 1/6/87
3rd draft 1/13/87
4th draft 1/21/87
5th draft 2/6/87
6th draft 2/12/87
LFP concurring
1st draft 1/7/87
2nd draft 2/17/87
soc dissenting
1st draft 1/28/87
2nd draft 2/20/87
Joined by CJ 1/29/87
As 2/19/87
BRW dissenting
1st draft 2/19/87
2nd draft 2/20/87
BRW awaiting dissent 12/16/86
SOC will dissent 12/17/86
LFP may write concurring opinion 12/18/86
AS awaiting dissent 12/18/86
SDO with WHR dissenting
3rd draft 2/10/87
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decision also c:onflrmed specula- :.
tlon that President Reqan's aamq
W~am H. Rehnqulat u a.tef Juatlce
aa. IUmmer and ~Una Antorun

~:,: -:.e~:~r::~;-:
aa.

ward the Administration's position
afflrmaUve action.
Both men dtssented today, as

,xpect:

ed, sldins with the Admlnlstrauon view
::that the quota order was not a aood
remedy for the discrimination. But this
did not represent a change In the over·
all voting lineup.
Mr. Rehnquist, as an Associate Justice, cons(stently opposed affirmative
action preferences. While Warren E.
Burger, .who retired as Chief Justice
last summer, was Jess consistent In opay STUART TAYLOR lr.
posing affirmative action, be aided
...., ........... Y-' '1'11111 '
with the Administration In all three of
WASHJNGTON, Feb. 25 ~A sharply
last year's cases.
divided SUpreme Cuurt, re)ectlna the .........;;.."',•.
Solicitor C.lled It Arbitrary
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trary." The Court upheld It In light of
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Alabama quota system wu not .William Bradford Reynolds, bead of
able to the Judie.
'"narrowly tailored" enough.
the Justice Department's Civil Rtghts '
1be decllloa reinforced and partly
Dlvir>ion, said the decision was not IUr·
expanded three JDajor rullnp last ,.ar
prlslng after last year's rulings and
In wblc:b the ODurt rejected the Ad*·
"didn't break any new 1round."
lltratlon'a broad auaclt an~ Ule f1l ra-1
Justice William J. Brennan Jr.'s
opinion, which was joined by only three
dal preferences to remedy put Job
other JustJces, rejected arguments by
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~High Court Upholds Racial Quota lor Promotions
Barry Goldstein, a lawyer for the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educationa! Fund, &tressed the majority's reJection of "rigid limitations on affirmalive action."
He said the decision lhowed that Mr.
Fried had beeR wrong in asserting that
•last year's rulings meant racial preferences c:ould ''hardly ever" be used.
Justice BreMan, citing last year's
decisions, aa~ "It Is now well-esta~
. llshed that sovemment bocHes, includ, lnB c:ourts, may constitutionally emI pJoy racial classJficlations essential to
remedy unlawfultreatment of racial or
· ethn!~ sroups subject to dlscrlmlna·
. tion.
'Raee-Censelous Reller Needed
"the pervasive, ..,sHe added that
·J
tematic and obstinate dtscriminatory

=~d~ ,:r.r;::Jtu:::~~O:

even though the promotions of aome
white troopers would be delayed.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred
In the decision but did not join Justice
Brennan's opinion. He stressed that
Federal c:ourts had broad discretion to
order racial preferences in cases in
which past discrimination had · been
proved.
Justice Stevens's opinion seemed to
endorse judicial ~se of affirmative ac·lion to remedy past discrimination
even more broadly than did Justice
Brennan's opinion. .
Citing the Court's endorsement of
"broad and nexlble" judicial authority
to remedy constitutional violations in
the context of school desegregation
cases, Justice Stevens said judicial au,

Its 5-4 decision
on an Alabama
CaSe eb ff.S the
Ad . . tr

for the race-<:onsclous rellel ordered by
the district court."
. Justice Brennan's 34-page oplnlori
f
was joined by Justices ThW'Iood MarU
shall, Harry A. Blackmun and Lewis F..
Powell, Jr..
t•
ffilDlS
10n.
Justice Powell said til a concurring
opinion that the state ~·had engaged in
persistent violation of constitutional
rights and repeated:f failed to carry thority to remedy job discrimination
that the
f
should be ~ually broad.
out c:ourt Orders "
one- orone promotion quota had been enforced
Unlike a fjrmatlve action plans
by the district court on only one occa- voluntarily adopted by state and local
slon, when it ordered the promotion of sovemments, Justice Stevens said,
eight blacks and eight whites to the those Imposed by Federal judges need
rank of corporal in 1984. .
not be "narrowly tailored to achieve a
He also said that unlike affirmative compelling governmental interest."
action plans requlrln& layoffs of whites Rather, they need only be within the
before Jess-eenlor blacks which a rna- bounds of "reasonableness."
jority of the Court . disapproved last
O'Connor Writes Dissent
year as Imposing a harsh burden ~
Justice Sandra Day · O'Connor diswhite employ~•• the district cou~ s sented, joined by Olief Justice RehnproF~ion11quotaf•~!'otlnddts1ru1dPt '"!;· qulst and Justice Scalia. Justice Byron
ous Y e ves o uu""""'nt
v _ua s, · R.. White dissented separately.
·
Justice O'Connor, like Mr. Fried,
argued that even though Alabama was
sullty of an "egregious history of discrimination," the lower court's quota

a

was not aufficently "narrowly tallored," and was unduly burdensome on
iMocent white troopers aeeking
promotions.
She faulted the district court for 1mposing "a racial quota without first
considering the effectiveness of alternatives," such as' imposing "stiff fines
or other penalties" on the Alabama Department of Public Safety until it
adopted adequate procedures for
promotion of blacks.
''The one-for~ promotion quota
used in this case far' exceeded the percentase of blacks in the trooper force,
and there Is no evidence in the record
that auch an extreme quota was necessary," Justice O'Connor wrote.
About 25 percent of the people qualified to be state troopers were blacks.
Justice BreMan said temporary use of

~::,m~u:~r;:s ·;:~<'f~P~ ~=::!

day when blacks would occupy something like 25 percent of the department's upper positions.
p
ressure on Departmeat SoUpt
He said the promotion . quota was
"narrowly tailored" to the ·legitimate
soals of eliminating 'the effects of past
discrimination, ·~ducing the department to Implement a promotion procedure that would not have an adverse
Impact on biacks," and ellmlna~ the
effects of the department'slong de ay.
The lower court had found the procedures previously adopted by the department inadequate because they ineluded examinations on which blacks
had scored much lower on average
than whites.
Justice Hrennan also termed the
quota "fiexlble in appJicatlon" because
It applied only to the extent that qualifled black troopers were available and
the department "needed to make
promotions, and because It would be
lifted whenever the department
adopted adequate procedures of its
own.
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES ~ ~
No, 85-999

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. PHILLIP PARADISE, JR., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1986]
JusTICE BRENNAN

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question we must decide is whether relief awarded in
this case, in the form of a one-black-for-one-white promotion
quota to be applied as an interim measure to state trooper
promotions in the Alabama Department of Public Safety (the
Department), is permissible under the Equal Protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1972 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama held that the Department had systematically excluded blacks from employment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Some eleven years later, confronted with the Department's failure to develop promotion
procedures that did not have an adverse impact on blacks,
the District Court ordered the promotion of one black trooper
for each white trooper elevated in rank, as long as qualified
black candidates were available, until the Department implemented an acceptable promotion procedure. The United
States challenges the constitutionality of this order. 1
'The Department and its director, Colonel Byron Prescott, and the intervenors, a class of white applicants for promotion within the Department, have filed briefs in support of the United States, but they did not
themselves petition for certiorari.
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I
Because the Department's prior employment practices and
conduct during this lawsuit bear directly on the constitutionality of any race-conscious remedy imposed upon it, we must
relate the tortuous course of this litigation in some detail.
A
In 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) brought this action challenging the
Department's long-standing practice of excluding blacks from
employment. The United States was joined as a party plaintiff, and Phillip Paradise, Jr. intervened on behalf of a class of
black plaintiffs. District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. determined that
"[p]laintiffs have shown without contradiction that the
defendants have engaged in a blatant and continuous
pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring in the Alabama Department of Public Safety, both as to troopers
and supporting personnel. In the thirty-seven year history of the patrol there has never been a black trooper
and the only Negroes ever employed by the. department
have been nonmerit system laborers. This unexplained
and unexplainable discriminatory conduct by state officials is unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F . Supp. 703, 705
(MD Ala. 1972).

He concluded:
"Under such circumstances ... the courts have the authority and the duty not only to order an end to discriminatory practices, but also to correct and eliminate the
present effects of past discrimination. The racial discrimination in this instance has so permeated the Department['s] employment policies that both mandatory
and prohibitory injunctive relief are necessary to end
these discriminatory practices and to make some sub-
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stantial progress toward eliminating their effects." !d.,
at 705-706 (citations omitted).
As a result, the court issued an order (the 1972 order), enjoining the Department to hire one black trooper for each
white trooper hired until blacks constituted approximately
25% of the state trooper force. 2 Judge Johnson also enjoined the Department from "engaging in any employment
practices, including recruitment, examination, appointment,
training, promotion, retention or any other personnel action,
for the purpose or with the effect of discriminating against
any employee, or actual or potential applicant for employment, on the ground of race or color." ld., at 706 (emphasis
added). The court further required that "eligible and promotional registers heretofore used for the purpose of hiring
troopers be and they are hereby abrogated to the extent necessary to comply with this decree." ld., at 707. 3
The defendants appealed, 4 but the Fifth Circuit upheld the
hiring requirement:
2
In United States v. Frazer, 317 F . Supp. 1079 (MD Ala. 1970), Judge
Johnson found that certain state agencies, including the Personnel Department, which supplies support staff to the Department, were engaged in
systematic violations of the constitutional rights of black applicants and
employees. In NAACP v. Allen, 340 F . Supp. 703 (MD Ala. 1972), the
decree in United States v. Frazer was amended to require the Personnel
Department to ensure that, until blacks constituted 25% of the Department's support personnel, 50% of the individuals hired for those positions
were black. Id., at 706.
3
The court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Judge Johnson
found that the defendants "unquestionably knew and understood that their
discriminatory practices violated the Fourteenth Amendment" and that, as
a consequence, "their defense of th[e] lawsuit amount[ed] to unreasonable
and obdurate conduct which necessitated the expense of the litigation."
NAACP v. Allen, supra, at 708.
4
While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals ordered the District Judge to supplement the record and to reconsider his decree. After
discovery, Judge Johnson decided not to alter his order. He explicitly
compared the results achieved by the injunction prohibiting discrimination
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"The use of quota relief in employment discrimination
cases is bottomed on the chancellor's duty to eradicate
the continuing effects of past unlawful practices. By
mandating the hiring of those who have been the object
of discrimination, quota relief promptly operates to
change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the
process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices. It is a temporary
remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as it can
by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can successfully operate to select public
employees solely on the basis of job-related merit."
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 621 (CA5 1974).
The Court of Appeals also held that white applicants who
had higher eligibility rankings than blacks were not denied
due process or equal protection of the laws by the one-for-one
hiring order. The Department's use of unvalidated selection
procedures that disproportionately excluded blacks precluded any argument that "'quota hiring produces unconstitutional 'reverse' discrimination, or a lowering of employment standards, .or the appointment of less or unqualified
persons."' ld., at 620. 5
in United States v. Frazer, supra, and the hiring order in NAACP v. Allen, supra:
"The contrast in results achieved to this point in the Allen case and the
Frazer case under the two orders entered in those cases is striking indeed.
Even though the agencies affected by the Frazer order and the Department of Public Safety draw upon the same pool of black applicants-that is,
those who have been processed through the Department of Personnel......,.Allen has seen substantial black hiring, while the progress under Frazer has
been slow and, in many instances, nonexistent ....
[T]his Court's experience reflects that the decrees that are entered must
contain hiring goals; otherwise effective relief will not be achieved."
United States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504, 506-507 (MD Ala.) aff'd sub
nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614 (CA5 1974).
6
None of the parties sought certiorari review of the Court of Appeals'
determination that the 50% hiring quota at issue in NAACP v. Allen,
supra, was constitutional.
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In 1974, only shortly after the Court of Appeals' decision,
the plaintiffs found it necessary to seek further relief from
the District Court. Judge Johnson found that "defendants
have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to
the plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper
force and the number of new troopers hired." Paradise v.
Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975).
The court also addressed the disproportionate failure of
blacks hired to achieve permanent trooper status: 6
"[T]he high attrition rate among blacks resulted from the
selection of other than the best qualified blacks from the
eligibility rosters, some social and official discrimination
against blacks at the trooper training academy, preferential treatment of whites in some aspects of training
and testing, and discipline of blacks harsher than that
given whites for similar misconduct while on the force."
Ibid.
The court reaffirmed the 1972 hiring order, enjoining any further attempts by the Department to delay or frustrate
compliance.
B
In September 1977 the plaintiffs again had to return to the
District Court for supplemental relief, this time specifically
on the question of the Department's promotion practices.
Following extensive discovery, the parties entered into a
Partial Consent Decree (the 1979 Decree), approved by the
court in February 1979. In this decree, the Department
agreed to develop within one year a promotion procedure
that would be fair to all applicants and have "little or no adverse impact upon blacks seeking promotion to corporal."
App. 40. In the decree, the Department also agreed that
the promotion procedure would conform with the 1978 Uni6
At this time, 40 blacks had been hired as a result of the 1972 District
Court order; only 27 remained on the force . All29 whites hired during the
same period had retained their positions. Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975).
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form Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 CFR
§ 50.14. 7 Once such a procedure was in place for the rank of
corporal, the decree required the defendants to develop similar procedures for the other upper ranks-sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major. The decree expressly provided that
the plaintiffs might apply to the court for enforcement of its
terms or for other appropriate relief. App. 41. 8
Five days after approval of the 1979 Decree, the defendants sought clarification of the 1972 hiring order. The Department maintained that its goal-a 25% black trooper
force-applied only to officers in entry-level positions and not
to the upper ranks. The court responded:
"On this point, there is no ambiguity. The Court's
[1972] order required that one-to-one hiring be carried
out until approximately twenty-five percent of the state
trooper force is black. It is perfectly clear that the
order did not distinguish among troopers by rank."
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 440 (MD Ala.
1979) (emphasis in original).
The Department also argued that because the 25% objective could not be achieved unless 37.5% of entry-level positions were held by blacks, "more qualified white applicants"
were passed over than was constitutionally permissible.
!d., at 441. The District Court rejected the argument,
stating:
To modify this order would be to do less than the law requires, which is to eradicate the continuing effects of
past unlawful practices. In 1972, defendants were not
just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hirThe Uniform Guidelines are "designed to provide a framework for
determining the proper use of tests and other [employee] selection procedures consistent with Federal law." 28 CFR § 50.14, Pt. 1, § 1 (1978).
8
In the interim the parties agreed to utilize the existing state merit system for promotions to the rank of corporal, provided that at least three
black troopers were promoted. The details of this procedure were set
forth in an "Agreement of Counsel for the Parties." App. 46.
7
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ing to entry-level positions. The Court found that in
thirty-seven years there had never been a black trooper
at any rank. One continuing effect of that discrimination is that, as of November 1, 1978, out of 232 state
troopers at the rank of corporal or above, there is still
not one black. The [hiring] quota fashioned by the
Court provides an impetus to promote blacks into those
positions. To focus only on the entry-level positions
would be to ignore that past discrimination by the Department was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that
they are manifest. . . . The order in this case is but the
necessary remedy for an intolerable wrong." !d., at 442
(emphasis added).
In April 1981, more than a year after the deadline set in
the 1979 Decree, the Department proposed a selection procedure for promotion to corporal and sought approval from the
District Court. The United States and the plaintiff class
both objected to implementation of the procedure, arguing
that it had not been validated and that its use would be impermissible if it had an adverse impact on blacks. To resolve
this dispute the parties executed a second consent decree
(the 1981 Decree) which the District Court approved on August 18, 1981.
In the 1981 Decree, the Department reaffirmed its commitment made in 1979 to implement a promotion procedure with
little or no adverse impact on blacks. The parties then
agreed to the administration of the proposed promotion procedure and that its results would be "reviewed to determine
whether the selection procedure has an adverse impact
against black applicants." App. 51. Whether there was adverse impact was to be determined by reference to the "fourfifths" rule of section 4 of the Uniform Guidelines. See 28
CFR § 50.14 (1978). 9 If the parties proved unable to agree
According to § 4 of the Uniform Guidelines, "[a] selection rate for any
racial, ethnic or sex group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be re9
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on a procedure, its determination would be submitted to the
District Court. No promotions would occur until the "parties ... agreed in writing or the Court . . . ruled upon the
method to be used for making promotions with little or no adverse impact." App. 53.
The defendants administered the test to 262 applicants of
whom 60 (23%) were black. Of the 60 blacks who took the
test, only 5 (8. 3%) were listed in the top half of the promotion
register; the highest ranked black candidate was number 80.
!d., at 119. In response to an inquiry from the United
States, the Department indicated that there was an immediate need to make between 8 and 10 promotions to corporal
and announced its intention to elevate between 16 and 20 individuals before construction of a new list. 1 Record 222.
The United States objected to any rank-ordered use of the
list, stating that "such use would result in substantial adverse impact on black applicants" and suggested that the defendants submit an alternative proposal that would comply
with the requirements of the 1979 and 1981 decrees. I d., at
220-221. No proposal was submitted, and no promotions
were made during the next nine months.
In April 1983, plaintiffs returned to District Court and
sought an order enforcing the terms of the two consent decrees. Specifically, they requested that defendants be required to promote blacks to corporal "at the same rate at
which they have been hired, 1 for 1, until such time as the
defendants implement a valid promotion procedure." 1
Record 112. The plaintiff class contended that such an order
would "encourage defendants to develop a valid promotional
procedure as soon as possible," and would "help alleviate the
gross underrepresentation of blacks in the supervisory ranks
garded as evidence of adverse impact." 28 CFR § 50.14, Pt. 1, § 4 (1978).
In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a promotion test pass
it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered must pass.
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of the Department" 10-an underrepresentation caused by the
Department's past discrimination and exacerbated by its continuing refusal to implement a fair procedure. Ibid.
Although it opposed the one-for-one promotion requirement, the United States agreed that the consent decrees
should be enforced. It stated that "defendants [had] failed
to offer any reasons why promotions should not be made, nor
had they offered an explanation as to why they [had] halted
progress towards remedying the effects of past discrimination." !d., at 199-201. The United States further observed
that the Department's failure to produce a promotion plan in
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 decrees "suggests that a
pattern of discrimination against blacks in the Department
... may be continuing." Id., at 200.n
After the motion to enforce was filed, four white applicants
for promotion to corporal sought to intervene on behalf of a
class composed of those white applicants who took the proposed corporal's examination and ranked #1 through #79.
App. 81-87. They argued that the 1979 and 1981 Decrees
and the relief proposed by the plaintiffs in their motion to enforce were "unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against
public policy." Id., at 99.
In an order entered October 28, 1983, the District Court
held that the Department's selection procedure had an adverse impact on blacks. Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp.
171, 174 (MD Ala. 1983). 12 Observing that even if 79 corpo10

In fact, the only black candidates who had been promoted since 1972
were the four promoted pursuant to the counsels' sidebar to the 1979 Decree. See note 8, supra.
11
The Department opposed the motion to enforce, arguing that the relief
sought by the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. The Department requested
an opportunity to demonstrate that the proposed procedure was valid and
that it did not adversely impact upon black candidates within the meaning
of the consent decrees and the Uniform Guidelines.
12
In a separate order issued that same day, the District Court permitted
the white intervenors to participate in the case on a prospective basis only.
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rals were promoted in rank order, rather than the 15 contemplated, none would be black, the court concluded that "[s]hort
of outright exclusion based on race, it is hard to conceive of a
selection procedure which would have a greater discriminatory impact." I d., at 173. 13 The Department was ordered
to submit, by November 10, 1983, "a plan to promote to corporal, from qualified candidates, at least 15 persons in a manner that will not have an adverse racial impact." I d., at 175.
The Department subsequently submitted a proposal to promote 15 persons to the rank of corporal, of whom four would
be black. In addition, the Department requested that the
Department of Personnel be given more time to develop and
submit for court approval a nondiscriminatory promotion
procedure.
The United States did not oppose the Department's proposal, but plaintiffs did. They argued that the proposal "totally disregards the injury plaintiffs have suffered due to the
defendants' four-and-a-half year delay [since the 1979 Decree] and fails to provide any mechanism that will insure the
present scenario will not reoccur." 2 Record 382.
On December 15, 1983, the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. Paradise
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72 (MD Ala. 1983). Confronted
with the Department's immediate need to promote 15 troopers to corporal and the parties' inability to agree, the court
was required by the 1979 and 1981 Decrees to fashion a promotion procedure. The District Judge summarized the
situation:
The court held that intervention was untimely as to prior orders, judgments, and decrees. App. 116.
13
The District Court also rejected the Department's argument that the
one-for-one hiring order was a "special program" within the meaning of the
Uniform Guidelines that would insulate the Department from any finding
of adverse impact in its promotion procedures. Paradise v. Prescott, 580
F. Supp. 171, 174 (MD Ala. 1983).
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"On February 10, 1984, less than two months from
today, twelve years will have passed since this court condemned the racially discriminatory policies and practices
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Nevertheless, the effects of these policies and practices remain
pervasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entrylevel position. Of the 6 majors, there is still not one
black. Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black.
Of the 35 lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of the
65 sergeants, there is still not one black. Of the 66 corporals, only four are black. Thus, the department still
operates an upper rank structure in which almost every
trooper obtained his position through procedures that totally excluded black persons. Moreover, the department is still without acceptable procedures for advancement of black troopers into this structure, and it does not
appear that any procedures will be in place within the
near future. The preceding scenario is intolerable and
must not continue. The time has now arrived for the
department to take affirmative and substantial steps to
open the upper ranks to black troopers." I d., at 74 (emphasis in original).
The court then fashioned the relief at issue here. It held
that "for a period of time," at least 50% of the promotions to
corporal must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black
candidates were available. The court also held that "if there
is to be within the near future an orderly path for black
troopers to enter the upper ranks, any relief fashioned by the
court must address the department's delay in developing acceptable promotion procedures for all ranks." I d., at 75.
Thus, the court imposed a 50% promotional quota in the
upper ranks, but only if there .were qualified black candidates, if the rank were less than 25% black, and if the Department had not developed and implemented a promotion
plan without adverse impact for the relevant rank. The
court concluded that the effects of past discrimination in the
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Department "will not wither away of their own accord" and
that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of
this discrimination cannot be eliminated." I d., at 75 and 76.
The court highlighted the temporary nature and flexible design of the relief ordered, stating that it was "specifically tailored" to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimination, to remedy the delayed compliance with the consent
decrees, and to ensure prompt implementation of lawful procedures. Ibid.
Finally, the Department was ordered to submit within 30
days a schedule for the development of promotion procedures
for all ranks above the entry-level. The schedule was to be
"based upon realistic expectations" as the court intended that
"the use of the quotas . . . be a one-time occurrence." I d:, at
75 and 76. The District Court reasoned that, under the
order it had entered, the Department had "the prerogative to
end the promotional quotas at any time, simply by developing
acceptable promotion procedures." I d., at 76.
Numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order
and for the alteration or amendment of the court's judgment
were denied by the District Court. In its motion, the Department set forth the "new contention" that it was "without
legal authority and sufficiently trained personnel to design
any promotional procedures" because "this function is allocated by statute to the Department of Personnel." Paradise
v. Prescott, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Jan. 13,
1984). The District Court responded that the Department
had signed consent decrees in 1979 and 1981 mandating
development of an acceptable procedure and that Department counsel had represented at the January 5, 1984 hearing
that "it was anticipated that the development of these procedures would take only a few months." Ibid. The judge
concluded:

"It is now years later and this court will not entertain the
excuse that the department is now without legal authority to meet its obligations under the consent de-
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crees. . . . [T]he Department of Personnel, which is
also a party to these proceedings, assured the court at
the January 5, [1984] hearing that it would work closely
with the Public Safety Department to develop acceptable
promotion procedures. The Public Safety Department's
contention that it is without legal authority is not only
meritless, it is frivolous.
Moreover, that the Department of Public Safety would
even advance this argument dramatically demonstrates
the need for the relief imposed by this court. Such frivolous arguments serve no purpose other than to prolong
the discriminatory effects of the department's 37-year
history of racial discrimination." Ibid. (emphasis
added).
In February 1984, the Department promoted eight blacks
and eight whites to corporal pursuant to the District Court's
order enforcing the consent decrees.
Four months later, the Department submitted for the
court's approval its proposed procedure for promotions to the
rank of corporal. The District Court ruled that the Department could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing this procedure
and suspended application of the one-for-one requirement for
that purpose. App. 163-164. In October 1984, following
approval of the Department's new selection procedure for
promotion to sergeant, the court similarly suspended application of the quota at that rank. App. 176-177. 14
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the relief at issue was designed to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination-"effects which, as the
history of this case amply demonstrates, 'will not wither
away. of their own accord."' Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d
In addition, the Department has been permitted to promote only white
troopers to lieutenant and captain because no blacks have qualified, as of
yet, for promotion to those ranks. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d 1514,
1538 n. 19 (CA5 1985).
14
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1514, 1533 (CA5 1985) (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F.
Supp., at 75). In addition, the relief awarded was deemed to
"exten[d] ·no further than necessary to accomplish the objective of remedying the 'egregious' and long-standing racial imbalances in the upper ranks of the Department." I d., at
1532-1533.
U.S. (1986). We
We granted certiorari.
affirm.
II
The United States maintains that the race-conscious relief
ordered in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to.the Constitution of the United
States. 15
It is now well established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of groups historically
subject to discrimination. See Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 478 U. S. - - , - - (1986), and cases cited therein.
See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S.
- - , - - (1986) ("The Court is in agreement that . . . remedying past discrimination is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program") (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
But although this Court has consistently held that some elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for remedial purposes, it has yet to reach
15

The Government framed the issue presented as "[w]hether the oneblack-for-one-white promotion quota adopted by the district court ... is
permissible under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Brief for Petitioner 1. Because the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth, we need not decide whether the race-conscious relief ordered in this case would violate the
former as well as the latter constitutional provision.
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consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis. 16 We
need not do so in this case, however, because we conclude
that the relief ordered in this case survives even strict scrutiny analysis: it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling
governmental purpose." Id., a t - - (opinion of POWELL,
J.).
The government unquestionably has a compelling interest
in remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor. See Wygant, supra, a t - - (opinion of POWELL, J.);
id., at - - (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at - - (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763
(1976) (prevention and remedying of racial discrimination and
its effects is a national policy of "highest priority"). In 1972
the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
that for almost four decades the Department had excluded
blacks from all positions, including jobs in the upper ranks.
Such egregious discriminatory conduct was "unquestionably
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at 705. As the United States concedes,
Brief for Petitioner 21, the pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct of the Department created a profound need and a firm justification for the race-conscious reSee Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. ,(1986) (opinion of POWELL, J.) (the means chosen must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling government interest"); id., a t - (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring) (same); id., a t - (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined
by BRENNAN, J . and BLACKMUN, J.) (remedial use of race permissible if it
serves "important governmental objectives" and is "substantially related
to achievement of those objectives") (quoting University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978)); id., a t - (STEVENS, J ., dissenting) (both public interest served by racial classification and means employed must justify adverse effects on the disadvantaged group); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980) (POWELL, J ., concurring) (expressing concern first articulated in Bakke, supra, at 362, that review not be
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
16

'· .~
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lief ordered by the District Court. 17
The Department and the intervenors, however, maintain
that the Department was found guilty only of discrimination
in hiring, and not in its promotional practices. They argue
that no remedial relief is justified in the promotion context
because the intentional discrimination in hiring was without
effect in the upper ranks, and because the Department's promotional procedure was not discriminatory. There is no
merit in either premise.
Discrimination at the entry-level necessarily precluded
blacks from competing for promotions, and resulted in a departmental
hierarchy
dominated
exclusively
by
nonminorities. The lower courts determined that this situation was explicable only by reference to the Department's
17
Amici, the City of Birmingham, the City of Detroit, the City of Los
Angeles, and the District of Columbia, state that the operations of police
departments are crippled by the lingering effects of past discrimination.
They believe that race-conscious relief in hiring and promotion restores
community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitates effective
police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. See also Wygant,
supra, at - - (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("[I]n a city with a recent history
of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude
that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the
community and do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a
force composed only of white officers"); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d, at 621
("This is a police department and the visibility of the Black patrolman in
the community is a decided advantage for all segments of the public at a
time when racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement" (citation omitted)). Amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. suggests that the governmental interest in a racially integrated Department is
amplified here due to community perceptions of, and reactions to the Department's historical role in defense of segregation and its active opposition
to the civil rights movement. We need not decide if either the generalized
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particularized need to overcome any impediments to law enforcement created by perceptions arising from the egregious discriminatory conduct of the Department is compelling. The judicial determinations of prior discriminatory
policies and conduct satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.
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past discriminatory conduct. 18 In 1972 the Department was
"not just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hiring to entry-level positions. The Court found that in thirtyseven years there had never been a black trooper at any
rank." Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp., at 442. In
1979 the District Judge stated that one continuing effect of
the Department's historical discrimination was that, "as of
November 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at the rank of
corporal or above, there is still not one black." Ibid. The
court explained that the hiring quota it had fashioned was intended to provide "an impetus to promote blacks into those
positions" and that "(t]o focus only on the entry-level positions would be to ignore that past discrimination by the Department was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that
they are manifest." Ibid. The District Court crafted the
relief it did due to "the department's failure after almost
twelve years to eradicate the continuing effects of its own
discrimination." 585 F. Supp., at 75 n. 1. It is too late for
the Department to attempt to segregate the results achieved
by its hiring practices and those achieved by its promotional
practices.
The argument that the Department's promotion procedure
was not discriminatory is belied by the record. In 1979,
faced with additional allegations of discrimination, the Department agreed to adopt promotion procedures without an
adverse impact on black candidates within one year. See
Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1532.
By 1983 the Department had promoted only four blacks, and these promotions had been made pursuant to the 1979 Decree, and "not
the voluntary action of the Department." Id., at 1533 n. 16.
In December 1983, the District Court found, despite the com18
Compare this situation with that described in Wygant, supra, at (opinion of POWELL, J.) ("There are numerous explanations for a disparity
between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any
kind").
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mitments made in the consent decrees, that the Department's proposed promotion plan would have an adverse impact upon blacks, Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp., at 174,
and that "the department still operate[d] an upper rank
structure in which almost every trooper obtained his position
through procedures that totally excluded black persons."
Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 74 (emphasis in original). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit summarily rejected the
argument of the Department and the intervenors:
"[l]t is no answer in this case to say that plaintiffs have
not proven that the Department has discriminated
against blacks above · the entry-level seeking promotions. . . . [l]t cannot be gainsaid that white troopers
promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an
official policy which systematically excluded all
blacks." Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1533 n. 16
(emphasis added).
Promotion, like hiring, has been a central concern of the
District Court since the commencement of this action; since
1972, the relief crafted has included strictures against promotion procedures that have a discriminatory purpose or effect.
The race-conscious relief at issue here is justified by a compelling interest in remedying the discrimination that permeated entry-level hiring practices and the promotional process
alike. 19
9
' We also reject the argument of the United States, the Department,
and the intervenors that the purpose of the order enforcing the consent decrees was the imposition of a particular racial balance on the upper ranks of
the Department. The one-for-one mechanism was employed not to punish
the Department's failure to achieve racial balance, but to remedy the Department's refusal to fulfill the commitment made in the consent decrees to
implement a promotion procedure without adverse impact on blacks and to
eradicate the effects of its past delay and discrimination. The racial imbalances in the Department are properly characterized as the effects of the
Department's past discriminatory actions and of its failure to develop a
promotion procedure without adverse impact as required by the previous
court orders and the consent decrees. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
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Finally, in this case, as in Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
--(POWELL, J., concurring), the District Court's enforcement order is "supported not only by the governmental interest in eradicating [the Department's] discriminatory practices, it is also supported by the societal interest in
compliance with the judgments of federal courts." The relief
at issue was imposed upon a defendant with a consistent history of resistance to the District Court's orders, and only
after the Department failed to live up to its court-approved
commitments.
III
While conceding that .the District Court's order serves a
compelling interest, the Government insists that it was not
narrowly tailored to accomplish its purposes-to remedy past
discrimination and eliminate its lingering effects, to enforce
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by bringing about
the speedy implementation of a promotion procedure that
would not have an adverse impact on blacks, and to eradicate
the ill effects of the Department's delay in producing such a
procedure. We cannot agree.
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including the necessity
for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability
of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals
to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on
the rights of third parties. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
--(opinion of BRENNAN, J.); id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring): Wygant, supra, at-- (opinion ofPOWELL, J.); id.,
at - - (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at - - (WHITE, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id., at-- (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
When considered in light of these factors, it was
amply established, and we find that the one-for-one promoJ., concurring) ("The contempt order was not imposed for
the Union's failure to achieve the goal, but for its failure to take the prescribed steps that would facilitate achieving the goal").

-(POWELL,
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tion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its several
purposes, both as applied to the initial set of promotions to
the rank of corporal and as a continuing contingent order
with respect to the upper ranks.
A

To evaluate the District Court's determination that it was
necessary to order the promotion of eight whites and eight
blacks to the rank of corporal at the time of the motion to enforce, we must examine the purposes the order was intended
to serve. First, the court sought to eliminate the effects of
the Department's "long term, open, and pervasive" discrimination, including the absolute exclusion of blacks from
its upper ranks. Second, the judge sought to ensure expeditious compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by inducing the Department to implement a promotion procedure that
would not have an adverse impact on blacks. Finally, the
court needed to eliminate so far as possible the effects of the
Department's delay in producing such a procedure. Confronted by the Department's urgent need to promote at least
15 troopers to corporal, the District Court determined that
all of its purposes could be served only by ordering the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites, as requested by the
plaintiff class.
The options proffered by the Government and the Department would not have served the court's purposes. The Department proposed, as a stop-gap measure, to promote four
blacks and eleven whites and requested additional time to
allow the Department of Personnel to develop and submit a
nondiscriminatory promotion procedure. The United States
argues that the Department's proposal would have allowed
this round of promotions to be made without adverse impact
on black candidates.
The Department's proposal was inadequate because it completely failed to address two of the purposes cited above.
The Department's ad hoc offer to make one round of promo-
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tions without an adverse impact ignored the court's concern
that an acceptable procedure be adopted with alacrity. As
early as 1972, the Department had been enjoined from engaging in any promotional practices "for the purpose or with the
effect of discriminating against any employee . . . on the
ground of race or color." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at
706. In 1979, the Department had promised in a court-approved consent decree to develop and implement a procedure
without adverse impact by 1980. By 1983, such a procedure
still had not been established, and Paradise sought enforcement of the consent decrees. Given the record of delay, we
find it astonishing that the Department should suggest that
in 1983 the District Court was constitutionally required to
settle for yet another promise that such a procedure would be
forthcoming "as soon as possible." 2 Record 358.
Moreover, the Department's proposal ignored the injury to
the plaintiff class that resulted from its delay in complying
with the terms of the 1972 order and the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. 20 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, no blacks were
The Government contends that "the Department in reality had acted
with reasonable diligence to devise a new corporal's examination" and that
both Paradise and the District Judge "failed to appreciate how difficult it is
to develop and implement selection procedures that satisfy the rigorous
standards of the Uniform Guidelines" because "the validation of selection
procedures is an expensive and time-consuming process usually extending
over several years" and because the tests, besides being validated, had to
be without adverse impact. Brief for Petitioner 25 n. 13.
This argument is without merit. Since the District Court order at issue
here was rendered, the Department has timely proposed and the court has
tentatively approved, procedures for promotion to corporal and sergeant.
App. 163-164, 176-177. Although these procedures have not yet been validated (and, according to the Government, may not be for some time, Tr. of
Oral Arg. 41-42), the use of the one-for-one promotion requirement was
suspended by the court both times the Department proposed a procedure
that appeared to be without adverse impact. It is therefore clear that any
inevitable delay in validating the procedures will not be utilized to maintain
the one-for-one requirement when the Department implements a procedure without apparent adverse impact. The difficulties of validating a
20
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promoted between 1972 and 1979; the four blacks promoted
in 1979 were elevated pursuant to the 1979 Decree and not as
a result of the voluntary action of the Department; and, finally, the whites promoted since 1972 "were the specific
beneficiaries of an official policy which systematically excluded all blacks." Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1533
n. 16. To permit ad hoc decisionmaking to continue and
allow only four of fifteen slots to be filled by blacks would
have denied relief to black troopers who had irretrievably
lost promotion opportunities. Thus, adoption of the Department's proposal would have fallen far short of the remedy
necessary to eliminate the effects of the Department's past
discrimination, would not have ensured adoption of a procedure without adverse impact, and would not have vitiated the
effects of the defendant's delay. 21
The Government suggests that the trial judge could have
imposed heavy fines and fees on the Department pending
compliance. This alternative was never proposed to the District Court. Furthermore, the Department had been ordered
to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs throughout this
lengthy litigation; these court orders had done little to prevent future foot-dragging. 22 See, e. g., NAACP v. Allen,
procedure do not excuse the Department's delay in developing a test without adverse impact.
In addition, it was the Department that initially proposed to implement a
validated procedure within one year; this time period was not imposed by
the court. Surely the Department was in the best position to assess the
practicality of its own proposal.
21
The merit of the District Court's determination in 1983 that it could
not accept the Department's promise to develop a promotion procedure
without adverse impact is illustrated by the Department's petition for reconsideration of the court's order enforcing the consent decrees. The Department argued that it was without legal authority to comply with the
court's order; the District Court stated that this argument was yet another
delaying tactic. See supra, at - - and App. 139.
22
Indeed, the Department had shown itself willing to sacrifice a great
deal of money to avoid the court's orders. See Paradise v. Dothard, Civ.
Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala. 1975) ("The evidence outlined above estab-
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317 F. Supp., at 1093, United States v. Frazer, 340 F. Supp.,
at 708-710. In addition, imposing fines on the defendant

does nothing to compensate the plaintiffs for the long delays
in implementing acceptable promotion procedures. Finally,
the Department had expressed an immediate and urgent
need to make 15 promotions, and the District Court took this
need into consideration in constructing its remedy. 23 As we
observed only last Term, "a district court may find it necessary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending the
development of nondiscriminatory hiring or promotion procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals provides
the compromise between two unacceptable alternatives: an
outright ban on hiring or promotions . . . continued use of a
discriminatory selection procedure," or, we might add, use of
no selection procedure at all. Sheet Metal Workers, supra,
lishes and this Court finds that, at the time of and in the years following the
Court's 1972 order, the administration and the heads of the Department of
Public Safety perceived a need for additional troopers-a need characterized as critical; that there were appropriated and available to the defendants funds in excess of $3 million, a substantial portion of which could have
been used for salaries and ancillary expenses for new troopers; and that
this money was not spent for the critically needed additional troopers but
went unspent or was diverted to other uses. These findings, when combined with the considerable testimony regarding the defendants' reluctance to implement the Court's remedial order by placing black troopers on
the state's highways, necessitate the conclusion that the defendants have,
for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the plaintiff class,
artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the number of new
troopers hired").
23
Fining the defendant lacks even the lone virtue of the Department's
proposal to promote four blacks: that at least a step would be taken toward
the eradication of past discrimination by elevating blacks in the hierarchy.
Furthermore, it does nothing to compensate plaintiffs for the past and future delay in implementation of procedures without adverse effect. While
fines vindicate the court's authority, here they would not fulfill the court's
additional responsibility to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past
as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United
States, supra, at 154.
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a t - - (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 24
By 1984 the District Court was plainly justified in imposing
the remedy chosen. Any order allowing further delay by the
Department was entirely unacceptable.
Cf. Green v.

County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438
(1968) ("[A] plan that at this late date fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a
dual system is . . . intolerable. . . . The burden on a school
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now").
Not only was the immediate promotion of blacks to the rank
of corporal essential, but, if the need for continuing judicial
oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Department be required to develop a procedure without adverse impact on blacks, and that the effect of past delays be
eliminated. 25
24
The United States also suggests that the District Court could have
made the promotion decisions itself or appointed a trustee to supervise the
Department's progress. Again neither of these alternatives were proposed to the judge. The suggestions appear rather beside the point as the
United States would presumably object if the District Court or the trustee
simply selected 50% blacks to be promoted each time vacancies occurred
until a test without adverse impact was created, rather than ordering the
Department to select 50% blacks. If the United States is actually suggesting that the court come up with an ad hoc proposal for each batch of promotions, this solution is subject to the same deficiencies noted with respect to
the Department's proposal to the court. See supra, at - -.
The imposition of the quota in the ranks beyond corporal was also
clearly justified. At the time the District Court imposed the corporal promotion ratio, it had required the Department to submit for its approval a
schedule for the development of promotion procedures for all ranks above
the entry level position "based upon realistic expectations." Paradise v.
Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 75. The Department complied, proposing periods of time ranging from five months for the position of corporal to twentyfour months for the position of major. 2 Record 569-570. Thus far, all
procedures have been submitted in a timely manner preventing any imposition of the one-for-one requirement in the upper ranks. The record indicates that, while the order itself is a continuing one, its application is entirely contingent on the repetition of the exact circumstances that
2/)
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We conclude that in 1983, when the District Judge entered
his order, "it is doubtful, given [the Department's] history in
this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any
other effective remedy." Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
- - (POWELL, J., concurring).
B
The features of the one-for-one requirement and its actual
operation indicate that it is flexible in application at all ranks.
The requirement may be waived if no qualified black candidates are available. The Department has, for example, been
permitted to promote only white troopers to the ranks of lieutenant and captain since no black troopers have qualified for
those positions. Further, it applies only when the Department needs to make promotions. Thus, if external forces,
such as budget cuts, necessitate a promotion freeze, the Department will not be required to make gratuitous promotions
to remain in compliance with the court's order. 26
Most significantly, the one-for-one requirement is ephemeral; the term of the quota's application is contingent upon
prompted its initial formulation. The District Court will resort to the
quota again only if confronted with further delay by the Department in implementing a neutral promotion procedure according to the schedule the
Department itself proposed. Thus, any future use of the one-for-one requirement will be lawful for the same reason that justified the District
Judge in ordering the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the
rank of corporal: the failure of the Department to meet its court-approved
commitments.
26
Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, a t - - (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)
("The [district] court has twice adjusted the deadline for achieving the
[membership] goal, and has continually approved of changes in the size of
the apprenticeship classes to account for the fact that economic conditions
prevented petitioners from meeting their membership targets; there is
every reason to believe that both the court and the administrator will continue to accommodate legitimate explanations for the petitioners' failure to
comply with the court's orders"); id., a t - - (POWELL, J., concurring)
("Additional flexibility is evidenced by the fact that this goal, originally set
to be achieved by 1981, has been twice delayed and is now set for 1987").
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the Department's own conduct. The quota endures only
until the Department comes up with a procedure that does
not have an adverse impact on blacks-something the Department was enjoined to do in 1972 and expressly promised
to do by 1980. As noted supra, at note - - , the court has
taken into account the difficulty of validating a test and does
not require validation as a prerequisite for suspension of the
promotional requirement. The one-for-one requirement
evaporated at the ranks of corporal and sergeant upon implementation of promotion procedures without an adverse impact, demonstrating that it is not a disguised means to
achieve racial balance. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
- - (POWELL, J., concurring).
Finally, the record reveals that this requirement was flexible, waivable, and temporary in application. When the District Court imposed the provision, the judge expressed the
hope that its use would be "a one-time occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 76. The court believed
that this hope would be fulfilled: at the January 15,.1984 hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the consent decrees,
"the Personnel Department pledged that it would now devote
its full resources to assisting the Public Safety Department in
not only developing acceptable promotion procedures as required by the two consent decrees, but in doing so within the
near future." App. 141. The Department has since timely
submitted procedures for promotions to corporal and sergeant, and the court has consequently suspended application
of the promotional quota in those ranks. In the higher
ranks, the Department has been permitted to promote only
white troopers. It now appears that the effect of the order
enforcing the decrees will be "the development of acceptable
promotion procedures for all ranks and the nullification of the
promotion quota." Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1538
n. 19. The remedy chosen has proven both effective and
flexible.
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c
We must also examine the relationship between the numerical relief ordered and the percentage of nonwhites in the
relevant workforce. The original hiring quota imposed upon
the Department required it to hire 50% black applicants until
25% of the state trooper force was composed of blacks; the
latter figure reflects the percentage of blacks in the relevant
labor market. Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 75
n. 2. The enforcement order at issue here is less restrictive:
it requires the Department to promote 50% black candidates
until 25% of the rank in question is black, but only until a promotion procedure without an adverse impact on blacks is in
place. Thus, had the promotion quota remained in effect for
the rank of corporal, it would have survived only until 25% of
the Department's corporals were black.
The Government suggests that the one-for-one requirement is arbitrary because it bears no relationship to the 25%
minority labor pool relevant here. This argument ignores
that the 50% figure is not itself the goal; rather it represents
the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved. The interim requirement of one-for-one promotion (had it continued) would simply have determined how quickly the Department progressed toward this ultimate goal.
This
requirement is therefore analogous to the imposition in Sheet
Metal Workers of an end date, which regulated the speed of
progress toward fulfillment of the hiring goal. Sheet Metal
Workers, supra, at-- (POWELL, J., concurring).
To achieve the goal of 25% black representation in the
upper ranks, the court was not limited to ordering the promotion of only 25% blacks at any one time. Some promptness in
the administration of relief was plainly justified in this case,
and use of deadlines or end-dates had proven ineffective. In .
these circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement of
50% minority promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet
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Metal Workers, was crafted and applied flexibly, was constitutionally permissible.
The District Court did not accept the argument that in
order to achieve a goal of 25% representation, it could order
only 25% of any particular round of promotions to be awarded
to minorities. Had it done so, the court would have implemented the Department's proposal to promote 4 blacks and
11 whites when it issued its order enforcing the consent decree, because this proposal approximated the 25% figure. 27
Again, however, this proposal completely ignores the fact
and the effects of the Department's past discrimination and
its delay in implementing the necessary promotion procedure. Here the District Court considered both the Department's proposal and the possibility of promoting blacks to all
15 corporal positions "[i]n light of the department's failure
after almost twelve years to eradicate the continuing effects
of its own discrimination and to develop acceptable promotion
procedures and in light of the severity of the existing racial
imbalances." Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 75 n. 1.
The court rejected both of these alternatives and, upon consideration of the Department's behavior and of the interests
and the purposes to be served, arrived at an intermediate figure. Although the appropriate ratio here "necessarily involve[d] a degree of approximation and imprecision," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 372 (1977), the District
Court, with its first-hand experience of the parties and the
potential for resistance, imposed the requirement that it de27
Following adoption of the plaintiffs' proposal that 8 blacks and 8 whites
should be promoted, the corporal rank was composed of 14 black and 73
white troopers (16% black). Under the Department's proposal that 4
blacks and 11 whites should be promoted, the corporal rank would have
been composed of 8 black and 79 white troopers (9.2% black). Neither
proposal would have raised the percentage of blacks in the corporal rank to
the 25% mark set as an alternate goal by the District Court (the other alternative being the adoption of a promotion procedure without adverse impact). Obviously, however, the plaintiffs' proposal provided an accelerated approach to achieving that goal to compensate for past delay .

...
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termined would compensate for past delay and prevent future recalcitrance, while not unduly burdening the interests
of white troopers. 28
It would have been improper for the District Judge to ignore the effects of the Department's delay and its continued
default of its obligation to develop a promotion procedure,
and to require only that, commencing in 1984, the Department promote one black for every three whites promoted.
The figure selected to compensate for past discrimination and
delay necessarily involved a delicate calibration of the rights
and interests of the plaintiff class, the Department, and the
white troopers. The Government concedes that a one-tothree requirement would have been lawful, Tr. of Oral Arg.
43; the District Court determined that more stringent measures were necessary. This Court should not second-guess
the lower court's carefully considered choice of the figure
necessary to achieve its many purposes, especially when that
figure is hedged about with specific qualifying measures de. signed to prevent any unfair impact that might arise from
rigid application.
D
The one-for-one requirement did not impose an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties. As stated above, the
temporary and extremely limited nature of the requirement
substantially limits any potential burden on white applicants
28

We have previously recognized the importance of expediting elimination of the vestiges of longstanding discrimination. In U. S . v. Montgomery County Bd. of Education , 395 U. S. 225 (1969), we upheld a District
Court's imposition of black-to-white faculty quota against modifications
made by the Court of Appeals , saying that the District Court order
"was adopted in the spirit of this Court's opinion in Green .. . in that his
plan 'promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now.' The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals,
while of course not intended to do so, would , we think, take from the order
some of its capacity to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day
when a completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope .. . . " Id., at 235- 236.
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for promotion. It was used only once at the rank of corporal
and may not be utilized at all in the upper ranks. Nor has
the court imposed an "absolute bar" to white advancement.
Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at--. In the one instance in
which the quota was employed, 50% of those elevated were
white. At most, the order briefly postponed the promotion
of certain white troopers to the rank of corporal. 29 "Denial of
a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of
an existing job," Wygant, supra, at-- (opinion of POWELL,
J.), and plainly postponement imposes a lesser burden still.
Any burden on nonminority expectations must be evaluated in light of the Department's past discriminatory conduct, its use of promotion procedures that had an adverse impact on black employees, and the altered expectations
created by the 1972 order and the 1979 and 1981 Decrees.
"[W]here an employer has violated an anti-discrimination
law, the expectations of non-minority workers are themselves products of discrimination and hence 'tainted' and
therefore more easily upset." Bakke, 438 U. S., at 365
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Cf. Fullilove, supra, at 484-485
(opinion of Burger, C. J.) ("some nonminority business may
have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities"). It is manifest that white promotion candidates
derived competitive benefit from the Department's pre- and
post-1972 discriminatory practices. Although enjoined from
using promotion procedures with discriminatory impact as of
1972, the Department had not implemented an acceptable
The one-for-one requirement does not require the layoff and discharge
of white employees and therefore does not impose burdens of the sort that
concerned the plurality in Wygant, 476 U. S., a t - (opinion of POWELL,
J.) ("layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives").
Because the one-for-one requirement is so limited in scope and duration, it
only postpones the promotions of affected whites. Consequently, like a
hiring goal, it "impose[s] a diffuse burden, ... foreclosing only one of several opportunities." Wygant, supra, a t - .
29
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procedure by January 1984; throughout the intervening years
the Department had continued to utilize a procedure with adverse impact, virtually ensuring that white troopers would
not have to compete with black candidates. As the Court of
Appeals determined, "it cannot be gainsaid that white troopers promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an
official policy which systematically excluded all blacks."
Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d, at 1533 n. 16 (emphasis
added).
We are not persuaded by the intervenors' claim that they
are entitled to promotion due to their higher eligibility ranking on the Department's test. As the Court of Appeals ex·
plained in 1974:
"[N]o applicant for public employment can base any
claim of right under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection or due process clauses upon an eligibility
ranking which results from unvalidated selection procedures that have been shown to disqualify blacks at a disproportionate rate. This is so because by definition
such criteria have not been shown to be predictive of successful job performance. Hence there is no reliable way
to know that any accepted applicant is truly better qualified than others who have been rejected." I d., at 618. 30
The court order in 1972 put the Department and all troopers on notice that promotion procedures without an adverse
impact on minorities were required; the 1979 Decree put the
Department on record as committed to the implementation of
such procedures by 1980. It is these orders that created legitimate expectations about promotions; after their entry,
30

In the promotion procedure proposed by the Department in 1981, seniority counted as 10% of the candidate's score. App. 56. But, under the
point system established, differences in seniority among candidates could
affect scores by no more than 3%. !d., at 50-51. Greater seniority did
not, therefore , by itself create an expectation of promotion. Moreover,
the greater seniority of white candidates itself is a result of the Department's prior discrimination against blacks.
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there could be no claim of any interest in a promotion
awarded by a procedure with an adverse impact. It was a
matter of public knowledge that such procedures were unlawful. Accordingly, the one-for-one promotion requirement
imposed in this case does not disproportionately harm the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent
individuals.
E

In determining whether this order was "narrowly tailored," we must acknowledge the respect owed a District
Judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A district court
has "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 154
(1965). "[O]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district court's power to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971).
Nor have we "required remedial plans to be limited to the
least restrictive means of implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is 'a balancing process left, within appropriate constitutional and statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial
court."' Fullilove, supra, at 508 (POWELL, J., concurring)
(quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S.,
at 794 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). Cf. Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent
County, 391 U. S., at 439 ("The obligation of the district
courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of
a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no universal answer to the complex problems of desegregation;
there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every
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case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance").
The district court has first-hand experience with the parties and is best qualified to deal with the "flinty, intractable
realities of day-to-day implementation of constitutional commands." Swann, supra, at 6. In this case, as in Sheet
Metal Workers, "th[e] court having had the parties before it
over a period of time, was in the best position to judge
whether an alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction,
would have been effective in ending [the] discriminatory
practices." I d., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring). The District Judge determined that the record demonstrated that
"without promotional quotas the continuing effects of [the
Department's] discrimination cannot be eliminated." Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp., at 76. His proximate position
and broad equitable powers mandate substantial respect for
this judgment.
Plainly the District Court's discretion in remedying the
deeply-rooted Fourteenth Amendment violations here was
limited by the rights and interests of the white troopers seeking promotion to corporal. But we conclude that the District
Judge properly balanced the individual and collective interests at stake, including the interests of the white troopers eligible for promotion, in shaping this remedy. See Swann,
supra, at 16 ("The task is to correct, by a balancing of the
individual and collective interests, the condition that offends
the Constitution"). While a remedy must be narrowly tailored, that requirement does not operate to remove all discretion from the District Court in its construction of a remedial decree. 31
31
See also Fullilove, 448 U. S. , at 527 (Stewart, J ., dissenting) (contrasting legislative branch with court of equity and suggesting that the latter has the "dispassionate objectivity" and the "flexibility" necessary "to
mold a race-conscious remedy around the single objective of eliminating
the effects of past or present discrimination"); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400 (1947) (Jackson, J.) ("The framing of de-
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IV
The remedy imposed here is an effective, temporary and
flexible measure. It applies only if qualified blacks are available, only if the Department has an objective need to make
promotions, and only if the Department fails to implement a
promotion procedure that does not have an adverse impact on
blacks. The one-for-one requirement is the product of the
considered judgment of the District Court which, with its
knowledge of the parties and their resources, properly determined that strong measures were required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance.
The race-conscious relief.imposed here was amply justified,
and narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate and laudable
purposes of the District Court. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals, upholding the order of the District Court, is
Affirmed.

crees should take place in the District rather than in the Appellate Court.
They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to the
exigencies of the particular case") (citations and footnote omitted).
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The question we must decide is whether relief awarded in
Wf/3~
this case, in the form of a one-black-for-one-white promotion
requirement to be applied as an interim measure to state ~ ~~
trooper promotions in the Alabama Department of Public
~~~
Safety (Department), is permissible under the Equal Protec~~~
tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1972 the United States District Court for the Middle s~~
District of Alabama held that the Department had systematically excluded blacks from employment in violation of the ~-~
Fourteenth Amendment. Some 11 years later, confronted ~f.9
with the Department's failure to develop promotion proce- ~~---~
. dures that did not have an adverse impact on blacks, the District Court ordered the promotion of one black trooper for · ~~
each white trooper elevated in rank, as long as qualified black ~~~
candidates were available, until the Department imple- ~I
mented an acceptable promotion procedure. The United
States challenges the constitutionality of this order. 1

tv.t-. (f.

' The Department and its director, Colonel Byron Prescott, and the intervenors, a class of white applicants for promotion within the Department, have filed briefs in support of the United States, but they did not
themselves petition for certiorari.
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I

Because the Department's prior employment practices and
conduct during this lawsuit bear directly on the constitutionality of any race-conscious remedy imposed upon it, we must
relate the tortuous course of this litigation in some detail.
A
In 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) brought this action challenging the
Department's long-standing practice of excluding blacks from
employment. The United States was joined as a party plaintiff, and Phillip Paradise, Jr., intervened on behalf of a class
of black plaintiffs. District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.,
determined that:
"Plaintiffs have shown without contradiction that the
defendants have engaged in a blatant and continuous
pattern and practice of discrimination in hiring in the Alabama Department of Public Safety, both as to troopers
and supporting personnel. In the thirty-seven year history of the patrol there has never been a black trooper
and the only Negroes ever employed by the department
have been nonmerit system laborers. This unexplained
and unexplainable discriminatory conduct by state officials is unquestionably a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705
(MD Ala. 1972).

He concluded:
"Under such circumstances ... the courts have the
authority and the duty not only to order an end to discriminatory practices, but also to correct and eliminate
the present effects of past discrimination. The racial
discrimination in this instance has so permeated the Department['s] employment policies that both mandatory
and prohibitory injunctive relief are necessary to end
these discriminatory practices and to make some sub-
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stantial progress toward eliminating their effects." I d.,
at 705-706 (citations omitted).
As a result, the court issued an order (1972 order), enjoining the Department to hire one black trooper for each white
trooper hired until blacks constituted approximately 25% of
the state trooper force. 2 Judge Johnson also enjoined the
Department from "engaging in any employment practices, including recruitment, examination, appointment, training,
promotion, retention or any other personnel action, for the
purpose or with the effect of discriminating against any employee, or actual or potential applicant for employment, on
the ground of race or color." Id., at 706 (emphasis added).
The court further required that "eligible and promotional
registers heretofore used for the purpose of hiring troopers
be and they are hereby abrogated to the extent necessary to
comply with this decree." /d., at 707. 3
The defendants appealed, 4 but the Fifth Circuit upheld the
hiring requirement:
2

In United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (MD Ala. 1970), Judge
Johnson found that certain state agencies, including the Personnel Department, which supplies support staff to the Department, were engaged in
systematic violations of the constitutional rights of black applicants and
employees. In NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (MD Ala. 1972), the
decree in United States v. Frazer was amended to require the Personnel
Department to ensure that, until blacks constituted 25% of the Department's support personnel, 50% of the individuals hired for those positions
were black. 340 F. Supp., at 706.
3
The court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Judge Johnson
found that the defendants "unquestionably knew and understood that their
discriminatory practices violated the Fourteenth Amt;ndment" and that, as
a consequence, "their defense of th[e] lawsuit amount[ed] to unreasonable
and obdurate conduct which necessitated the expense of litigation." I d.,
· at 708.
'While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals ordered the District Judge to supplement the record and to reconsider his decree. After
discovery, Judge Johnson decided not to alter his order. He explicitly
compared the results achieved by the injunction prohibiting discrimination

..
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"The use of quota relief in employment discrimination
cases is bottomed on the chancellor's duty to eradicate
the continuing effects of past unlawful practices. By
mandating the hiring of those who have been the object
of discrimination, quota relief promptly operates to
change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the
process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices. It is a temporary
remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as it can
by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can successfully operate to select public
employees solely on the basis of job-related merit."
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614, 621 (1974).
The Court of Appeals also held that white applicants who
had higher eligibility rankings than blacks were not denied
due process or equal protection of the laws by the one-for-one
hiring order. The Department's use ofunvalidated selection
procedures that disproportionately excluded blacks precluded any argument that "quota hiring produces unconstitutional 'reverse' discrimination, or a lowering of employment
standards, or the appointment of less or unqualified persons."
ld., at 618. 5
in United States v. Frazer, supra, and the hiring order in NAACP v.
Allen, supra:
"The contrast in results achieved to this point in the Allen case and the
Frazer case under the two orders entered in those cases is striking indeed.
Even though the agencies affected by the Frazer order and the Department of Public Safety draw upon the same pool of black applicants-that is,
those who have been processed through the Department of Personnel-Allen has seen substantial black hiring, while the progress under Frazer has
been slow and, in many instances, nonexistent....
"[T]his Court's experience reflects that the decrees that are entered
must contain hiring· goals; otherwise effective relief will not be achieved."
United States v. Dothard, 373 F. Supp. 504, 506-507 (MD Ala.), aff'd sub
nom. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614 (CA5 1974).
& None of the parties sought certiorari review of the Court of Appeals'
determination that the 50% hiring quota at issue was constitutional.

85-9~0PINION

UNITED STATES v. PARADISE

In 1974, only shortly after the Court of Appeals' decision,
the plaintiffs found it necessary to seek further relief from
the District Court. Judge Johnson found that "defendants
have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to
the plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper
force and the number of new troopers hired." Paradise v.
Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975).
The court also addressed the disproportionate failure of
blacks hired to achieve permanent trooper status: 6
"[T]he high attrition rate among blacks resulted from the
selection of other than the best qualified blacks from the
eligibility rosters, some social and official discrimination
against blacks at the trooper training academy, preferential treatment of whites in some aspects of training
and testing, and discipline of blacks harsher than that
given whites for similar misconduct while on the force."
Ibid.
The court reaffirmed the 1972 hiring order, enjoining any further attempts by the Department to delay or frustrate
compliance.
B

In September 1977 the plaintiffs again had to return to the
District Court for supplemental relief, this time specifically
on the question of the Department's promotion practices.
Following extensive discovery, the parties entered into a
Partial Consent Decree (1979 Decree), approved by the court
in February 1979. 7 In this decree, the Department agreed
to develop within one year a promotion procedure that would
be fair to all applicants and have "little or no adverse impact
At this time, 40 blacks had been hired as a result of the 1972 District
Court order; only 27 remained on the force. All29 whites hired during the
· same period had retained their positions. Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975).
7
Judge Johnson presided in this litigation until he assumed his position
Df'l ~the former Fifth Circuit in 1979. At that time, the case was transferred
to District Judge Varner; subsequentlJ it was reassigned to Judge Myron
Thompson in October 1980.
D(
6

!

..
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upon blacks seeking promotion to corporal." App. 40. In
the decree, the Department also agreed that the promotion
procedure would conform with the 1978 Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 CFR § 50.14 (1978). 8
Once such a procedure was in place for the rank of corporal,
the decree required the defendants to develop similar procedures for the other upper ranks-sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and major. The decree expressly provided that the
plaintiffs might apply to the court for enforcement of its
terms or for other appropriate relief. App. 41. 9
Five days after approval of the 1979 Decree, the defendants sought clarification of the 1972 hiring order. The Department maintained that its goal-a 25% black trooper
force-applied only to officers in entry-level positions and not
to the upper ranks. The court responded:
"On this point, there is no ambiguity. The Court's
[1972] order required that one-to-one hiring be carried
out until approximately twenty-five percent of the state
trooper force is black. It is perfectly clear that the
order did not distinguish among troopers by rank."
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 440 (MD Ala.
1979) (emphasis in original).
The Department also argued that because the 25% objective could not be achieved unless 37.5% of entry-level positions were held by blacks, "more qualified white applicants"
were passed over than was constitutionally permissible.
I d., at 441. The District Court rejected the argument,
stating:
The Uniform Guidelines are "designed to provide a framework for
determining the proper use of tests and other [employee] selection proce. dures consistent with Federal law." 28 CFR § 50.14, pt. 1, § 1 (1978).
• In the interim the parties agreed to utilize the existing state merit system for promotions to the rank of corporal, provided that at least three
black troopers were promoted. The details of this procedure were set
forth in an "Agreement of Counsel for the Parties." App. 46.
8
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"To modify this order would be to do less than the law
requires, which is to eradicate the continuing effects of
·past unlawful practices. In 1972, defendants were not
just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hiring to entry-level positions. The Court found that in
thirty-seven years there had never been a black trooper
at any rank. One continuing effect of that discrimination is that, as of November 1, 1978, out of 232 state
troopers at the rank of corporal or above, there is still
not one black. The [hiring] quota fashio!led py the
Court provides an impetus to promote blacks into those
positions. To focus only on the entry-level positions
would be to ignore that past discrimination by the Department was pervasive, that its effects persist, and that
they are manifest. . . . The order in this case is but the
necessary remedy for an intolerable wrong." Id., at 442
(emphasis added).
In April 1981, more than a year after the deadline set in
the 1979 Decree, the Department proposed a selection procedure for promotion to corporal and sought approval from the
District Court. The United States and the plaintiff class
both objected to implementation of the procedure, arguing
that it had not been validated and that its use would be impermissible if it had an adverse impact on blacks. To resolve
this dispute the parties executed a second consent decree
(1981 Decree) which the District Court approved on August
18, 1981.
In the 1981 Decree, the Department reaffirmed its commitment made in 1979 to implement a promotion procedure with
little or no adverse impact on blacks. The parties then
agreed to the administration of the proposed promotion procedure and that its results would be "reviewed to determine
· whether the selection procedure has an adverse impact
against black applicants." App. 51. Whether there was adverse impact was to be determined by reference to the "fourfifths" rule of § 4 of the Uniform Guidelines. See 28 CFR
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§ 50.14 (1978). 10

If the parties proved unable to agree on a
procedure, its determination would be submitted to the District Court. No promotions would occur until the "parties
. . . agreed in writing or the Court . . . ruled upon the
method to be used for making promotions with little or no adverse impact." App. 53.
The defendants administered the test to 262 applicants of
whom 60 (23%) were black. Of the 60 blacks who took the
test, only 5 (8.3%) were listed in the top half of the promotion
register; the highest ranked black candidate was number 80.
ld., at 119. In response to an inquiry from the United
States, the Department indicated that there was an immediate need to make between 8 and 10 promotions to corporal
and announced its intention to elevate between 16 and 20 individuals before construction of a new list. 1 Record 222.
The United States objected to any rank-ordered use of the
list, stating that such use "would result in substantial adverse impact against black applicants" and suggested that the
defendants submit an alternative proposal that would comply
with the requirements of the 1979 and 1981 decrees. /d. , at
220-221. No proposal was submitted, and no promotions
were made during the next nine months.
In April 1983, plaintiffs returned to District Court and
sought an order enforcing the terms of the two consent decrees. Specifically, they requested that defendants be required to promote blacks to corporal "at the same rate at
which they have been hired, 1 for 1, until such time as the
defendants implement a valid promotional procedure." I d.,
at 112. The plaintiff class contended that such an order
would "encourage defendants to develop a valid promotional
10

According to § 4 of the Uniform Guidelines, "[a] selection rate for any
· racial, ethnic or sex group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded as evidence of adverse impact." 28 CFR § 50.14, pt. 1, § 4 (1978).
In other words, if 60% of the white troopers who take a promotion test pass
it, then 48% of the black troopers to whom it is administered must pass.
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procedure as soon as possible," and would "help to alleviate
the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the supervisory
ranks of the Department" 11-an underrepresentation caused
by the Department's past discrimination and exacerbated by
its continuing refusal to implement a fair procedure. Ibid.
Although it opposed the one-for-one promotion requirement, the United States agreed that the consent decrees
should be enforced. It stated that defendants had failed to
offer "any reason[s] why promotions should not be made,"
nor had they offered an explanation as to why they had halted
"progress towards remedying the effects of past discrimination." !d., at 199-201. The United States further observed
that the Department's failure to produce a promotion plan in
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 decrees "suggests that a
pattern of discrimination against blacks in the Department
... may be continuing." Id., at 200. 12
After the motion to enforce was filed, four white applicants
for promotion to corporal sought to intervene on behalf of a
class composed of those white applicants who took the proposed corporal's examination and ranked #1 through #79.
App. 81-87. They argued that the 1979 and 1981 Decrees
and the relief proposed by the plaintiffs in their motion to enforce were "unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional or against
public policy." Id., at 99.
In an order entered October 28, 1983, the District Court
held that the Department's selection procedure had an adverse impact on blacks. Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp.
11

In fact, the only black candidates who had been promoted since 1972
were the four promoted pursuant to the counsels' sidebar to the 1979 Decree. See n. 8, supra.
12
The Department opposed the motion to enforce, arguing that the relief
sought by the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. The Department requested
an opportunity to demonstrate that the proposed procedure was valid and
that it did not adversely impact upon black candidates within the meaning
of the consent decrees and the Uniform Guidelines.
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171, 174 (MD Ala.). 13 Observing that even if 79 corporals
were promoted in rank order, rather than the 15 contemplated, none would be black, the court concluded that "[s]hort
of outright exclusion based on race, it is hard to conceive of a
selection procedure which would have a greater discriminatory impact." I d., at 173. 14 The Department was ordered
to submit, by November 10, 1983, "a plan to promote to corporal, from qualified candidates, at least 15 persons in a manner that will not have an adverse racial impact." I d., at 175.
The Department subsequently submitted a proposal to promote 15 persons to the rank of corporal, of whom four would
be black. In addition, the Department requested that the
Department of Personnel be given more time to develop and
submit for court approval a nondiscriminatory promotion
procedure.
The United St~tes did not oppose the Department's proposal, but plaintiffs did. They argued that the proposal "totally disregards the injury plaintiffs have suffered due to the
defendants' four-and-a-half year delay [since the 1979 Decree.] and fails to provide any mechanism that will insure the
present scenario will not reoccur." 2 Record 382.
On December 15, 1983, the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. Paradise
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72 (MD Ala.). Confronted with the
Department's immediate need to promote 15 troopers to corporal and the parties' inability to agree, the court was required by the 1979 and 1981 Decrees to fashion a promotion
procedure. The District Judge summarized the situation:
13
In a separate order issued that same day, the District Court permitted
the white intervenors to participate in the case on a prospective basis only.
The court held that intervention was untimely as to prior orders, judgments, and decrees. App. 116.
14
The District Co\lrt also rejected the Department's argument that the
one-for-one hiring order was a "special program" within the meaning of the
Uniform Guidelines that would insulate the Department from any finding
of adverse impact in its promotion procedures. Paradise v. Prescott, 580
F. Supp. 171, 174 (MD Ala. 1983).
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"On February 10, 1984, less than two months from
today, twelve years will have passed since this court condemned the racially discriminatory policies and practices
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Nevertheless, the effects of these policies and practices remain
pervasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entrylevel position. Of the 6 majors, there is still not one
black. Of the 25 captains, there is still not one black.
Of the 35 lieutenants, there is still not one black. Of the
65 sergeants, there is still not one black. Of the 66 corporals, only four are black. Thus, the department still
operates an upper rank structure in which almost every
trooper obtained his position through procedures that totally excluded black persons. Moreover, the department is still without acceptable procedures for advancement of black troopers into this structure, and it does not
appear that any procedures will be in place within the
near future. The preceding scenario is intolerable and
must not continue. The time has now arrived for the
department to take affirmative and substantial steps to
open the upper ranks to black troopers." /d., at 74 (emphasis in original).
The court then fashioned the relief at issue here. It held
that "for a period of time," at least 50% of the promotions to
corporal must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black
candidates were available. The court also held that "if there
is to be within the near future an orderly path for black
troopers to enter the upper ranks, any relief fashioned by the
court must address the department's delay in developing acceptable promotion procedures for all ranks." I d., at 75.
Thus, the court imposed a 50% promotional quota in the
.upper ranks, but only if there were qualified black candidates, if the rarik were less than 25% black, and if the Department had not developed and implemented a promotion
plan without adverse impact for the relevant rank. The
court concluded that the effects of past discrimination in the
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Department "will not wither away of their own accord" and
that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of
this discrimination cannot be eliminated." I d., at 75 and 76.
The court highlighted the temporary nature and flexible design of the relief ordered, stating that it was "specifically tailored" to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimination, to remedy the delayed compliance with the consent
decrees, and to ensure prompt implementation of lawful procedures. Ibid .
Finally, the Department was ordered to submit within 30
days a schedule for the development of promotion procedures
for all ranks above the entry-level. The schedule was to be
"based upon realistic expectations" as the court intended that
"the use of the quotas . . . be a one-time occurrence." Ibid.
The District Court reasoned that, under the order it had entered, the Department had "the prerogative to end the promotional quotas at any time, simply by developing acceptable
promotion procedures." I d., at 76.
Numerous motions for reconsideration of the court's order
and for the alteration or amendment of the court's judgment
were denied by the District Court. In its motion, the Department set forth the "new contention" that it was "without
legal authority and sufficiently trained personnel to design
any promotional procedures" because "this function is allocated by statute to the Department of Personnel." Paradise
v. Prescott, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Jan. 13,
1984). The District Court responded that the Department
had signed consent decrees in 1979 and 1981 mandating
development of an acceptable procedure and that Department counsel had represented at the January 5, 1984, hearing
that "it was anticipated that the development of these procedures would take only a few months." Ibid. The judge
concluded:

"It is now years later and this court will not entertain the
excuse that the department is now without legal authority to meet its obligations under the consent de-

:
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crees. . . . [T]he Department of Personnel, which is
also a party to these proceedings, assured the court at
the January 5, [1984] hearing that it would work closely
with the Public Safety Department to develop acceptable
promotion procedures. The Public Safety Department's
contention that it is without legal authority is not only
meritless, it is frivolous.
"Moreover, that the Department of Public Safety
would even advance this argument dramatically demonstrates the need for the relief imposed by this court.
Such frivolous arguments serve no purpose other than to
prolong the discriminatory effects of the department's
37-year history of racial discrimination." Ibid. (emphasis added).
In February 1984, the Department promoted eight blacks
and eight whites to corporal pursuant to the District Court's
order enforcing the consent decrees.
Four months later, the Department submitted for the
court's approval its proposed procedure for promotions to the
rank of corporal. The District Court ruled that the Department could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing this procedure
and suspended application of the one-for-one requirement for
that purpose. App. 163-164. In October 1984, following
approval of the Department's new selection procedure for
promotion to sergeant, the court similarly suspended application of the quota at that rank. I d., at 176-177. 15
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the relief at issue was designed to remedy the
present effects ofpast discrimination-"effects which, as the
history of this case amply demonstrates, 'will not wither
. away of their own accord."' Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F. 2d
15
In addition, the Department has been permitted to promote only white
troopers to lieutenant and captain because no blacks have qualified, as of
yet, for promotion to those ranks. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F . 2d 1514,
1538, n. 19 (CAll 1985).
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1514, 1533 (1985) (quoting 585 F. Supp., at 75). In addition,
the relief awarded was deemed to "exten[d] no further than
necessary to accomplish the objective of remedying the 'egregious' and long-standing racial imbalances in the upper ranks
of the Department." 767 F. 2d, at 1532-1533.
We granted certiorari. 478 U. S. - - (1986). We
affirm.
II

The United States maintains that the race-conscious relief
ordered in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.'6
It is now well established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications
essential to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic \
groups subject to discrimination. See Sheet Metal Workers
v. EEOC, 478 U. S. - - , - - (1986), and cases cited
therein. See also Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U. S. - - , - - (1986) ("The Court is in agreement that
. . . remedying past or present racial discrimination . . . is a
sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial
use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program")
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But although this Court has consistently held that
some elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or
ethnic distinction is made for remedial purposes, it has yet to
16
The Government framed the issue presented as "[w]hether the oneblack-for-one-white promotion quota adopted by the district court . .. is
permissible under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and
· Fifth Amendments .to the United States Constitution." Brief for United
States I. Because the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth, we need not decide whether the race-conscious relief ordered in this case would violate the
former as well as the latter constitutional provision.
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reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis. 17
We need not do so in this case, however, because we conclude
that the relief ordered in this case survives even strict scrutiny analysis: it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling
governmental purpose." /d., a t - - (opinion of POWELL,
J.).
The government unquestionably has a compelling interest
in remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor. See Wygant, 476 U. S., a t - - (opinion of POWELL,
J.); id., at - - (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Sheet Metal
Workers, supra, at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See also
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 763
(1976) (prevention and remedying of racial discrimination and
its effects is a national policy of "highest priority"). In 1972
the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
that for almost four decades the Department had excluded
blacks from all positions, including jobs in the upper ranks.
Such egregious discriminatory conduct was "unquestionably
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at 705. As the United States concedes,
Brief for United States 21, the pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct of the Department created a
profound need and a firm justification for the race-conscious
See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U . S . - , (1986) (opinion of PowELL, J.) (the means chosen must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling government interest"); id., a t - (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring) (same); id., a t - (MARSHALL, J., dissenting, joined
by BRENNAN, J. and BLACKMUN, J.) (remedial use of race permissible if it
serves "'important governmental objectives'" and is "'substantially related to achievement of those objectives'") (quoting University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978)); 476 U. S., a t - (STE. YENS, J., dissenting) (both public interest served by racial classification
and means employed must justify adverse effects on the disadvantaged
group); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring) (expressing concern first articulated in Bakke, supra, at 362, that
review not be "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
17
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relief ordered by the District Court. 18
The Department and the intervenors, however, maintain
that the Department was found guilty only of discrimination
in hiring, and not in its promotional practices. They argue
that no remedial relief is justified in the promotion context
because the intentional discrimination in hiring was without
effect in the upper ranks, and because the Department's promotional procedure was not discriminatory. There is no
merit in either premise.
Discrimination at the entry-level necessarily precluded
blacks from competing for promotions, and resulted in a departmental hierarchy dominated exclusively by nonminorities. The lower courts determined that this situation was
explicable only by reference to the Department's past dis8
' Amici, the City of Binningham, the City of Detroit, the City of Los
Angeles, and the District of Columbia, state that the operations of police
departments are crippled by the lingering effects of past discrimination.
They believe that race-conscious relief in hiring and promotion restores
community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitates effective
police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. See also Wygant ,
supra, at-- (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("[I]n a city with a recent history
of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude
that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the
community and do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a
force composed only of white officers"); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F. 2d, at 621
("This is a police department and the visibility of the Black patrolman in
the community is a decided advantage for all segments of the public at a
time when racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement" (citation omitted)). Amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., suggests that the governmental interest in a racially integrated Department is
amplified here due to community perceptions of, and reactions to the Department's historical role in defense of segregation and its active opposition
to the civil rights movement. We need not decide if either the generalized
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particular. ized need to overcome any impediments to law enforcement created by perceptions arising froin the egregious discriminatory conduct of the Department is compelling. In this case the judicial detenninations of prior
discriminatory policies and conduct satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.
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criminatory conduct. 19 In 1972 the Department was "not
just found guilty of discriminating against blacks in hiring to
entry-level positions. The Court found that in thirty-seven
years there had never been a black trooper at any rank."
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp., at 442. In 1979 the
District Judge stated that one continuing effect of the Department's historical discrimination was that, "as of November 1, 1978, out of 232 state troopers at the rank of corporal
or above, there is still not one black." Ibid. The court explained that the hiring quota it had fashioned was intended to
provide "an impetus to promote blacks into those positions"
and that "[t]o focus only on the entry-level positions would be
to ignore that past discrimination by the Department was
pervasive, that its effects persist, and that they are manifest." Ibid. The District Court crafted the relief it did due
to "the department's failure after almost twelve years to
eradicate the continuing effects of its own discrimination."
585 F. Supp., at 75, n. 1. It is too late for the Department to
attempt to segregate the results achieved by its hiring practices and those achieved by its promotional practices.
The argument that the Department's promotion procedure
was not discriminatory is belied by the record. In 1979,
faced with additional allegations of discrimination, the Department agreed to adopt promotion procedures without an
adverse impact on black candidates within one year. See
767 F. 2d, at 1532.
By 1983 the Department had promoted
only four blacks, and these promotions had been made pursuant to the 1979 Decree, and "not the voluntary action of the
Department." Id., at 1533, n. 16. In December 1983, the
District Court found, despite the commitments made in the
consent decrees, that the Department's proposed promotion
Compare this situation with that described in Wygant, supra, at-.(opinion of PowELL; J.) ("There are numerous explanations for a disparity
between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any
kind").
19
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plan would have an adverse impact upon blacks, 580 F.
Supp., at 174, and that "the department still operate[d) an
upper rank structure in which almost every trooper obtained
his position through procedures that totally excluded black
persons." 585 F. Supp., at 74 (emphasis in original). On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit summarily rejected the argument of the Department and the intervenors:
"[l]t is no answer in this case to say that plaintiffs have
not proven that the Department has discriminated
against blacks above the entry-level seeking promotions. . . . [l]t cannot be gainsaid that white troopers
promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an
official policy which systematically excluded all
blacks." 767 F . 2d, at 1533, n. 16 (emphasis added).
Promotion, like hiring, has been a central concern of the
District Court since the commencement of this action; since
1972, the relief crafted has included strictures against promotion procedures that have a discriminatory purpose or effect.
The race-conscious relief at issue here is justified by a compelling interest in remedying the discrimination that permeated entry-level hiring practices and the promotional process
alike. 20
20
We also reject the argument of the United States, the Department,
and the intervenors that the purpose of the order enforcing the consent decrees was the imposition of a particular racial balance on the upper ranks of
the Department. The one-for-one mechanism was employed not to punish
the Department's failure to achieve racial balance, but to remedy the Department's refusal to fulfill the commitment made in the consent decrees to
implement a promotion procedure without adverse impact on blacks and to
eradicate the effects of its past delay and discrimination. The racial imbalances in the Department are properly characterized as the effects of the
· Department's past :discriminatory actions and of its failure to develop a
promotion procedure without adverse impact as required by the previous
court orders and the consent decrees. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,
478 U. S., a t - - , - - (1986) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The contempt order was not imposed for the Union's
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Finally, in this case, as in Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S.,
at - - (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment), the District Court's enforcement order is "supported not only by the governmental interest in eradicating
[the Department's] discriminatory practices, it is also supported by the societal interest in compliance with the judgments of federal courts." The relief at issue was imposed
upon a defendant with a consistent history of resistance to
the District Court's orders, and only after the Department
failed to live up to its court-approved commitments.

III
While conceding that the District Court's order serves a
compelling interest, the Government insists that it was not
narrowly tailored to accomplish its purposes-to remedy past
discrimination and eliminate its lingering effects, to enforce
compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by bringing about
the speedy implementation of a promotion procedure that
would not have an adverse impact on blacks, and to eradicate
the ill effects of the Department's delay in producing such a
procedure. We cannot agree.
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, including the necessity
for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability
of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals
to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on
the rights of third parties. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S.,
at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); id., at-- (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476
U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at-- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id.,
at - - (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); id., at - (MARSHALL, J.,: dissenting).
When considered in light of
failure to achieve the goal, but for its failure to take the prescribed steps
that would facilitate achieving the goal").
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these factors, it was amply established, and we find that the
one-for-one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to
serve its several purposes, both as applied to the initial set of
promotions to the rank of corporal and as a continuing contingent order with respect to the upper ranks.
A

To evaluate the District Court's determination that it was
necessary to order the promotion of eight whites and eight
blacks to the rank of corporal at the time of the motion to enforce, we must examine the purposes the order was intended
to serve. First, the court sought to eliminate the effects of
the Department's "long term, open, and pervasive" discrimination, including the absolute exclusion of blacks from
its upper ranks. Second, the judge sought to ensure expeditious compliance with the 1979 and 1981 Decrees by inducing the Department to implement a promotion procedure that
would not have an adverse impact on blacks. Finally, the
court needed to eliminate so far as possible the effects of the
Department's delay in producing such a procedure. Confronted by the Department's urgent need to promote at least
15 troopers to corporal, see Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F.
Supp. , at 173, the District Court determined that all of its
purposes could be served only by ordering the promotion of
eight blacks and eight whites, as requested by the plaintiff
class.
The options proffered by the Government and the Department would not have served the court's purposes. The Department proposed, as a stop-gap measure, to promote four
blacks and eleven whites and requested additional time to
allow the Department of Personnel to develop and submit a
·nondiscriminatory promotion procedure. The United States
argues that the Department's proposal would have allowed
this round of promotions to be made without adverse impact
on black candidates.
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The Department's proposal was inadequate because it completely failed to address two of the purposes cited above.
The Department's ad hoc offer to make one round of promotions without an adverse impact ignored the court's concern
that an acceptable procedure be adopted with alacrity. As
early as 1972, the Department had been enjoined from engaging in any promotional practices "for the purpose or with the
effect of discriminating against any employee . . . on the
ground of race or color." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp., at
706. In 1979, the Department had promised in a court-approved consent decree to develop and implement a procedure
without adverse impact by 1980. By 1983, such a procedure
still had not been established, and Paradise sought enforcement of the consent decrees. Given the record of delay, we
find it astonishing that the Department should suggest that
in 1983 the District Court was constitutionally required to
settle for yet another promise that such a procedure would be
forthcoming "as soon as possible." 2 Record 358.
Moreover, the Department's proposal ignored the injury to
the plaintiff class that resulted from its delay in complying
with the terms of the 1972 order and the 1979 and 1981 Decrees. 21 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, no blacks were
21
The Government contends that "the Department in reality had acted
with reasonable diligence to devise a new corporal's examination" and that
both Paradise and the District Judge "failed to appreciate how difficult it is
to develop and implement selection procedures that satisfy the rigorous
standards of the Uniform Guidelines" because "the validation of selection
procedures is an expensive and time-consuming process usually extending
over several years" and because the tests, besides being validated, had to
be without adverse impact. Brief for United States 24-25, n. 13.
This argument is without merit. Since the District Court order at issue
here was rendered , the Department has timely proposed and the court has
tentatively approved, procedures for promotion to corporal and sergeant .
. App. 163-164, 176-177. Although these procedures have not yet been validated (and, according to the Government, may not be for some time , Tr. of
Oral Arg. 41-42), the use of the one-for-one promotion requirement was
suspended by the court both times the Department proposed a procedure
that appeared to be without adverse impact. It is therefore clear that any
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promoted between 1972 and 1979; the four blacks promoted
in 1979 were elevated pursuant to the 1979 Decree and not as
a result of the voluntary action of the Department; and, finally, the whites promoted since 1972 "were the specific
beneficiaries of an official policy which systematically excluded all blacks." 767 F . 2d, at 1533, n. 16. To permit ad
hoc decisionmaking to continue and allow only four of fifteen
slots to be filled by blacks would have denied relief to black
troopers who had irretrievably lost promotion opportunities.
Thus, adoption of the Department's proposal would have
fallen far short of the remedy necessary to eliminate the effects of the Department's past discrimination, would not have
ensured adoption of a procedure without adverse impact, and
would not have vitiated the effects of the defendant's delay. 22
The Government suggests that the trial judge could have
imposed heavy fines and fees on the Department pending
compliance. This alternative was never proposed to the District Court. Furthermore, the Department had been ordered
to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs throughout this
lengthy litigation; these court orders had done little to prevent future foot-dragging. 23 See, e. g., United States v. Fra-

~sult

inevitable delay in validating the procedures will not
in
reinposition of the one-for-one requirement so long as the Department implements a procedure without apparent adverse impact. The difficulties
of validating a procedure do not excuse the Department's delay in developing a test without adverse impact.
In addition, it was the Department that initially proposed to implement a
validated procedure within one year; this time period was not imposed by
the court. Surely the Department was in the best position to assess the
practicality of its own proposal.
22
The merit of the District Court's determination in 1983 that it could
not accept the Department's promise to develop a promotion procedure
without adverse impact is illustrated by the Department's petition for re. consideration of the court's order enforcing the consent decrees. The Department argued that it was without legal authority to comply with the
court's order; the District Court stated that this argument was yet another
delaying tactic. See supra, at - -, and App. 139.
23
Indeed, the Department had shown itself willing to sacrifice a great
deal of money to avoid the court's orders. See Paradise v. Dothard, Civ.
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zer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1093 (1970); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F.
Supp., at 708-710. In addition, imposing fines on the defendant does nothing to compensate the plaintiffs for the long
delays in implementing acceptable promotion procedures.
Finally, the Department had expressed an immediate and urgent need to make 15 promotions, and the District Court took
this need into consideration in constructing its remedy. 24 As
we observed only last Term, "a district court may find it necessary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending
the development of nondiscriminatory hiring or promotion
procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals provides a compromise between two unacceptable alternatives:
an outright ban on hiring or promotions ... continued use of
a discriminatory selection procedure," or, we might add, use
of no selection procedure at all. Sheet Metal Workers, 478
Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975) ("The evidence outlined above
establishes and this Court now finds that, at the time of and in the years
following the Court's 1972 order, the administration and the heads of the
Department of Public Safety perceived a need for additional troopers-a
need characterized as critical; that there were appropriated and available
to the defendants funds in excess of $3 million, a substantial portion of
which could have been used for salaries and ancillary expenses for new
troopers; and that this money was not spent for the critically needed additional troopers but went unspent or was diverted to other uses. These
findings , when combined with the considerable testimony regarding the defendants' reluctance to implement the Court's remedial order by placing
black troopers on the state's highways, necessitate the conclusion that the
defendants have, for the purpose of frustrating or delaying full relief to the
plaintiff class, artificially restricted the size of the trooper force and the
number of new troopers hired").
24
Fining the defendant lacks even the lone virtue of the Department's
proposal to promote four blacks: that at least a step would be taken toward
the eradication of past discrimination by elevating blacks in the hierarchy.
· Furthermore, it does nothing to compensate plaintiffs for the past and future delay in implementation of procedures without adverse effect. While
fines vindicate the court's authority, here they would not fulfill the court's
additional responsibility to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past
as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United
States , 380 U. S. 145, 154 (1965).
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U. 8., a t - - (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 25
By 1984 the District Court was plainly justified in imposing
the remedy chosen. Any order allowing further delay by the
Department was entirely unacceptable.
Cf. Green v.

County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438
(1968) ("[A] plan that at this late date fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a
dual system is . . . intolerable. . . . The burden on a school
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now").
Not only was the immediate promotion of blacks to the rank
of corporal essential, but, if the need for continuing judicial
oversight was to end, it was also essential that the Department be required to develop a procedure without adverse impact on blacks, and that the effect of past delays be
eliminated. 26
The United States also suggests that the District Court could have
made the promotion decisions itself or appointed a trustee to supervise the
Department's progress. Again neither of these alternatives were proposed to the judge. The suggestions appear rather beside the point as the
United States would presumably object if the District Court or the trustee
simply selected 50% blacks to be promoted each time vacancies occurred
until a test without adverse impact was created, rather than ordering the
Department to select 50% blacks. If the United States is actually suggesting that the court come up with an ad hoc proposal for each batch of promotions, this solution is subject to the same deficiencies noted with respect to
the Department's proposal to the court. See supra, at --.
26
The imposition of the District Court's requirement with respect to the
ranks beyond corporal was also clearly justified. At the time the District
Court imposed the corporal promotion ratio, it had required the Department to submit for its approval a schedule for the development of promotion procedures for all ranks above the entry level position "based upon realistic expectations." Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 75 (1983).
The Department complied, proposing periods of time ranging from 5
. months for the position of corporal to 24 months for the position of major.
2 Record 569-570. : Thus far, all procedures have been submitted in a
timely manner preventing any imposition of the one-for-one requirement in
the upper ranks. The record indicates that, while the order itself is a continuing one, its application is entirely contingent on the repetition of the
25
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We conclude that in 1983, when the District Judge entered
his order, "it is doubtful, given [the Department's] history in
this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any
other effective remedy." Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
- - (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
B

The features of the one-for-one requirement and its actual
operation indicate that it is flexible in application at all ranks.
The requirement may be waived if no qualified black candidates are available. The Department has, for example, been
permitted to promote only white troopers to the ranks of lieutenant and captain since no black troopers have qualified for
those positions. Further, it applies only when the Department needs to make promotions. Thus, if external forces,
such as budget cuts, necessitate a promotion freeze, the Department will not be required to make gratuitous promotions
to remain in compliance with the court's order. 27
exact circumstances that prompted its initial formulation. The District
Court will resort to ~ again only if confronted with further delay by
the Department in imple entmg a neutral promotiOn procedure accordmg
to the schedule the Department itself proposed. Thus, any future use of
the one-for-one requirement will be lawful for the same reason that justified the District Judge in ordering the promotion of eight blacks and eight
whites to the rank of corporal: only in the event the Department fails to
meet its court-approved commitments. We cannot anticipate that this will
occur.
27
Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., at-- (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)
("The [district] court has twice adjusted the deadline for achieving the
[membership] goal, and has continually approved of changes in the size of
the apprenticeship classes to account for the fact that economic conditions
prevented petitioners from meeting their membership targets; there is
every reason to believe that both the court and the administrator will con. tinue to accommodate legitimate explanations for petitioners' failure . to
comply with the court's orders"); id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) ("Additional flexibility is evidenced by
the fact that this goal, originally set to be achieved by 1981, has been twice
delayed and is now set for 1987").
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Most significantly, the one-for-one requirement is ephemeral; the term of its application is contingent upon the Department's own conduct. The requirement endures only \
until the Department comes up with a procedure that does
not have a discriminatory impact on blacks-something the
Department was enjoined to do in 1972 and expressly promised to do by 1980. As noted at note - - , supra, the court
has taken into account the difficulty of validating a test and
does not require validation as a prerequisite for suspension of
the promotional requirement. The one-for-one requirement
evaporated at the ranks of corporal and sergeant upon implementation of promotion procedures without an adverse impact, demonstrating that it is not a disguised means to
achieve racial balance. Cf. Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at
- - (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
Finally, the record reveals that this requirement was flexible, waivable, and temporary in application. When the District Court imposed the provision, the judge expressed the
hope that its use would be "a one-time occurrence." 585 F.
Supp., at 76. The court believed that this hope would be fulfilled: at the January 15, 1984, hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the consent decrees, "the Personnel Department pledged that it would now devote its full resources to
assisting the Public Safety Department in not only developing acceptable promotion procedures as required by the two
consent decrees, but in doing so within the near future."
App. 141. The Department has since timely submitted procedures for promotions to corporal and sergeant, and the
court has consequently suspended application of the promotional order with respect to in those ranks. In the higher
· ranks, the Department has been permitted to promote only
white troopers. It now appears that the effect of the order
enforcing the decrees will be "the development of acceptable
promotion procedures for all ranks and the nullification of the
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promotion quota." 767 F. 2d, at 1538, n. 19.
chosen has proven both effective and flexible.

27

The remedy

c
We must also examine the relationship between the numerical relief ordered and the percentage of nonwhites in the
relevant workforce. The original hiring order of the District
Court required the Department to hire 50% black applicants
until 25% of the state trooper force was composed of blacks;
the latter figure reflects the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor market. 585 F. Supp., at 75, n. 2. The enforcement order at issue here is less restrictive: it requires the Department to promote 50% black candidates until 25% of the
rank in question is black, but only until a promotion procedure without an adverse impact on blacks is in place. Thus,
had the promotion order remained in effect for the rank of
corporal, it would have survived only until 25% of the Department's corporals were black.
The Government suggests that the one-for-one requirement is arbitrary because it bears no relationship to the 25%
minority labor pool relevant here. This argument ignores
that the 50% figure is not itself the goal; rather it represents
the speed at which the goal of 25% will be achieved. The
interim requirement of one-for-one promotion (had it continued) would simply have determined how quickly the Department progressed toward this ultimate goal. This requirement is therefore analogous to the imposition in Sheet Metal
Workers of an end date, which regulated the speed of
progress toward fulfillment of the hiring goal. Sheet Metal
Workers , 478 U. S., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
To achieve the goal of 25% black representation in the
·upper ranks, the court was not limited to ordering the promotion of only 25% blacks at any one time. Some promptness in
the administration of relief was plainly justified in this case,
and use of deadlines or end-dates had proven ineffective. In

I
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these circumstances, the use of a temporary requirement of
50% minority promotions, which, like the end date in Sheet
Metal Workers, was crafted and applied flexibly, was constitutionally permissible.
The District Court did not accept the argument that in
order to achieve a goal of 25% representation, it could order
only 25% of any particular round of promotions to be awarded
to minorities. Had it done so, the court would have implemented the Department's proposal to promote 4 blacks and
11 whites when it issued its order enforcing the consent decree, because this proposal approximated the 25% figure. 28
Again, however, this proposal completely ignores the fact
and the effects of the Department's past discrimination and
its delay in implementing the necessary promotion procedure. Here the District Court considered both the Department's proposal and the possibility of promoting blacks to all
15 corporal positions "[i]n light of the department's failure
after almost twelve years to eradicate the continuing effects
of its own discrimination and to develop acceptable promotion
procedures and in light of the severity of the existing racial
imbalances." 585 F. Supp., at 75, n. 1. The court rejected
both of these alternatives and, upon consideration of the Department's behavior and of the interests and the purposes to
be served, arrived at an intermediate figure. Although the
appropriate ratio here "necessarily involve[d) a degree of approximation and imprecision," Teamsters v. United States,
431 U. S. 324, 372 (1977), the District Court, with its first28
Following adoption of the plaintiffs' proposal that 8 blacks and 8 whites
should be promoted, the corporal rank was composed of 14 black and 73
white troopers (16% black). Under the Department's proposal that 4
blacks and 11 whites should be promoted, the corporal rank would have
been composed of 8 black and 79 white troopers (9.2% black). Neither
. proposal would have raised the percentage of blacks in the corporal rank to
the 25% mark set as an alternate goal by the District Court (the other alternative being the adoption of a promotion procedure without adverse impact). Obviously, however, the plaintiffs' proposal provided an accelerated approach to achieving that goal to compensate for past delay.

85-999-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. PARADISE

29

hand experience of the parties and the potential for resistance, imposed the requirement that it determined would
compensate for past delay and prevent future recalcitrance,
while not unduly burdening the interests of white troopers. 29
It would have been improper for the District Judge to ignore the effects of the Department's delay and its continued
default of its obligation to develop a promotion procedure,
and to require only that, commencing in 1984, the Department promote one black for every three whites promoted.
The figure selected to compensate for past discrimination and
delay necessarily involved a delicate calibration of the rights
and interests of the plaintiff class, the Department, and the
white troopers. The Government concedes that a one-tothree requirement would have been lawful, Tr. of Oral Arg.
43; the District Court determined that more stringent measures were necessary. This Court should not second-guess
the lower court's carefully considered choice of the figure
necessary to achieve its many purposes, especially when that
figure is hedged about with specific qualifying measures designed to prevent any unfair impact that might arise from
rigid application.
D
The one-for-one requirement did not impose an unacceptable burden on innocent third parties. As stated above, the
29

We have previously recognized the importance of expediting elimination of the vestiges of longstanding discrimination. In United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Education, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), we upheld a
District Court's imposition of black-to-white faculty goal against modifica- /
tions made by the Court of Appeals, saying that the District Court order
"was adopted in the spirit of this Court's opinion in Green v. County School
Board, [391 U. S. 430, 439 (1968)], in that his plan 'promises realistically
to work, and promises realistically to work now.' The modifications or. dered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while of course not intended to
do so, would, we think, take from the order some of its capacity to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a completely unified,
unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a
hope .. . .'' Id., at 235-236.
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temporary and extremely limited nature of the requirement
substantially limits any potential burden on white applicants
for promotion. It was used only once at the rank of corporal
and may not be utilized at all in the upper ranks. Nor has
the court imposed an "absolute bar" to white advancement.
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., at - - . In the one instance in which thellquota 1\vas employed, 50% of those ele- V'
vated were white. "
"
The one-for-one requirement does not require the layoff
~ discharge of white employees and therefore does not impose burdens of the sort that concerned the plurality in
Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.) ("layoffs
impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of
their lives") id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring) (same). Because the one-for-one requirement is so limited in scope and
duration, it only postpones the promotions of qualified
whites. Consequently, like a hiring goal, it "impose[s] a diffuse burden, . . . foreclosing only one of several opportunities." I d., at - - . "Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job," Wygant,
476 U. S., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.), and plainly postponement imposes a lesser burden still. 30
Finally, the basic limitation, that black troopers promoted
must be qualified, remains. Qualified white candidates simply have to compete with qualified black candidates. To be
sure, should the District Court's promotion requirement be
applied, black applicants would receive some advantage.
But this situation is only temporary, and is subject to amelioration by the action of the Department itself.
In the promotion procedure proposed by the Department in 1981, seniority counted as 10% of the candidate's score. App. 56. But, under the
point system established, differences in seniority among candidates could
affect scores by no more than 3%. ld., at 50-51. Greater seniority did
not, therefore, by itself create an expectation of promotion.
80
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Accordingly, the one-for-one promotion requirement imposed in this case does not disproportionately harm the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent
individuals.
E
In determining whether this order was "narrowly tailored," we must acknowledge the respect owed a District
Judge's judgment that specified relief is essential to cure a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A district court
has "not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 154
(1965). "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad; for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971).
Nor have we in all situations "required remedial plans to be
limited to the least restrictive means of implementation. We
have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial
discrimination is 'a balancing process left, within appropriate
constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of
the trial court."' Fullilove, supra, at 508 (POWELL, J., concurring) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U. S., at 794 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Cf. Green v. County School Bd. of New
Kent County, 391 U. S., at 439 ("The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is
no universal answer to the complex problems of desegrega. tion; there is o~viously no one plan that will do the job in
every case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each
instance").
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The district court has first-hand experience with the parties and is best qualified to deal with the "flinty, intractable
realities of day-to-day implementation of constitutional commands." Swann, supra, at 6. In this case, as in Sheet
Metal Workers, "th[e] court having had the parties before it
over a period of time, was in the best position to judge
whether an alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction,
would have been effective in ending [the] discriminatory
practices." 478 U. 8., at - - (POWELL, J., concurring).
The District Judge determined that the record demonstrated
that "without promotional quotas the continuing effects of
[the Department's] discrimination cannot be eliminated."
585 F. Supp., at 76. His proximate position and broad equitable powers mandate substantial respect for this
judgment.
Plainly the District Court's discretion in remedying the
deeply-rooted Fourteenth Amendment violations here was
limited by the rights and interests of the white troopers seeking promotion to corporal. But we conclude that the District
Judge properly balanced the individual and collective interests at stake, including the interests of the white troopers eligible for promotion, in shaping this remedy. See Swann,
supra, at 16 ("The task is to correct, by a balancing of the
individual and collective interests, the condition that offends
the Constitution"). While a remedy must be narrowly tailored, that requirement does not operate to remove all discretion from the District Court in its construction of a remedial decree. 31
See also Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contrasting legislative branch with court of equity and suggesting that the latter has the "dispassionate objectivity" and the "flexibility" necessary "to
mold a race-conscious remedy around the single objective of eliminating
. the effects of past or present discrimination"); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400 (1947) (Jackson, J.) ("The framing of decrees should take place in the District rather than in Appellate Courts.
They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to the
exigencies of the particular case") (citations and footnote omitted).
31
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IV

The remedy imposed here is an effective, temporary and
flexible measure. It applies only if qualified blacks are available, only if the Department has an objective need to make
promotions, and only if the Department fails to implement a
promotion procedure that does not have an adverse impact on
blacks. The one-for-one requirement is the product of the
considered judgment of the District Court which, with its
knowledge of the parties and their resources, properly determined that strong measures were required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance.
The race-conscious relief imposed here was amply justified,
and narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate and laudable
purposes of the District Court. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals, upholding the order of the District Court, is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
In 1970, two years before the District Court found in this
case that the State of Alabama had persistently maintained a
deliberately segregated police force, this Court issued a
unanimous opinion setting forth the guidelines for district
judges in fashioning remedies to eliminate the effects of racial
segregation in public schools. Swann v. C harlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1970). The central
theme of that opinion is that race-conscious remedies are
obviously required to remedy racially discriminatory actions
by the State that violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because Swann explained the appropriate governing
standard, it must have provided guidance to the district court
in this case and it should now guide our deliberations. Chief
Justice Burger wrote:
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope
of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies.
"'The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.
The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
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equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private
needs as well as between competing private claims."
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944),
cited in Brown II, supra, at 300.
"[A] school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional
right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends
the Constitution.
"In default by the school authorities of their obligation to
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad
power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary
school system.
"We see therefore that the use made of mathematical
ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of
shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement.
From that starting point the District Court proceeded to
frame a decree that was within its discretionary powers,
as an equitable remedy for the particular circumstances.
As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan
or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its
effectiveness. Awareness of the racial composition of
the whole school system is likely to be a useful starting
point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional
violations. In sum, the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court.
"Absent a constitutional violation there would be no
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a
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racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of
discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils
to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not
equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed
and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations
and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness
and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school systems.
"The Court of Appeals, searching for a term to define
the equitable remedial power of the district court, used
the term 'reasonableness.' In Green, supra, this Court
used the term 'feasible' and by implication, 'workable,'
'effective,' and 'realistic' in the mandate to develop 'a
plan that promises realistically to work, and . . . to work
now.' On the facts of this case, we are unable to conclude that the order of the District Court is not reasonable, feasible and workable. However, in seeking to
define the scope of remedial power or the limits on remedial power of courts in an area as sensitive as we deal
with here, words are poor instruments to convey the
sense of basic fairness inherent in equity. Substance,
not semantics, must govern, and we have sought to suggest the nature of limitations without frustrating the
appropriate scope of equity." 402 U. S., at 15, 16, 25,
28, 31.

A party who has been found guilty of repeated and persistent violations of the law bears the burden of demonstrating
that the chancellor's efforts to fashion effective relief exceed
the bounds of "reasonableness." The burden of proof in a
case like this is precisely the opposite of that in cases such as
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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. --,and
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), which did not
involve any proven violations of law.* In such cases the
governmental decisionmaker who would make race-conscious
decisions must overcome a strong presumption against them.
No such burden rests on a federal district judge who has
found that the governmental unit before him is guilty of racially discriminatory conduct that violates the Constitution.
The relief that the district judge has a duty to fashion must
unavoidably consider race. A unanimous Court held in
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402
U. S. 43 (1971) (per curiam), a case decided on the same day
as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
that the State's Anti-Busing Law, which prohibited assignment of any student on account of race or for the purpose
of creating a racial balance in the schools, conflicted with
the State's duty to remedy constitutional violations. We
observed:
"[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to
control school assignment plans by directing that they be
'color blind'; that requirement, against the background of
segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Just as
*The law violator who would oppose a remedy imposed against him as
itself a violation of the law does not stand in the same position as an innocent party; those whom the court has found in the wrong may not oppose a
remedy on the ground that it would constitute a wrong if leveled at a nonparticipant in the litigation. "In fashioning a remedy, the District Court
may, of course, consider the fact that its injunction may impinge upon
rights that would otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protections do not prevent it from remedying" the violations. National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 697-698 (1978).
See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400-401
(1947); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,- U . S . - , - n. 22
(1986) ("The judicial remedy for a proven violation of law will often include
commands that the law does not impose on the community at large.") (citations omitted).
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the race of students must be considered in determining
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also
must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To
forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of
race would deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems.
"Similarly, the flat prohibition against assignment of
students for the purpose of creating a racial balance
must inevitably conflict with the duty of school authorities to disestablish dual school systems. As we have
held in Swann, the Constitution does not compel any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing, but when
past and continuing constitutional violations are found,
some ratios are likely to be useful starting points in shaping a remedy." 402 U. S., at 45-46.
The District Court, like the school authority in Board of
Education v. Swann, may, and in some instances must, resort to race-conscious remedies to vindicate federal constitutional guarantees. Because the instant employment discrimination case "does not differ fundamentally from other
cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair
the denial of a constitutional right," Swann, supra, 402
U. S., at 415-416, and because there has been no showing
that the district judge abused his discretion in shaping a remedy, I concur in the Court's judgment.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
In 1971, one year before the District Court found in this
case that the State of Alabama had persistently maintained a
deliberately segregated police force, this Court issued a
. unanimous opinion setting forth the guidelines for district
judges in fashioning remedies to eliminate the effects of racial
segregation in public schools. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). The central
theme of that opinion is that race-conscious remedies are obviously required to remedy racially discriminatory actions by
the State that violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because Swann explained the appropriate governing
standard, it must have provided guidance to the District
Court in this case and it should now guide our deliberations.
Chief Justice Burger wrote:
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope
of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies.
" 'The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.
The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
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equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private
needs as well as between competing private claims."
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944),
cited in Brown [v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.],
at 300.
402 U. S. , at 15.
In this case, the record discloses an egregious violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. It follows, therefore, that the District Court had broad and flexible authority to remedy the
wrongs resulting from this violation-exactly the opposite of
the Solicitor General's unprecedented suggestion that the
judge's discretion is constricted by a "narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest" standard.
Brief for Petitioner 17.
The notion that this Court should craft special and narrow
rules for reviewing judicial decrees in racial discrimination
cases was soundly rejected in Swann. Chief Justice Burger
wrote for a unanimous Court:
"[A] school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional
right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends
the Constitution.
"In default by the school authorities of their obligation to
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad
power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary
school system." Id., at 15-16.
The Court was equally unambiguous in its rejection of the
argument that a different standard of review is required
when a remedial decree employs mathematical ratios.
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"We see therefore that the use made of mathematical
ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of
shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement.
From that starting point the District Court proceeded to
frame a decree that was within its discretionary powers,
as an equitable remedy for the particular circumstances.
As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan
or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its
effectiveness. Awareness of the racial composition of
the whole school system is likely to be a useful starting
point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional
violations. In sum, the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court." I d., at 25.
"Absent a constitutional violation there would be no
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a
racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of
discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils
to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not
equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed
and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations
and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness
and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim
period when remedial adjustments are being made to
eliminate the dual school systems." Id., at 28.
"The Court of Appeals, searching for a term to define
the equitable remedial power of the district courts, used
the term 'reasonableness.' In Green, supra, this Court
used the term 'feasible' and by implication, 'workable,'
'effective,' and 'realistic' in the mandate to develop 'a
plan that promises realistically to work, and . . . to work
now.' On the facts of this case, we are unable to conclude that the order of the District Court is not reasonable, feasible and workable. However, in seeking to
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define the scope of remedial power or the limits on remedial power of courts in an area as sensitive as we deal
. with here, words are poor instruments to convey the
sense of basic fairness inherent in equity. Substance,
not semantics, must govern, and we have sought to suggest the nature of limitations without frustrating the appropriate scope of equity." !d., at 31.
A party who has been found guilty of repeated and persist-

ent violations of the law bears the burden of demonstrating
that the chancellor's efforts to fashion effective relief exceed
the bounds of "reasonableness." The burden of proof in a
case like this is precisely the opposite of that in cases such
as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.-(1986), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980),
which did not involve any proven violations of law. 1 In such
cases the governmental decisionmaker who would make raceconscious decisions must overcome a strong presumption
against them. No such burden rests on a federal district
judge who has found that the governmental unit before him is
guilty of racially discriminatory conduct that violates the
Constitution.
The relief that the district judge has a duty to fashion must
unavoidably consider race. A unanimous Court held in
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402
1
The law violator who would oppose a remedy imposed against him as
itself a violation of the law does not stand in the same position as an innocent party; those whom the court has found in the wrong may not oppose a
remedy on the ground that it would constitute a wrong if leveled at a nonparticipant in the litigation. "In fashioning a remedy, the District Court
may, of course, consider the fact that its injunction may impinge upon
rights that would otherwise be constitutionally protected, but those protections do not prevent it from remedying" the violations. National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 697-698 (1978).
See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400-401
(1947); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U. S. - , - n. 22 (1986) ("The judicial
remedy for a proven violation of law will often include commands that the
law does not impose on the community at large") (citations omitted).
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U. S. 43 (1971), a case decided on the same day as Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, that the State's
- Anti-Busing Law, which prohibited assignment of any student on account of race or for the purpose of creating a racial
balance in the schools, conflicted with the State's duty to
remedy constitutional violations. We observed:
"[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to
control school assignment plans by directing that they be
'color blind'; that requirement, against the background of
segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Just as
the race of students must be considered in determining
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also
must race be considered in formulating a remedy. To
forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of
race would deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems.
"Similarly, the fiat prohibition against assignment of
students for the purpose of creating a racial balance
must inevitably conflict with the duty of school authorities to disestablish dual school systems. As we have
held in Swann, the Constitution does not compel any
particular degree of racial balance or mixing, but when
past and continuing constitutional violations are found,
some ratios are likely to be useful starting points in shaping a remedy." 402 U. S., at 45-46.
The District Court, like the school authority in North
Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, may, and in
some instances must, resort to race-conscious remedies to
vindicate federal constitutional guarantees. Because the instant employment discrimination case "does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable
remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right,"
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
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supra, at 15-16, and because there has been no showing that
the District Judge abused his discretion in shaping a remedy,
_I concur in the Court's judgment. 2
2
For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, JUSTICE PowELL assumes that the standard to be applied in reviewing the court-ordered action a State must take to correct its violations of the Equal Protection
Clause is different when the violations take place in the administration of a
public school system than when they occur in the operation of a public law
enforcement agency. Ante, at 2 n. 2. Dismissing the inconvenience of \
being bused as a relatively inconsequential by-product of the remedial decree, JUSTICE POWELL suggests that desegregation decisions upholding
the District Court's broad remedial powers are less than fully applicable to
this case; he seems to regard the possibility thaa ome white troopers will
have their promotions delayed, ee id., at 4, as mandating a different and
more exacting standard of review.
I cannot agree that the applicability of the school desegregation cases in
determining the validity of any particular remedial solution fashioned by a
District Court and imposed on a State depends on detailed and inevitably
imprecise calculations of hardship. For me the relevant fact in this case is
that the remedial order was directed against a proven violator of the Constitution. Just as I believe that a uniform standard should govern our review of the merits of an equal protection claim, see Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190, 211 (1976) (STEVENS, J., concurring), so do I believe that a uniform standard should govern our review of all such decrees entered by District Courts. Of course, different violations require different remedies,
but they should be reviewed under the principles of equitable discretion set
forth in the school desegregation cases. "[A] school desegregation case
does riot differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right." Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971). The
District Court's task in each case is to "be guided by equitable principles.
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public
and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of the traditional
attributes of equity power." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294,
300 (1955) (footnotes omitted). Thus, the remedial issue in these cases is \
dramatically different from the question whether a statutory racial classification can be justified as a response to a past societal wrong. See
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537-539 (1980) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
~~~
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. - - ,
- - (1986), we concluded that the level of Fourteenth
Amendment "scrutiny does not change merely because the
challenged classification operates against a group that his- LA-~~
torically has not been subject to governmental discrimination." Thus, in evaluating the constitutionality of the ~~
District Court order in this case under the Fourteenth
Amendment, we must undertake a two-part inquiry. First,
we must decide whether the order is "supported by a compel- ~~
ling state purpose." I d., at - - . Second, we must scrutinize the order to ensure that "the means chosen to accomplish
that purpose are narrowly tailored." Ibid.
One cannot read the record in this case without concluding
that the Alabama Department of Public Safety had undertaken a course of action that amounted to "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct." Ante, at
- - . Because the government has a compelling interest in
remedying past and present discrimination by the Department, the District Court unquestionably had the authority to
fashion a remedy designed to end the Department's egregious history of discrimination. In doing so, however, the
District Court was obligated to fashion a remedy that was
narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose. The Court
today purports to apply strict scrutiny, and concludes that
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the order in this case was narrowly tailored for its remedial
purpose. Because the Court adopts a standardless view of
"narrowly tailored" far less stringent than that required by
strict scrutiny, I dissent.
As JUSTICE POWELL notes, this case is similar to Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. - - (1986). In Sheet
Metal Workers, I observed that "it is completely unrealistic
to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with
mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent
unlawful discrimination." I d., at - - . Thus, a rigid uota
i~ iJ!!~~b~ because it adopts "an unjustified conclusion
about tne preCise extent to which past discrimination has lingering effects, or . . . an unjustified prediction about what
would happen in the future in the absence of continuing discrimination." Ibid.
Even more flexible "goals," however,
also may trammel unnecessarily the rights of nonminorities.
Racially preferential treatment of nonvictims, therefore,
should only be ordered "where such remedies are truly necessary." Id., at--. Thus, "the creation of racial preferences by courts, even in the more limited form of goals rather
than quotas, must be done sparingly and only where manifestly necessary." Ibid.
In my view, whether characterized as a goal or a quota, the
District Court's order was not "manifestly necessary" to
achieve compliance with that court's previous orders. The
order at issue in this case clearly had one purpose, and one
purpose only-to compel the Department to develop a promotion procedure that would not have an adverse impact on
blacks. Although the Court and the courts below suggest
that the order also had the purpose of "eradicat[ing] the ill
effects of the Department's delay in producing" such a promotion procedure, ante, at - - , the District Court's subsequent implementation of the order makes clear that the order
cannot be defended on the basis of such a purpose.
The order imposed the promotion quota only until the
Department developed a promotion procedure that complied

l
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with the consent decrees. If the order were truly designed
to eradicate the effects of the Department's delay, the District Court would certainly have continued the use of the onefor-one quota even after the Department had complied with
the consent decrees. Consistent with the terms of the
order, once the Department developed a promotion procedure that did not have an adverse impact on blacks, the District Court suspended application of the quota. Under the
approved promotion procedure, 13 troopers were promoted
to corporal, of whom 3 (23.1%) were black. App. 160. The
result of this new procedure was the promotion of a lower
percentage of blacks than the purported goal of 25% black
representation in the upper ranks, and the promotion of
fewer blacks than even the Department's promotion proposal
rejected by the District Court. To ·say the least, it strains
credibility to view the one-for-one promotion quota as designed to eradicate the past effects of the Department's delay
when the quota was suspended once the Department developed a promotion procedure that promoted a lower percentage of blacks than the 25% black representation goal.
Moreover, even if the one-for-one quota had the purpose of
eradicating the effects of the Department's delay, this purpose would not justify the quota imposed in this case. "[T]he
relationship between the percentage of minority workers to
be [promoted] and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force" is of vital importance in considering the validity of a racial goal. Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, supra, at-- (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The onefor-one promotion quota used in this case far exceeded the
percentage of blacks in the trooper force, and there is no
evidence in the record that such an extreme quota was necessary to eradicate the effects of the Department's delay. The
Court attempts to defend this one-for-one promotion quota as
merely affecting the speed by which the Department attains
the goal of 25% black representation in the upper ranks.
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Ante, at - - . Such a justification, however, necessarily
eviscerates any notion of "narrowly tailored" because it has
no stopping point; even a 100% quota could be defended on
the ground that it merely "determined how quickly the Department progressed toward" some ultimate goal. Ante, at
- - . If strict scrutiny is to have any meaning, therefore, a
promotion goal must have a closer relationship to the percentage of blacks eligible for promotions. In this case the
District Court-and indeed this Court-provide no justification for the choice of a one-for-one promotion quota rather
than a lower quota. In my view, therefore, the order in this
case must stand or fall on its stated purpose of coercing the
Department to develop a promotion procedure without an adverse impact on black troopers.
Given the singular in terrorem purpose of the District
Court order, it cannot survive strict scrutiny. There is simply no justification for the use of racial preferences if the purpose of the order could be achieved without their use because
"[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit
any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Thus, to survive strict
scrutiny, the District Court order must fit with greater precision than any alternative remedy. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974). The District Court had available
several alternatives that would have achieved full compliance
with the consent decrees without trammeling on the rights of
nonminority troopers. The court, for example, could have
appointed a trustee to develop a promotion procedure that
would satisfy the terms of the consent decrees. By imposing
the trustee's promotion procedure on the Department until
the Department developed an alternative promotion procedure that complied with the consent decrees, the District
Court could have enforced the decrees without the use of racial preferences. Alternatively, the District Court could
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have found the recalcitrant Department in contempt of court,
and imposed stiff fines or other penalties for the contempt.
Surely, some combination of penalties could have been
designed that would have compelled compliance with the consent decrees.
The District Court, however, did not discuss these options
or any other alternatives to the use of a racial quota. Not a
single alternative method of achieving compliance with the
consent decrees is even mentioned in the District Court's
opinion-with the exception of an even more objectionable
100% racial quota. See Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp.
72, 75, n. 1 (MD Ala 1983). What is most disturbing about
the District Court's order, therefore, is not merely that it
implicitly or explicitly rejected two particular options, but
that the District Court imposed the m:omotion quota without
consideration of any of the available alternatives. Even in
Sheet Metal Workers, supra, the District Court had "considere? the efficacy of altern~tive rem~dies" before imposing a
racial quota. I d., at - - , see also td., at - - (POWELL, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus,
the Court was able to evaluate the claim that the racial quota
was "necessary." Without any exploration of the available
alternatives in the instant case, no such evaluation is possible. Remarkably, however, the Court-purporting to apply
"strict scrutiny"-concludes that the order in this case was
narrowly tailored for a remedial purpose.
Although the Court states that it is merely "respect[ing]"
the "balancing process" of the District Court, ante, at--, it
wholly ignores the fact that no such "balancing process" took
place in this case. For even if, as the Court insists, the
District Court "'was in the best position to judge whether an
alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction, would have
been effective in ending [the] discriminatory practices,"'
ante, at - - (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U. S., at
- - (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)), the least that strict scrutiny requires is that the

I
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District Court expressly evaluate the available alternative
remedies. If a District Court order that is imposed after no
evident consideration of the available alternatives can survive strict scrutiny as narrowly tailored, the requirement
that a racial classification be "narrowly tailored" for a compelling state purpose has lost most of its meaning.
I have no quarrel with the Court's conclusion that the recalcitrance of the Department of Public Safety in complying
with the consent decrees was reprehensible. In its understandable frustration over the Department's conduct, however, the District Court ill!.posed a racial qu9ta without first
considering the effectiveness of alternatives that would have
a lesser effect on the rights of nonminority troopers. Because the District Court did not even consider the available
alternatives to ·a one-for-one promotion quota, and because
these alternatives would have successfully compelled the
Department to comply with the consent decrees, I must
respectfully dissent.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

~· . d~
J, ~ I
~,I'D

~

~·

join JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion , in its 8ntirety.

~

In my

view the remedy ordered by the District Court in this case
meets the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.

assessing a constitutional challenge to a racial
classification:
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does
not conflict with constitutional guarantees."
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 491 (1980)
(opinion of Burger, C.J.). There are two prongs
to this examination. First, any racial
classification "must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest," Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 u.s. 429, 432 (1984) ~ see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 u.s. 1, 11 (1967) ~ cf. Graham v.
Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage).
Second, the means chosen by the State to
effectuate its purpose must be "narrowly
tailored to the achievement of that goal."

I

.

2.

Fullilove, supra, at 480. Wyqant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 u.s. ___ ,
(1986).

. . ~~
. t h'IS case.
t h at examination
IS met In

The District Court

A

{N...~~~)
~~,
found that the Alabama Department of Public Safety engaged

"

"'

in "blatant and continuous" discrimination over a period
of many years.

r:

NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD

&.4.1-c. ~rh....v t:h.~_......_..J
Ala. 1972l ,j The District Court's

~ V/ - - - ; H....4../-~ Wl..
orde ~ ~o

~

is supported

~ ..L.~·-••&Jt-~1 ~~~ ~-~-

c;;iij2...

compelling see-i-e-tal interest ir:t compliance with the

"

~~. ~~ ~~-~~~C:: ~¥.•L~f( jUdgmePt S ~c:l.e..r.D l GGJ.J.l>-.q; .'\ See Sheet Metal Workers v. ~

~.
EEOC,

U.S. ___ , ___ (opinion of POWELL, J.). j
Workers,

Id. , at

Department~~

~~
~

s commitments under the Consent Agreements.

?

f!pj.-,9~~
~~~~· ?'

3.

The District Court, unlike the court in Sheet Metal
Workers, did not hold the defendants in contempt.

The

protracted history of this litigation nevertheless
supports the conclusion that the ~~+et ~ourt would have
been "powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had

__
lacked authority to establish a benchmark against which to

~~--~
measure progress in remedying the effects of ~
.A.

discrimination.

Sheet Metal Workers, supra,

at ~

In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is
~

narrowly ~ ilored to the achievement of its goal, I have

relied on five factors:

(i) the efficacy of alternative

remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii)
the relationship between the percentage of minority
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force;
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(iv} the availability of waiver provisions 1f the hiring ~#~v\
plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy
upon innocent third parties.

Sheet Metal Workers,

U.S., at ___(; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510(opinion of POWELL, J.).
District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion
.
~ .:? 1--e- ~
requirement only on~ccasion, when it ordered the

promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of
corporal in February 1984.

Because the Department

urgently needed at least fifteen additional ( corpor) ls, see

.)(Ut; t;

........ .,...

~e:

Prescott v. Paradise, 580 F. Supp., at 173, no remedy
~

~

short of a direct order to make promotions would have met

...L.z<:......4

1\

~
~-- . 7Z-. f).q.,f. C::.;"C·~·~ ~ J1u.:.v ~*
the.( :i..mm.99iat~ eriS.S. A. The one-for-one requirement has not1
1

~I

been applied to any subsequent promotions.

"has now proposed procedures

The Department

for making promotions to

5.

corporal and sergeant, and the District Court has
suspended the one-for-one requirement to allow the
Department to

~~~e the procedures.

If the Department

t\

proceeds in good faith to develop valid promotion

./~
/I)

procedures, the one-for-one requirement will not be

/\_

Q' ~
reimposed

..

...r

_Jil- ~
~~ ~
rtw.:- f?

as a result of any inevitable delay ~~
~

If the promotion order is reimposed, it will remain in
effect only until the Department proposes promotion
procedures that appear to have no adverse effect on
blacks.

The Department itself

' propo~,e
!L ~
a.--~
to adopt a fully

?
'

validated procedure for making promotions to corporal
within one year.

~ubsequent events have shown that it

takes far less time to propose promotion procedures that
appear likely to have little or no adverse

impact. ~

\

6.

-----· - - - -- ----

There is no dispute that the 25
related to the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant
workforce.

~

this case the one-for-one promotion

J

requirement also

j

percent

/

W7:tA-

goal~

~ reasonably

related to the ultimate 25

The Department's proposal to promote 11

white troopers and 4 black troopers to corporal would have
taken only a short step toward the ultimate goal.

If the

Department continued promoting blacks at this rate, it
would not reach its goal until there had been a complete
l

turnover of Department personnel.

In view of the

Department's long history of discrimination and its
~e

failure to develop an acceptable remedial

program, the District Court's order to take a longer first
step toward the goal did not violate the Equal Protection

'

.

7.

----~~~~~~~ e

.

%lf{&

District Court's order contains

significant elements of

flexib~~~~

applies

"'

only if qualified black candidates are available for
The ~ ¢ ourt, moreover, suspended the

promotion.
order as

s~n

~
-a-s the Department proposed procedures that

""
appeared likely to have no adverse impact on minority

(

applicants.

As in Sheet Metal Workers, "[a]n examination

of what has occurred in the litigation over the years

I
makes plain that the District Court has not enforced the

l

goal in [al rigid manner."

u.s.

__, __

(emphasis in

original).

~~~~

Finally, the effects on innocent white troopers are
1\

relatively diffuse.

Unlike layoffs, promotion

8.

requirements generally do not "impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and
do not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent
individuals.
476 U.S.

~ ~~-1
-;>

1)/

See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,

-

~ AlthotHJh~e

(1986)

.

(opinion of POWELL, J.).

a-,.,_~ ~

burden

o~ promotion goa],$~

~ ~

~-"-'-yc.c,..c...c..

<:......u.,

the burden

of hiring goals, is not diffused among society generally,
a.-"1~

it isj shdred by the nonminority employees over a period of

a.-.. ...,...._. te.J.time.

~nly

~I'

qualified minority applicants are eligible for

A

promotion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain
eligible to compete for the available promotions.
Although some white troopers will have their promotions

d~yed, it is lii';!Y to --be uncertain whether any
individual trooper, white or black, would have acheived a

...

9.

different rank, or would have acheived it at a different
time, but for the promotion requirement.
I continue to believe that the indiscriminate use of
race-conscious remedies violates the Equal Protection
Clause.

Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at

In this

case, however, I conclude that the District Court's order

~

was necessary to remedy longstanding and pervasive
~

discrimination against minorities.
I
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion.

In my view the

remedy ordered by the District Court in this case meets
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.

I have

stated what I believe to be the standard for assessing a
constitutional challenge to a racial classification:
"'Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does
not conflict with constitutional guarantees.'
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980)
(opinion of Burger, C.J.). There are two prongs
to this examination. First, any racial
classification 'must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest,' Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 u.s. 429, 432 (1984); see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. Graham v.
Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage).
Second, the means chosen by the State to
effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly
tailored to the achievement of that goal.'
Fullilove, supra, at 480." Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 u.s. ____, ____ (1986).

,

I•'

2.

The District Court's order of December 1983, that is
before us, clearly is justified by the compelling interest
in eliminating proven racial discrimination.

The District

Court repeatedly found that the Alabama Department of
Public Safety (the Department) engaged in blatant racial
discrimination over a period of many years.

NAACP v.

Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. 1972); Paradise v.
Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975);
Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD Ala.
1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD Ala.
1983).

A finding that an employer has engaged in

egregious constitutional or statutory violations
"establishes, without a doubt, a compelling governmental
interest sufficient to justify the imposition of a
racially classified remedy."

Local 28 of Sheet Metal

3.

Workers v. EEOC,
POWELL,

J.)

u.s.

__,

(1986)

<opinion of

(hereinafter Sheet Metal Workers).

The

Department, moreover, failed to comply with final orders
of the District Court and even failed to carry out its own
commitments under the Consent Agreements.

The District

Court, unlike the court in Sheet Metal Workers, did not
hold the defendants in contempt.

A formal contempt

finding, however, is not always a necessary prerequisite
to a court order of race-conscious relief.

As in Sheet

Metal Workers, the protracted history of this litigation
supports the conclusion that the court would have been
"powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had
lacked authority to establish a benchmark against which to
measure progress in remedying the effects of persistent
discrimination.

Id., at

4.

In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is
precisely fitted to the achievement of its goal, I have
relied on five factors:

(i) the efficacy of alternative

remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii)
the relationship between the percentage of minority
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority
group members in the relevant population or work force;
(iv) the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring
plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy
upon innocent third parties.
Klutznick, 448
J.).

u.s.

Id., at __; Fullilove v.

448, 510-511, 514 (opinion of POWELL,

The Court's opinion today makes clear that the

affirmative action ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was carefully structured -- "narrowly tailored" -- to

5.

achieve the goal of remedying the proven and continuing
discrimination.

I therefore will mention only certain

aspects of the plan before us.
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion
requirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the
promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of
corporal in February 1984.

Because the Department

urgently needed at least fifteen additional corporals, see
Paradise v. Prescott, 580 F. Supp. 171, 173 CMD Ala.
1983), no alternative remedy would have met the thenexisting need.

Given the findings of egregious

discrimination, the Department's long-standing resistance
to necessary remedies, and the exigent circumstances
presented to the District Court, the imposition of a one-

6.

for-one requirement on the particular promotions at issue
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court's order contains significant
elements of flexibility and fairness.

First, the order

applies only if qualified black candidates are available
for promotion.

Second, the District Court suspended the

order when the Department proposed procedures that
appeared likely to have no adverse impact on minority
applicants.

It thus appears that the District Court's

order is based upon "realistic expectations," and that the
one-for-one requirement is likely to be, as the District
Court intended, a "one-time occurrence."
Prescott, supra, at 75-76.

Paradise v.

As in Sheet Metal Workers,

"[a]n examination of what has occurred in the litigation
over the years makes plain that the District Court has not

7.

enforced the goal in [a) rigid manner."

u.s.

(emphasis in original).
Finally, and particularly important, the effects of
the order on innocent white troopers are relatively
diffuse.

Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion

requirement at issue in this case does not "impose the
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular
individuals," and does not disrupt seriously the lives of
innocent individuals.
Education, supra, at

See Wygant v. Jackson Board of
(opinion of POWELL, J.).

Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion
goal, as in this case, is not diffused among society
generally, the burden is shared by the nonminority
employees over a period of time.

As noted above, only

qualified minority applicants are eligible for promotion,

8.

and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible to
compete for the available promotions.

Although some white

troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is
uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black,
would have achieved a different rank, or would have
achieved it at a different time, but for the promotion
requirement.
I continue to believe that the indiscriminate use of
race-conscious remedies violates the Equal Protection
Clause.

Sheet Metal Workers, supra, at

In this

case, however, I conclude that the District Court's order
was reasonably necessary to remedy longstanding and
pervasive discrimination against minorities.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
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Justice White
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constitu" 'Any pre renee based on racial or eth · criteria must
necessarily eceive a most searchi
examination to
make sure th t it does not confli with constitutional
guarantees.'
llilove v. Klut tck, 448 U. S. 448, 491
(1980) (opinion of rger, C. . . There are two prongs
to this examination. F' st, any racial classification
'must be justified by
ompelling governmental interest,' Palmore v. Si i, 66 U. S. 429, 432 (1984); see
Loving v. Virgini , 388 U. . 1, 11 (1967); cf. Graham v.
Richardson, 4 U. S. 365,
(1971) (alienage). Second, the me s chosen by the St e to effectuate its purpose mus e 'narrowly tailored t the achievement of
that go .' Fullilove, supra, at 480. Wygant v. Jackson oard of Education, 476 U. S.
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ment) engaged,. in -blatan~ racial discriminat' n
over a per o of many years. NAACP v. Allen, 3 F.
Supp. 703, 70 MD Ala. 1972); Paradise v. Dotha , Civ.
Action No. 3561- (MD Ala., Aug. 5, 1975); P radise v.
Shoemaker, 470 F. S
. 439, 442 (MD Ala. 19 ); Paradise
v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp~2, 74 (MD Ala. 1 ). A finding
that an employer has enga~~ in egregio constitutional or
statutory violations "establish~, witho a doubt, a compelling governmental interest suffic
o justify the imposition
of a racially classified remedy." 'b cal 28 of Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC,-- U. . - - ,
(1986) (opinion of
POWELL, J.) (hereinafter
eet Metal Wo ers). The Department, moreover, fa' d to comply with fina rders of the
District Court and e en failed to carry out its o
commitments under the nsent Agreements. The Distri Court,
unlike the cou ·n Sheet Metal Workers, did not hold e de,,....,,.__..L<.....-1:- •__
fendants inc tempt. A formal contempt finding, howe er,
is not alw s a necessary prerequisite to
-,r
~
race-con ·cious relief. As in Sheet Metal Workers, the pro
tracte history of this litigation supports the conclusion that
the ourt would have been "powerless to provide an effective
edy" if it had lacked authority to establish a benchmark
gainst which to measure progress in remedying the effects
_
. ~isrent-di -· · ·
~ In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is
~ Ll- ~
111.. ~ (API=egisely fitted to the achievement of its goal, I have r.elied,..('" ~ ~~ ~
~
~e-fagtan;: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the
0~ ...t.-t_
planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between
·~ ~- _• _ ..... .4 :
the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the
~~
percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of waiver provisions
if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the
remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at - - ; Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 510-511, 514 (opinion of PowELL, J.). The Court's opinion today makes clear that the affirmative action ordered by the District Court and approved
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by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit w Qare ~-;--..___.:__ _ __
"" ~ ~~=="narroWly tatlUI e~ to achieve the al of
c;-remedying the proven and continuing discrimination. I
.
~ will mention only certain aspects of the plan before
~

us.

The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion requirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed
at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott
~
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), o a erna 1ve remedy
~~hi
would have met the then-existing nee . Given the findings
~ ... 0 ~ oL.C . "
·~~'if·~ discrimination, the Department's long-standing
resistance to necessary remedies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the District Court, the imposition of a
one-for-one requirement .q(l the particular promotions at
issue did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court's order contains significant elements of
flexibility and fairness. First, the oPee.r""applies only if quali- <-~
fied black candidates are available for promotion. Second,
the ~pi.Qt..,eOurt suspended the order when the Department
proposed procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse
impact on minority applicants. It thus appears that the ~
~iet jtourt's order is based upon "realistic expectations," aJ?-d
that the one-for-one requirement is likely to be, as the Dts :;Jr
~ </ourt intended, a "one-time occurrence." Paradise v.
Prescott, supra, at 75-76. As in Sheet Metal Workers, "(a]n ;;J;,.
examination of what has occurred in the litigation over the
years makes plain that the District Court has not enforced
the goal in [a] rigid manner." --U.S.--,-- (emphasis in original).
Finally, and particularly important, the effectf ofthe order
on innocent white troopers~,felativeiy diffuse. Unlike
layoff requirements, the promotiOn requirement at issue in
this case does not "impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals," ·and does not disrupt
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seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, supra, at-- (opinion of PowELL, J.). Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not diffused among society generally, the burden is shared by the nonminority employees
over a period of time. As noted above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for promotion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible to compete for the available
promotions. Although some white troopers will have their
promotions delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual
trooper, white or black, would have achieved a different
rank, or would have achieved it at a different time, but for
the promotion requirement.
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No. 85-999
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. PHILLIP PARADISE, JR., ET AL.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In many respects this case is similar to Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,-- U.S.-- (1986). Here, as in that case,
racial discrimination had been continued for many years in
contravention of repeated decisions of the District Court.
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. (1972);
Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug
5, 1975); Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD
Ala. 1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD
Ala. 1983). There are differences. Sheet Metal Workers involved an action under Title VII, and here the courts below
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 Also, in
Sheet Metal Workers the District Court had finally cited the
union for contempt. This difference is of no importance
where, as here, it has been established beyond question that
the Department of Public Safety had engaged in persistent
violation of constitutional rights and repeatedly failed to
carry out court orders. In such circumstances there is a
"compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the
imposition of a racially classified remedy." Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--.
' Although we need not resolve the question in this case, I have not
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection casesthough similar-are identical.
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I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted history of this litigation justifies the conclusion that the "onefor-one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. It is reasonable to conclude that the District Court would have been
"powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had lacked
authority to establish a benchmark against which to measure
progress in remedying the effects of the discrimination. I d.,
at--.
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is
narrowly drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five
factors may be relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the plam1ed duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v)
the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at
- - ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 510-511, 514
(opinion of POWELL, J.). 2 The Court's opinion today makes
clear that the affirmative action ordered by the District
Court and approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit was narrowly drawn to achieve the goal of remedying
the proven and continuing discrimination. In view of the
Court's thorough opinion, I will mention only certain aspects
of the plan before us.
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion requirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed
JUSTICE STEVEN's concurring opinion relies primarily on school desegregation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). Although these cases are broadly relevant,
they differ significantly from the Court's subsequent affirmative action decisions. No desegregation decree denied any child the right to attend public school. Apart from the inconvenience of being bused, the children suffered no detriment. As the Court noted in Swann, id., at 29-30, busing
had been common for years in many school districts in this country.
2
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at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott,
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), there appears to have

been no alternative remedy that would have met the then-existing need. Given the findings of persistent discrimination,
the Department's long-standing resistance to necessary remedies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the District Court, the imposition of a one-for-one requirement for
the particular promotions at issue did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
The District Court's order contains significant elements of
flexibility and fairness. First, it applies only if qualified
black candidates are available for promotion. Second, the
court suspended the order when the Department proposed
procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse impact on
minority applicants. It thus appears that the court's order is
based upon "realistic expectations," and that the one-for-one
requirement is likely to be, as the court intended, a "one-time
occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, supra, at 75-76. The
court's actions indicate that the order will be enforced in a
constitutional manner if it is reimposed. As in Sheet Metal
Workers, "[a]n examination of what has occurred in the litigation over the years makes plain that the District Court has
not enforced the goal in [a] rigid manner." - - U. S. - - ,
- - (emphasis in original).
Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order
on innocent white troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse.
Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at
issue in this case does not "impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and does
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, --U.S. - - ,
--(opinion of POWELL, J.). Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not diffused among society generally, the burden is shared by the
nonminority employees over a period of time. As noted
above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for pro-
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motion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible
to compete for the available promotions. Although some
white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would
have achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a
different time, but for the promotion requirement.
In view of the purpose and indeed the explicit language of
the Equal Protection Clause, court-ordered or governmentadopted affirmative action plans must be most carefully scrutinized. The Court, in its opinion today, has done this. I
therefore join the opinion.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In many respects this case is similar to Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,-- U.S.-- (1986). Here, as in that case,
racial discrimination had been continued for many years in
contravention of repeated decisions of the District Court.
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (MD Ala. (1972);
Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug
5, 1975); Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD
Ala. 1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD
Ala. 1983). There are differences. Sheet Metal Workers involved an action under Title VII, and here the courts below
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 Also, in
Sheet Metal Workers the District Court had finally cited the
union for contempt. This difference is of no importance
where, as here, it has been established beyond question that
the Department of Public Safety had engaged in persistent
violation of constitutional rights and repeatedly failed to
carry out court orders. In such circumstances there is a
"compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the
imposition of a racially classified remedy." Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--.
'Although we need not resolve the question in this case, I have not
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection casesthough similar-are identical.
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I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted history of this litigation justifies the conclusion that the "onefor-one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. It is reasonable to conclude that the District Court would have been
"powerless to provide an effective remedy" if it had lacked
authority to establish a benchmark against which to measure
progress in remedying the effects of the discrimination. I d.,
at--.
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is
narrowly drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five
factors may be relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v)
the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at
- - ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448·, 510-511, 514
(opinion of POWELL, J.). 2 The Court's opinion today makes
2

Our decisions make clear that all government-imposed affirmative action plans must be closely scrutinized because "[r]acial classifications are
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Because racial distinctions are inherently suspect whether they are imposed by a legislature or a court, we
have never measured court-ordered affirmative action remedies against a
less demanding standard.
JUSTICE STEVENS's concurring opinion relies primarily on school desegregation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1972). See post, at--. Although these cases are
broadly relevant, they differ significantly from the Court's subsequent affirmative action decisions. To be sure, a pupil who is bused from a neighborhood school to a comparable school in a different neighborhood m
inconvenienced. Indeed, I have said
a e x ens1ve pup1l transportation may threaten liberty or privacy interests." Washington v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 492 n. 6. But the position of bused pupils is far different from that of employees who are laid off or denied promotion. Court-ordered busing does not deprive students of any race of an
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clear that the affirmative action ordered by the District
Court and approved by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit was narrowly drawn to achieve the goal of remedying
the proven and continuing discrimination. In 'view of the
Court's thorough opinion, I will mention only certain aspects
of the plan before us.
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion requirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed
at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott,
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), there appears to have
been no alternative remedy that would have met the then-existing need. Given the findings of persistent discrimination,
the Department's long-standing resistance to necessary remedies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the District Court, the imposition of a one-for-one requirement for
the particular promotions at issue did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
The District Court's order contains significant elements of
flexibility and fairness. First, it applies only if qualified
black candidates are available for promotion. Second, the
court suspended the order when the Department proposed
procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse impact on
minority applicants. It thus appears that the court's order is
based upon "realistic expectations," and that the one-for-one
requirement is likely to be, as the court intended, a "one-time
occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, supra, at 75-76. The
court's actions indicate that the order will be enforced in a
equal opportunity for an education. Cf. University of California Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 2f35, 300 n. 39 (1978) (opinion of PowELL, J.) (distinguishing bused pupil from applicant denied admission to medical school).
Moreover, as the Court noted in Swann, busing had been common for
years in many schools districts throughout the country. 402 U. S., at
29-30. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189,
243 n. 22 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutional manner if it is reimposed. As in Sheet Metal
Workers, "[a]n examination of what has occurred in the litigation over the years makes plain that the District Court has
not enforced the goal in [a] rigid manner." - - U. S. - - ,
--(emphasis in original).
Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order
on innocent white troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse.
Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at
issue in this case does not "impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and does
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, --U.S. - - ,
- - (opinion of POWELL, J. ). Although the burden of a narrowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not diffused among society generally, the burden is shared by the
nonminority employees over a period of time. As noted
above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for promotion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible
to compete for the available promotions. Although some
white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would
have achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a
different time, but for the promotion requirement.
In view of the purpose and indeed the explicit language of
the Equal Protection Clause, court-ordered or governmentadopted affirmative action plans must be most carefully scrutinized. The Court, in its opinion today, has done this. I
therefore join the opinion.
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[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In many respects this case is similar to Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. - - (1986). Here, as in that case,
racial discrimination had been continued for many years in
contravention of repeated decisions of the District Court.
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703,705 (MD Ala. 1972); Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (MD Ala., Aug 5,
1975); Paradise v. Shoemaker, 470 F. Supp. 439, 442 (MD
Ala. 1979); Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (MD
Ala. 1983). There are differences. Sheet Metal Workers involved an action under Title VII, and here the courts below
found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 Also, in
Sheet Metal Workers the District Court had finally cited the
union for contempt. This difference is of no importance
where, as here, it has been established beyond question that
the Department of Public Safety had engaged in persistent
violation of constitutional rights and repeatedly failed to
carry out court orders. In such circumstances there is a
"compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the
imposition of a racially classified remedy." Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--.
Although we need not resolve the question in this case, I have not
thought the standards of analysis in Title VII and Equal Protection casesthough similar-are identical.
1
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I therefore agree with the Court that the protracted history of this litigation justifies the conclusion that the "onefor-one" promotion to corporal was appropriate. It is reasonable to conclude that the District Court would have been
"powerless to provide an effective remedy'' if it had lacked
authority to establish a benchmark against which to measure
progress in remedying the effects of the discrimination. I d.,
at--.
In determining whether an affirmative action remedy is
narrowly drawn to achieve its goal, I have thought that five
factors may be relevant: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or work force; (iv) the availability of
waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v)
the effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties. I d., at
- - ; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 510-511, 514
(1980) (opinion of PoWELL, J.). 2 The Court's opinion today
2

Our decisions make clear that all government-imposed affirmative action plans must be closely scrutinized because "[r]acial classifications are
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 537
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Because racial distinctions are inherently suspect whether they are imposed by a legislature or a court, we
have never measured court-ordered affirmative action remedies against a
less demanding standard.
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurring opinion relies primarily on school desegregation decisions such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1972). See post, at - . Although these cases are
broadly relevant, they differ significantly from the Court's subsequent affirmative action decisions. To be sure, a pupil who is bused from a neighborhood school to a comparable school in a different neighborhood may be
inconvenienced. Indeed, I have said that "[e]xtensive pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy interests." Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 492 n. 6 (1982). But the position of
bused pupils is far different from that of employees who are laid off or denied promotion. Court-ordered busing does not deprive students of any
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makes clear that the affirmative action ordered by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit was narrowly drawn to achieve the goal of
remedying the proven and continuing discrimination. In
view of the Court's thorough opinion, I will mention only certain aspects of the plan before us.
The District Court imposed the one-for-one promotion requirement only on one occasion, when it ordered the promotion of eight blacks and eight whites to the rank of corporal in
February 1984. Because the Department urgently needed
at least fifteen additional corporals, see Paradise v. Prescott,
580 F. Supp. 171, 173 (MD Ala. 1983), there appears to have
been no alternative remedy that would have met the then-existing need. Given the findings of persistent discrimination,
the Department's longstanding resistance to necessary remedies, and the exigent circumstances presented to the District
Court, the imposition of a one-for-one requirement for the
particular promotions at issue did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court's order contains significant elements of
flexibility and fairness. First, it applies only if qualified
black candidates are available for promotion. Second, the
court suspended the order when the Department proposed
procedures that appeared likely to have no adverse impact on
minority applicants. It 'thus appears that the court's order is
based upon "realistic expectations," and that the one-for-one
requirement is likely to be, as the court intended, a "one-time
occurrence." Paradise v. Prescott, supra, at 75-76. The
court's actions indicate that the order will be enforced in a
race of an equal opportunity for an education. Cf. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 300 n. 39 (1978) (opinion of POWELL,
J.) (distinguishing bused pupil from applicant denied admission to medical
school). Moreover, as the Court noted in Swann, busing had been common for years in many schools districts throughout the country. 402
U. S., at 29-30. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413
U. S. 189, 243 n. 22 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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constitutional manner if it is reimposed. As in Sheet Metal
Workers, "[a]n examination of what has occurred in this litigation over the years makes plain that the District Court has
not enforced the goal in [a] rigid manner." 478 U. S. - -·,
--(emphasis in original).
Finally, and particularly important, the effect of the order
on innocent white troopers is likely to be relatively diffuse.
Unlike layoff requirements, the promotion requirement at
issue in this case does not "impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals," and does
not disrupt seriously the lives of innocent individuals. See
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. - -, - (1986) (opinion of POWELL, J.). 3 Although the burden of a
narrowly prescribed promotion goal, as in this case, is not
diffused among society generally, the burden is shared by the
nonminority employees over a period of time. As noted
above, only qualified minority applicants are eligible for promotion, and qualified nonminority applicants remain eligible
to compete for the available promotions. Although some
white troopers will have their promotions delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would
have achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a
different time, but for the promotion requirement.
In view. of the purpose and indeed the explicit language of
the Equal Protection Clause, court-ordered or governmentadopted affirmative action plans must be most carefully scrutinized. The Court, in its opinion today, has done this. I
therefore join the opinion.

See generally Fallon and Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting
Models of Racial Justice,l984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 28-32 (contending that allocating the costs of affirmative action remedies raises separate issues of
fairness).
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